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Summary 
This thesis examines the changes in health governance at both global and country levels 
brought by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund), a 
self-described public/private partnership intended as a financing mechanism to achieve 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 6.  Since the G8 announced the Global Fund’s 
creation in 2001, it has succeeded in mobilising over US$30 bn in commitments, primarily 
from donor governments.    
This thesis is rooted in the ‘high politics’ of International Relations (IR), and in particular 
its literature on globalisation, governance and international institutions.  Where this 
literature has failures or gaps, it draws from the Development Studies and International 
Political Economy (IPE) literatures.  It also relies on key informant interviews undertaken 
in Geneva, Lilongwe and Zomba with executives of international institutions, and those 
involved in Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response including government representatives and staff 
from the National AIDS Commission, donors, NGOs and those working on the front line. 
This thesis relies on a descriptive, single case study to create a ‘thick’ narrative.  Rather 
than deriving generalisations, it provides a basis for further research into the nature and 
effects of systemic change in how health is governed that the Global Fund signals.   
This thesis makes three contributions to knowledge:  1) It provides a basis to evolve the IR 
literature on globalisation, governance and international institutions to consider the nature, 
significance and effects of the Global Fund as a form of institutional innovation which is 
disrupting the traditional multilateral order, particularly for international institutions 
working in health; 2) It challenges the use of the term ‘country ownership’ to mean 
‘putting the country in the driver’s seat’, and instead notes the double deficit in external 
accountability that arises when global politics and country evidence collide in a Global 
Fund convened elite, mediated space for country ownership; and 3) It synthesises 
observations from field work in Malawi on the exercise of the Global Fund’s authority and 
its dislocation from external accountability when failures occur.  The IR literature is silent 
on the rise of the Global Fund’s authority.  It fails to contend with the notion that country 
ownership is as much about the burden of responsibility as it is about agenda setting.  This 
highlights the dislocation between the loci for authority and accountability despite the 
Global Fund’s growing authoritative territorial claims. 
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Chapter 1 -  Introduction and Framework for the Inquiry 
1. Introduction 
[t]he AIDS virus swept across the world, silently, before we even knew it existed. 
The worldwide epidemic was well under way by 1981, when AIDS was first 
recognized and was given a name. Since then, six years have passed and it has 
taken these six years of discovery and struggle to learn enough to rise above the 
flood of ignorance and fear and view clearly the dimensions of this new threat to 
global health...Yet today, remarkably, only six years after the disease was first 
recognized, we do know enough to seize the initiative to stop AIDS (Mann 1987, 
‘Statement at an Informal Briefing on AIDS to the 42nd Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly’). 
In 1987 Jonathan Mann, the first Director of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
Global Program on AIDS declared that enough was known about HIV/AIDS to bring a halt 
to the pandemic.  Yet it was to take until 2001 for the international community to mobilise 
a coordinated response to HIV/AIDS, what Peter Piot (UNAIDS 2011, p. 23), Executive 
Director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) from 1995 to 
2008, described as an “inflection point.” This change at the millennium signalled not only 
the political intent by donor nations to address what had become a pandemic but also the 
acknowledgement that the scale of resources and the institutional response that would be 
necessary were unprecedented.   
Since 1981 when the United States Center for Disease Control (CDC) first recognised an 
unusual pneumonia killing homosexual men in the United States, UNAIDS estimates that 
more than 60 million people have been infected with HIV and nearly 30 million people 
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have died of HIV/AIDS related causes.  Out of 33.2 million people living with HIV/AIDS 
in 2011, 22.5 million were in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2010d, p. 23).  The numbers 
are staggering as is the acknowledgment that it took almost 20 years for the international 
community to mobilise a response (UNAIDS 2011, p. 15).   
…a defining feature of the first two decades of HIV was the common failure of 
leaders to put scientific knowledge to use…governmental inaction allowed the 
epidemic to become a global crisis, with especially harsh consequences in southern 
Africa (UNAIDS 2011, pp. 17 and 19). 
While, as Jonathan Mann noted, enough might have been known in 1987 to halt the 
epidemic, whether or not and how to do it were other matters. 
The creation of what would become The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (The Global Fund) was announced in a G8 communiqué (2001, ‘Communiqué, 
Genoa July 28’) a month after the June 2001 United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
Special Session (UNGASS) on HIV/AIDS committed to working with the private sector, 
Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and communities on a coordinated response to 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic (UNAIDS 2011, p. 23).  The Global Fund was a new type of 
institution, describing itself as a “…unique global public/private partnership dedicated to 
attracting and disbursing additional resources to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria. This partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector and 
affected communities represents a new approach to international health financing” (2010a, 
‘About the Global Fund’).  The international community had on its hands a pandemic of 
extraordinary proportions.  Its response signalled not only “a new approach to international 
health financing”, but also a departure from traditional multilateralism and the once 
unassailable authority of nation states (Bartsch 2007b, p. 5).   
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2. Framing the Inquiry 
The remainder of this chapter sets out the underlying structure for this thesis.  The first 
section frames the thesis, presenting the puzzle that serves as the foundation for the 
inquiry.  It goes on to provide the rationale for locating the thesis in International Relations 
(IR) and situating it in particular in the IR literature on globalisation, governance and 
international institutions. This section concludes by outlining the approach adopted for the 
inquiry including the two research questions that structured it.    
The second section outlines the descriptive, single case method.  It argues for why this 
method was chosen at this juncture in the Global Fund’s evolution and relative to the 
research questions at hand.  It describes the data and information that were collected 
including the conduct of key informant interviews in Geneva, Lilongwe and Zomba all of 
which ultimately contributed to the ‘thick’ narrative for the descriptive, single case. 
The last section reviews the literature that informs the thesis.  It describes where the IR 
literature on globalisation, governance and international institutions has gaps or fails to 
explore the dimensions necessary to respond adequately to the puzzle posed.  It also 
provides some definition for terms which are applied in this thesis which compensate for 
failures in the literature to describe the changes in global and country level health 
governance.  It concludes by outlining the contribution to knowledge that this thesis 
makes. 
The Puzzle 
The puzzle at the centre of this thesis seeks to understand how the Global Fund has so 
rapidly won legitimate authority at global and country levels even though the nature of its 
innovative design challenges liberal notions of legitimate state authority in the 
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international system.  It investigates how the Global Fund has changed global health 
governance by looking at the nature of the Global Fund as a form of institutional 
innovation with distinct sources of legitimacy from traditional multilaterals like the WHO.  
It examines how the Global Fund’s governance affects what is ‘country owned’.  It finds 
evidence that its systems of accountability do not keep step with its rapidly growing 
authority at global and country levels.  It asserts that, as revealed by Malawi’s failed 2009 
National Strategy Application, this disconnect results in a troubling double deficit in 
external accountability where accountability accrues to donor governments, but not to 
those whose lives the Global Fund affects.  It finds that while the Global Fund may signal 
an emerging order which pushes the boundaries of traditional state-centric models of 
legitimate authority, failures reveal that the dissonance between the loci for authority and 
accountability have yet to be resolved. 
The Location 
In order to set a context for this research and analyse how the Global Fund has effected 
change at global and country levels, this thesis is located in IR from which it draws on the 
literature on globalisation, governance and international institutions.  Where this main 
literature has gaps or has yet to evolve, the arguments and analysis in this thesis rely on 
other disciplines. These include the literatures on global and country level public health 
policy which straddle IR, Development Studies and International Political Economy 
(IPE)—in the case of the latter particularly with respect to HIV/AIDS—and the policy 
literatures including those by international institutions and research institutes.   
With the emergence of globalisation, the IR discipline is shifting from its traditional point 
of reference--the realist-positivist focus on the authority of the nation state and state-
governed global institutions. However, a new point of reference has yet to take shape.  
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This means that the IR literature lacks a robust foundation for analysing how the Global 
Fund both challenges traditional notions of legitimate authority and has captured 
significant authority at global and country levels in a short period of time.  Similarly the IR 
literature has yet to offer a basis from which to examine the consequences of the Global 
Fund’s new sources of legitimacy, and its weak accountability link. Consequently a more 
eclectic approach to the literature has been taken in this analysis. 
This thesis could have been situated differently in two main ways.  First, it could have used 
a meta-theoretical perspective.  This framing was rejected in favour of a literature-based 
approach primarily because the rise of the Global Fund and its effects at global and 
country levels is an emergent phenomenon which lacks the stability or maturity that would 
benefit the structure of an epistemological lens.  For example, this thesis concerns the 
departure of an international institution from a state-centred governance model and the 
effects of the inclusion of non-state actors and their elite character on aspects of 
legitimacy, accountability and authority for Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy and 
its country-based systems for drug financing and supply.  Consequently, the thesis could 
be framed with a neo-realist focus on the pursuit of hegemonic interests through 
international institutions.  While this framing would serve to analyse aspects of the Global 
Fund such as its resource mobilisation, it would not provide sufficient breadth to explain 
its form of institutional innovation holistically.  For example, the thesis uses the work of 
neo-institutionalists, accepting Keohane and Nye’s (1977, p. 24) description of complex 
interdependence where “actors other than states participate directly in world politics.”  It 
also both draws on and challenges constructivist views on how non-state actors such as 
NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have ‘socially’ shaped the Global Fund and 
Malawi’s country context.  Given the Global Fund’s emergent nature, a meta-theoretical 
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framing of the thesis would have precluded or limited the flexibility offered by locating the 
analysis in the IR literature on globalisation, governance and international institutions. 
The second way of situating this thesis would have been to locate it within IPE.  IPE suits 
the analysis of the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic because it facilitates linking 
epidemiology, for example rates of prevalence, incidence and mortality, to economic 
impact such as slowed economic growth or damaged national factor markets such as 
labour.  As argued by Poku and Whiteside (2004, p. xxii), “…the pandemic is reshaping 
social, political and economic life in a way that have [sic] not been witnessed previously.” 
IPE is not ignored in this thesis as the chapters which discuss the magnitude of the Global 
Fund’s resource mobilisation and the extent of Malawi’s aid dependence indicate but using 
it as a the point for inquiry may have precluded a more robust analysis on the nature and 
effects of the Global Fund’s governance. 
With its focus on institutional innovation within traditional multilateralism and the 
implications for governance, including aspects of legitimacy, accountability and authority, 
this thesis locates itself in the IR discipline and draws on its literature of globalisation, 
governance and international institutions. Necessarily it draws on other disciplines 
including IPE.  The IR discipline and a literature based approach provides a robust and 
flexible foundation from which to analyse the Global Fund as a form of institutional 
innovation and an emergent phenomenon with implications for global and country level 
governance of the HIV/AIDS response. 
The Approach 
The inquiry that became this thesis began with curiosity about the Global Fund as a 
‘different’ global institution, one that was succeeding in mobilising significant funds for 
three diseases, with strong political support from wealthy and powerful states and a self-
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proclaimed public/private model.  This curiosity was fuelled by the author’s professional 
background which includes academic study of and experience in the design of ‘greenfield’ 
organisations and a recognition that institutional innovation of this nature rarely occurs 
within the multilateral order.   
The approach to this thesis was shaped by two research questions: 
1. How has the Global Fund changed global health governance and what are the 
implications for traditional multilateralism, particularly its sources of 
legitimacy, authority and accountability? 
2. How has the Global Fund’s governance affected what is ‘country owned’ with 
respect to Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response and in particular Malawi’s HIV/AIDS 
prevention strategy and what are the implications for accountability to those 
whose lives are affected? 
Following the structure of the two research questions the thesis includes two areas of 
empirical analysis.  The first area focuses on the Global Fund’s design and makes a case 
for its model as a form of institutional innovation distinct from traditional multilateral 
organisations like the WHO.  The second area of empirical analysis describes Malawi’s aid 
reliance, the nature of its health system and its response to its HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Both 
these analyses inform the literature based discussions on aspects of governance which 
follow them.   
In addition to the IR literature on globalisation, governance and international institutions 
and the complementary IPE literature, this thesis draws key informant interviews with staff 
of the Global Fund and international institutions in Geneva including the WHO, UNAIDS, 
UNDP, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), Roll Back Malaria 
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and Stop TB and government representatives, staff of NGOs, aid agencies and local 
consultants to these organisations in Malawi.  A list of all those interviewed is included on 
page 279.   Lastly, policy documents including those authored for and by the Government 
of Malawi, international institutions such as the World Bank and UNAIDS and research 
institutions such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) were an important resource. 
The field work conducted in Malawi brought to light the case of Malawi’s failed National 
Strategy Application and the feedback provided by the Global Fund’s Technical Review 
Panel (TRP) on Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy.  This case was selected because 
it highlights the dissonance between the Global Fund’s loci for authority and 
accountability which its global and country level governance models have failed to 
resolve.  It also highlights the elite nature of country ownership, a departure from claims of 
inclusiveness meant to imply an association with liberal democratic values of broader 
participation of non-state actors in decision making and agenda setting.  The use of a 
descriptive, single case in this research is discussed in more detail in the next section on 
methodology.  A detailed discussion on the literatures applied to this research concludes 
the chapter. 
3. Devising the Method 
The Suitability and Value of a Descriptive, Single Case Study 
The context and nature of this inquiry suits a descriptive rather than a cause and effect 
research design.  Yin (2003, p. 23) noted that many investigations have as their main 
objective description rather than explanation where the ‘theory’ “covers the scope and 
depth of the object being described.” A descriptive approach for this IR located research 
was chosen for several reasons:   
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1. First the Global Fund lacks a comparator.  Therefore there is no counterfactual 
against which to compare the Global Fund’s effects or its effects in Malawi.  
Further, because of the considerable complexity of Malawi’s HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
it is premature to isolate and select variables to compare either with another 
country or in a ‘before’ and ‘after’ scenario within Malawi. 
2. Second, the country level research and analysis that has been done is largely in the 
domain of IPE or the product of population health evaluations because these data 
are available and accessible and the cause and effect arguments can be made.  For 
example the increase in the number of people on treatment or a decrease in 
mortality due to HIV/AIDS can be monitored for in-country trends and inter-
country comparison.  IR as a location for investigation is informed by these data, 
but not wholly.  
3. Third the Global Fund’s creation and the international community’s efforts to 
address the HIV/AIDS pandemic is a nascent phenomenon, one that is in the 
process of maturing rather than one that is subject to summative analysis.  In part 
this is due to the nature of the HIV/AIDS pandemic where “the full effects…on 
mortality and orphanhood take decades to unfold” (Poku and Whiteside 2004, p. 
xxi).  It is also because endemic countries’ ability to respond is recent.  Malawi for 
example began to scale up its HIV/AIDS response only in 2004 when it received its 
first Global Fund grant. 
4. Lastly, because of the unique and formative nature of the Global Fund and its 
political effects at global and country levels, there is value in developing a more 
robust understanding of the complex context and variables that explain how change 
is occurring and how further research might take shape. 
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A descriptive case study at this juncture in the Global Fund’s evolution and Malawi’s 
HIV/AIDS response suits the nature and maturity of these phenomena and can inform 
reliable and valid future research by uncovering a more refined understanding of the 
variables at play. 
There is debate among scholars as to the validity of a single case study approach used in 
this research.  Most famously, Lijphart (1971, p. 683) favours what he describes as 
“scientific explanation” provided by the experimental, statistical and comparative research 
methods which share, “1) the establishment of general empirical relationships among two 
or more variables, while 2) all other variables are controlled, that is, held constant.”  
Lijphart (1971, p. 691) goes on, somewhat begrudgingly, to acknowledge the value of 
other research approaches including the descriptive, single case study:  “The great 
advantage…of focusing on a single case [is] that the case can be intensively 
examined…The scientific status of the case study method is somewhat 
ambiguous…because…a single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid 
generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization.”  Lijphart 
(1971, p. 691) continues his tempered enthusiasm by claiming that “[p]urely descriptive 
case studies do have great utility as basic data-gathering operations, and can thus 
contribute indirectly to theory-building.”  Lijphart’s preference for the comparative 
method is appreciated for its ability to isolate cause and effect and explain change; 
however, this author argues that it is ill-suited to researching the effects of the Global Fund 
at this stage in its evolution.  This thesis is not an attempt to validate or disprove a 
generalisation as none exist.  Rather, a descriptive, single case study is an essential step in 
furthering research of a nascent phenomenon which operates in complex global and 
national contexts. 
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More recently some scholars have become proponents for the validity of descriptive, single 
case studies.  Campbell (1966, pp. 6-7) for example recanted his early research orthodoxy 
where “[a]ny appearance of absolute knowledge, or intrinsic knowledge about singular 
isolated objects, is found to be illusory upon analysis.”  Instead he came to promote the 
value of a descriptive, single case study as imperfect, but as “…all that we have. It is the 
only route to knowledge--noisy, fallible, and biased though it be. We should be aware of 
its weaknesses, but must still be willing to trust it if we are to go about the process of 
comparative (or monocultural) social science at all” (Campbell 1975, p. 179).  Flyvbjerg 
(2006, pp. 223-4) took things farther, claiming that “[s]ocial science has not succeeded in 
producing general, context-independent theory and, thus, has in the final instance nothing 
else to offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge. And the case study is especially 
well suited to produce this knowledge.”  This investigation of the Global Fund and its 
effects within traditional multilateralism and in Malawi intends to grapple with the 
“complexities and contradictions of real life… [where]…a particularly “thick” and hard-to-
summarize narrative is not a problem…[but] a sign that the study has uncovered a 
particularly rich problematic” (Flyvbjerg 2006, pp. 223-4).  In other words, the descriptive, 
single case study on Malawi contributes to knowledge on how the departure of an 
international institution from a state-centred governance model affects aspects of its 
legitimacy, accountability and authority and has implications at country level as Malawi’s 
failed National Strategy Application and the TRP’s feedback on its HIV/AIDS prevention 
strategy shows. 
Research Design and the Descriptive Case Study ‘Theory’ 
According to Yin (2003, p. 23), the ‘theory’ of a descriptive case study is derived by 
defining what the description should include rather than collecting data about ‘everything’.  
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The inspiration for this research—to know more about the Global Fund including how its 
governance is institutionally innovative, how it has matured organisationally and its global 
and country level effects—did not give rise to a comparative theory testing hypothesis but 
one where the premise is laid by the research questions. 
The two research questions for this thesis outlined earlier in this chapter--one that focused 
on how the Global Fund has changed global health governance and the implications for 
traditional multilateralism and one that focused on how the Global Fund’s governance has 
affected ‘country ownership’ particularly with respect to Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention 
strategy--set the parameters for the descriptive case ‘theory’.   
Malawi was selected as the site for the descriptive single case for several reasons.  First, 
the Global Fund is the primary funder of Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response.  While the United 
States is a development partner and there is the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) funding in the country, the Global Fund dominates by a significant 
margin.  Second, Malawi is a highly HIV/AIDS endemic country so its government and 
donors are motivated to effect change.  Third, Malawi has been politically stable and 
efforts to address its HIV/AIDS epidemic have not for the period of this study been unduly 
complicated by conflict, migration, food insecurity and other macro-environmental effects.  
Lastly, as a practical consideration, English is the language of government in Malawi 
which facilitated the analysis of documentation. 
For each of the two research questions a list of sub-propositions and rival sub-propositions 
were developed (see p. 263) and these formed the basis for the key informant interview 
structure and questions (Patton 2002, pp. 344).  For example at global level the 
propositions sought to establish if there were clear leadership roles among international 
institutions for aspects of the global health agenda, if the Global Fund had changed the 
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division of labour for health among multilaterals and whether or not the Global Fund had 
affected the resource mobilisation strategies of other global health institutions.  In total 38 
interviews were conducted primarily in Geneva and Lilongwe and their transcripts were 
“organized into readable narrative descriptions with major themes, categories and 
illustrative case examples extracted through content analysis” (Patton 2002, pp. 5).  This 
approach allowed for exploration of the narrative territory between the sub-proposition and 
its rival which in turn informed the development of the descriptive case.  A pure theory 
testing approach would have precluded this type of analysis (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 237).  The 
field research was complemented by analysis of the literatures and documents as described 
in the literature review section of this chapter.  Together, the key informant interviews in 
the field and the analysis of literature and documents created the ‘thick’, descriptive, single 
case examining Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application and the TRP’s feedback on 
its HIV/AIDS prevention strategy. 
The descriptive, single case study approach used in this thesis provides rich ground for 
further research, particularly research that might develop theory related to how the Global 
Fund has changed global health governance or test theory on the definition and practice of 
country ownership in specific donor/recipient contexts.  Future work might also take a 
normative path, comparing and developing governance mechanisms and approaches to 
address the external accountability gap (outlined in Chapter 5).  Lastly, there is rich ground 
for more local research on how the effects of the double deficit in external accountability 
play out.  The descriptive, single case in this thesis is a platform to better formulate 
hypotheses related to the Global Fund as a form of institutional innovation within the 
traditional multilateral order and its governance effects at global and country levels. 
4. Synthesising Literatures  
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This thesis is concerned with the emergence of the Global Fund as a new type of institution 
in the multilateral context, how its legitimacy, accountability and authority are created and 
conferred and the implications this has for its multilateral partners at global level and the 
notion of ‘country ownership’ in the case of Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy.  The 
thesis is situated in IR, yet the IR global governance literature fails to adequately deal with 
four critical factors related to this inquiry: 
1. First, the IR literature has yet to evolve to a point where it has refined its 
terminology and language to adequately describe the departure from a realist-
positivist world of the nation state and state-governed global institutions to one 
where the boundaries blur between state and non-state and national and 
international spheres.  This thesis challenges terms used frequently in the policy 
domain such as ‘country ownership’ to imply liberal democratic values which do 
not necessarily bear out in practice.  Instead this thesis describes a mediated space 
for country ownership.  The changes in the international order which the Global 
Fund both exemplifies and furthers lack terminology and language in IR 
scholarship which are without ambiguity. 
2. The Global Fund is a new institutional form but the literature fails to adequately 
analyse how it differs from traditional multilateral institutions such as the WHO.  
The early literature on Global Public Private Partnerships in health (for example, 
Buse and Walt 2000a and 2000b; Buse and Waxman 2001; Caines et al. 2004) 
addresses the emergence of new organisational models, but fails to explain the 
Global Fund’s unique design which underpins its sources of legitimacy and strong 
internal but weak external accountability model.  The IR literature on international 
institutions has so far focused on traditional ‘states as members’ models and does 
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not contend with the nature, significance or the effects of the Global Fund as a form 
of institutional innovation within the traditional multilateral order. 
3. The current IR literature takes the ‘global’ as its point of reference largely ignoring 
the country lens as an analytical view into the interplay between the national, the 
transnational and the supranational.  The Global Fund has significant influence on 
recipient countries, but the IR literature ignores the tensions between the politics of 
‘country ownership’, the aid relationship and the elite nature of country-level health 
policy making.  The consequences when global politics and country evidence 
collide provide rich ground for exploring the ambiguous and unaccountable nature 
of a ‘national public sphere’ beyond the state.  The IR literature has yet to address 
the governance problems of this Global Fund convened mediated space for country 
ownership. 
4. As the Global Fund matures, its authority at global and country levels has grown. 
However, its governance model has not kept step.  What is emerging is a troubling 
gap between its authority and its accountability particularly as it plays out when 
failures occur.  The IR literature is silent on the rise of the Global Fund’s authority 
and how it is exercised.  The Development Studies literature informs the analysis of 
country-level authority, but neither literature contends with the blurring of 
boundaries between public legitimacy and private power (Slaughter 2004a, p. 169) 
and the challenge of articulating where these boundaries might lie and who draws 
them.  The literatures do not contend with the ambiguities inherent in the ‘national 
sphere’ or explore the problem of the Global Fund’s weak authority-accountability 
link. 
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The next four sections address how the thesis’ arguments were contextualised within the 
existing literatures, identifying the gaps in the IR literature and the additional sources that 
were used to create a robust analysis. 
Describing Change 
This thesis grapples with several terms that indicate a changing system of institutional 
governance and political effects.  It attempts to describe the gaps between concepts and 
practices on the ground.  This section will describe terms used in this thesis including those 
that reflect change and which have yet to be assumed by IR scholarship. 
First, traditional multilateralism refers to a state-centred form of global governance which 
perpetuates “the dominance of states at the top of the hierarchical state system” (Knight 
2001, p. 15).  This thesis refers to a ‘states as members’ model of governance as shorthand 
for the governance models of traditional multilateral institutions like the WHO.  This 
shorthand is not meant to suggest that this is the only distinctive feature of governance of 
traditional multilateral institutions.   
Ruggie’s exploration of the term ‘multilateralism’--which he distinguishes from 
bilateralism and imperialism—results in an often cited definition: 
…an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on 
the basis of "generalized" principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify 
appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic 
interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific 
occurrence (Ruggie 1992, p. 571). 
The concept of coordinated relations, and Ruggie’s corollaries that there is indivisibility 
and an expectation of reciprocity among members applies broadly to the Global Fund’s 
 28 
global and country level governance models; however, the Global Fund deviates in one 
critical aspect, the unit of analysis.  The Global Fund is an international institution 
which imitates Ruggie’s ‘“generalized” principles of conduct’ but it includes both state 
and non-state actors.  As one of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
1
 (see p. 
268 for a list of the MDGs), MDG 6, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 
serves as the rallying or coordination point for the interests of wealthy and powerful 
donor countries and recipient countries and also a range of global and country level 
actors from civil society, private foundations and business.  Therefore, traditional 
multilateralism as referred to in this thesis indicates that it is states which govern. 
This thesis’ use of the term emerging order signals the Global Fund’s departure from 
Ruggie’s state-centric construct and its retention of the notion of ‘coordinated relations’ 
among those who govern.  The recognition that this order is emergent, that it is not fully 
formed, indicates that the Global Fund’s claim of an inclusive alternative to state-
centric governance is not without contention, particularly as discussed in this thesis 
related to legitimacy, accountability and authority. 
The second area in this thesis where terminology and language are particularly challenging 
pertains to the boundaries which define the ‘country space’ including and beyond the state.  
This thesis takes liberty with Castell’s (2008, p. 80) definition of an ‘international public 
sphere’, as a space where citizens, civil society, and the state interact creating a ‘global 
social-political order’ where states “cling to the illusion of sovereignty despite the realities 
wrought by globalization” (Castells 2008, p. 80), adopting the term national public sphere.  
The word ‘national’ in this case indicates an interest in and focus on change at country 
rather than global level where, as the field work for this thesis uncovers, there is a 
dissonance between the loci for accountability and authority.  The use of the word ‘sphere’ 
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reflects an expansion beyond the state to include non-state national and international 
actors.  This thesis contends the national public sphere is more elite than Castells concedes. 
The thesis refers to the ‘country space’—now understood to include and lie beyond the 
state—as mediated.  The use of this term alludes to the dissonance between authority and 
accountability not only relative to the state, but also to national and international non-state 
actors.  That is, authority is not exclusive to the state nor is it intended to be; moreover, 
accountability is not clearly ascribed except where recipients of Global Fund resources are 
ultimately accountable to the donor governments which provide them.  Without explicit or 
clear ownership, authority and accountability then are subject to influence and negotiation 
among a range of state and non-state as well as national and international actors who 
engage in the ‘country space’, thus lending it a mediated character. 
Lastly, a significant part of this thesis explores the meaning of country ownership (see 
Chapter 5).  It describes the case of Malawi where country ownership is advocated by the 
Global Fund although what the term means is ambiguous.  The term carries an association 
with liberal democratic values but what is meant by ‘country’ and what it is that is ‘owned’ 
is not made explicit.  This thesis challenges the expediency of country ownership where it 
is intended to suggest that the country is “in the driver’s seat” (Stiglitz 1998, pp. 27) when 
this does not play out on the ground.  Consequently, this thesis uses the term mediated 
space for country ownership. 
The IR literature and the language of its scholarship faces the challenge of keeping step 
with the changes that are occurring in the political sphere once dominated by states.  This 
thesis derives, challenges and applies terms in order to more accurately reflect the effects 
of a changing institutional and governance order. 
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Disrupting Multilateralism:  Global Health Governance, the Global Fund and Institutional 
Innovation  
The IR literature on global governance of international institutions has largely been honed 
through analysing the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and where 
health is concerned, the WHO.  The Global Fund is a new type of institution with 
governance characteristics derived from new sources distinct from those of traditional 
multilaterals:  its inclusive governance model, its modus operandi centred on transparency 
and performance-based funding and the magnitude of funds it has mobilised and 
distributed for three diseases is without precedent.  The IR literature on global governance 
has yet to come to terms with institutional innovation within the multilateral order and the 
effects of the Global Fund, particularly as it matures.   
The G8 leaders (2001, ‘Communiqué, Genoa July 28’) committed to a new kind of 
institution when they announced the creation of what would become the Global Fund:  
“…we have launched with the UN Secretary-General a new Global Fund to fight 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis… The Fund will be a public-private partnership and 
we call on other countries, the private sector, foundations, and academic institutions to join 
with their own contributions - financially, in kind and through shared expertise.”  Global 
public health had risen on the agendas of the world’s political leaders, the subject of ‘high 
politics’ rather than social policy because of the perceived threats of infectious disease and 
bioterrorism to economic and political stability and security (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 
2004, p. 127; Ingram 2005, p. 381; McInnes and Lee 2006, p. 5; Bartsch 2007b, p. 3; 
Zacher and Keefe 2008, p. 19; Kickbusch 2009, p. 323). The G8 sought a new mechanism 
outside of UN and Bretton Woods institutions to address global public health concerns and 
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in particular MDG 6:  to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (Buse and Walt 
2000a, p. 551; Forman and Segaar 2006, p. 216; Kickbusch 2009, p. 323). 
As the 2001 G8 Communiqué lays out, the Global Fund was conceived as a global public 
private partnership. There is little in the literature that analyses the role of the neo-liberal 
agenda in shaping the Global Fund’s conception, despite the fact that it embraces the 
private sector, it adoption of an ethos of efficiency and its location outside of the UN.  The 
literature at the time focused on coming to grips with a number of global health initiatives 
that had emerged due to new sources of funds from donor governments and private 
foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (the Gates Foundation) to meet 
the three MDGs that focused on health.  In 2004 the database of global health initiatives 
maintained by the Initiative on Public-Private Partnerships for Health (IPPPH) listed 92 
such organisations.
2
 The early literature on the phenomenon of burgeoning health 
initiatives had two veins: the first sought to define these new institutional arrangements 
and the second had a more normative bent, proposing how these new organisations should 
work, particularly how multilateral institutions including the UN should engage the private 
sector.  
Buse and Walt’s (2000a, p. 550) early work on public private partnerships for health 
grappled with assigning a definition to the set of new institutional arrangements that were 
emerging and proposed that they could be recognised as “…a collaborative relationship 
which transcends national boundaries and brings together at least three parties, among 
them a corporation (and/or industry association) and an intergovernmental organization, so 
as to achieve a shared health-creating goal on the basis of a mutually agreed division of 
labour.”  Several years later Buse and Harmer (2007, p. 259) offered a less prescriptive 
interpretation of what had come to be described as global health initiatives (GHIs) rather 
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than global public private partnerships as “relatively institutionalised initiatives, 
established to address global health problems, in which public and for-profit private sector 
organisations have a voice in collective decision-making.”  Given the diversity of 
institutional arrangements that these definitions sought to embrace and their range of 
purpose including advocacy, financing, product development, medical research, and 
supply chain and procurement optimisation, a one-size-fits-all definition proved to be 
elusive.  It also failed to explain how institutions like the Global Fund were not only 
different from traditional multilateral institutions, but ultimately could grow in size and 
authority to become a form of institutional innovation that would change the multilateral 
order. 
The second area of interest in the early literature on GHIs was normative, or how these 
new institutional arrangements should work (Buse and Walt 2000b; Buse and Waxman 
2001; Caines et al. 2004).  Some for example derived generalisations from observing a 
range of GHIs or what they called “aid instruments” (Caines et al 2004, p. 5).  Others 
focused on how traditional multilateral organisations such as the WHO should ‘partner’ 
with multinational corporations and other private actors:   
 A useful distinction has been made between partnerships in which the 
management functions are undertaken by a secretariat within an intergovernmental 
agency (e.g. the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization) or in a not-for-
profit host (e.g. the Mectizan Donation Programme) and those where the 
management is housed in a separate legal entity (e.g. the International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative).  A more comprehensive review of WHO’s relations with the 
private sector should be aware of the spectrum of relationships as well as the 
diversity embraced by the term ‘partnership’ (Buse and Waxman 2001, p. 749). 
 33 
The nature of these analyses was a response to the ‘newness’ of these institutional 
arrangements for global public health.  Something was happening in global public health 
and its governance, but in the early 2000s it was an immature trend and a clear picture had 
yet to emerge. 
In the ensuing decade, the GHI landscape has matured.  The Global Fund has become a 
leader in terms of its institutional size, the magnitude of the resources it has mobilised and 
distributed and its authority at global and country levels.  However, the literature related to 
its governance, in particular its legitimacy, accountability and authority is weak, treating 
the Global Fund as an idiosyncratic, narrowly focused organisation rather than a change 
agent within the multilateral order. 
Chapter 3 examines the nature of the Global Fund’s legitimacy (see for example Hurd 
1999, p. 381; Suchman 1995, p. 574; Barker 2001 p. 8) and how it is conferred making the 
case that its innovative institutional design both distinguishes it from traditional 
multilaterals like the WHO and ultimately contributes to its weak authority-accountability 
link.  The literature on legitimacy is vast (see for example Beetham and Lord 1998, p. 16; 
Barker 2000, p. 8; Bernstein 2004, p. 12).  However a focus on select dimensions such as 
its rational roots (see for example Green 1988-9, p. 796; Tyler and Darley 2000, p. 724; 
Slaughter 2004a p. 178; Bernstein 2004-5, p. 154), its normative character (see for 
example Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 318; Ruggie 2004, p. 504; Zürn 2004, p. 261; Bartsch 
2007b, p. 5), its relational necessity (see for example Beetham and Lord 1998, p. 16; Raz 
1981, p. 188) and its self-referential and self-generating capacity (Barker 2000, p. 9) help 
shed some light on how the Global Fund’s legitimacy is conferred.  These features 
highlight how the Global Fund’s unique institutional design--its inclusive governance at 
global and country levels, its transparent and performance based modus operandi and its 
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unprecedented resource mobilisation and distribution--both distinguish the Global Fund 
from traditional multilaterals and provide new sources of legitimacy, making a new 
argument for how legitimacy is derived beyond the legitimate authority of nation states.   
The thesis draws from the well-established literature on the democratic legitimacy of 
international institutions and global forms of governance (see for example, Nye 2001, p. 3; 
Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 315; Keohane 2006, p. 14) which acknowledges the dislocation 
of legitimacy and legitimate authority from the realist-positivist focus on the nation state 
and state-governed global institutions (see Ruggie 2004, p. 519; Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 
315; Castells 2008, p. 78).  It considers the varying views on the extent of this dislocation 
(see for example, Beetham and Lord 1998, pp. 17-18; Ruggie 2004, p. 504; Zürn 2004, p. 
277).  It also acknowledges the substantial discourse on democratic legitimation that arises 
which includes debate on the existence or extent of a democratic deficit (Moravcsik 2004, 
pp. 346-7; Börzal and Risse 2002, p. 18) and the role that civil society may be seen to play 
in addressing it (Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 323).   It argues that Barker’s (2000 p. 9) 
notion that legitimating can be a self-referential and self-generating act is particularly 
relevant in the case of the Global Fund as it puts in relief the role and even the payoff of 
claims of inclusiveness and transparency when as Stone (2008, p. 26) describes, “[a]genda 
setting is more contested, externalized beyond the nation-state, and open to the input and 
disruption of a variety of political agents.” 
The discussion in Chapter 3 makes the case for Global Fund’s sources of legitimacy as a 
departure from what appears at first glance to be input-oriented legitimacy or ‘government 
by the people’ defined by Scharpf (1999, p. 2) where member states govern.  Rather it 
makes the argument that they are akin to output-oriented legitimacy or the “capacity to 
solve problems requiring collective solutions” and are subject to what Barker (2000, p. 9) 
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identifies as the act of legitimising where “the absence of democratic legitimation will 
throw into relief how much legitimation is by government and for government…where the 
legitimating activities of government… more contested and more varied.”  The Chapter 
asks the question of legitimacy in whose eyes, asserting that the Global Fund’s legitimacy 
is ultimately held in the eyes of wealthy and powerful states. Unravelling the nature of the 
Global Fund’s legitimacy requires piecing together select dimensions on the broad 
literature on legitimacy, considering how the Global Fund’s design departs from the 
traditional conception of  legitimate authority resting with the nation state, and uncovering 
its output-oriented nature despite input-oriented claims of inclusiveness and transparency. 
The well-established literature on accountability of international institutions relies on their 
constitutive ‘states as members’ governance and the role of national governments, civil 
society and NGOs in holding these institutions to account (Woods and Narlikar 2001, p. 
574; Held 2004, p. 372; Koenig-Archibugi 2004, p. 237; Grant and Keohane 2005, pp. 31-
2).  Grant and Keohane define the accountability problem of International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) by distinguishing between two models:  a participatory model where 
people with power are accountable to those who are affected by their decisions and a 
delegation model where people with power are accountable to those who have entrusted 
them with it.  The problem arises according to Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 33) when IFIs 
practise both:     
…the IMF might be considered accountable to those whose money it is lending to 
take only reasonable risks, which leads to a policy of requiring structural 
adjustments. But it is also called to account for the effects of those structural 
adjustments within the countries accepting the conditions of IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] loans. 
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This analysis of the structural and procedural issues related to accountability of IFIs--who 
is accountable to whom and how they are held to account--does not consider new types of 
institutions in the multilateral order, particularly the Global Fund with its output-oriented 
legitimacy. 
Accountability as it relates to the role of non-state actors in IR is analysed by several 
scholars.  For example, Scholte (2004, p. 212) explores the role of civil society in holding 
global and national power-wielders to account and reflects on the weak accountability of 
many CSOs to their own stakeholders.  Benner, Reinicke and Witte (2004, p. 198) explore 
accountability in global public policy networks arguing that electoral and hierarchical 
accountability models cannot work and new, multidimensional models need to be devised 
because by their nature networks are “diffuse, complex and weakly institutionalized 
collaborative systems…[without] an electoral base..[or] clear principal–agent 
relationships.”  Stone (2008, p. 23) in her work on global public policy and transnational 
policy communities argues that the space between the traditional, hierarchical conception 
of global/national accountabilities and the ideal of deliberative world government deserves 
attention where “new forms of authority are emerging through global and regional policy 
processes that coexist alongside nation-state processes.”  Bull (2010, pp. 226-7) takes a 
different tack, concerned more with the elite nature of the governance of global initiatives 
like the Global Fund and the consequences for agenda setting.  What these scholars infer is 
that these new forms of authority are less powerful than that of international institutions, 
particularly the IFIs.  That is, they may “coexist alongside nation-state processes” and 
influence them, but they are not ‘above’ them.  From the perspective of the Global Fund, 
the gap in this literature is in considering the role of non-state actors as embedded in the 
governance of an institutionally innovative multilateral, one that has grown its authority to 
 37 
match that of other health international institutions in a short period of time.  In other 
words, if a new order is emerging, traditional authority holders are challenged. 
To frame and analyse the Global Fund’s accountability problem, this thesis draws on 
Keohane’s (2002, pp. 14-15) distinction between internal accountability--the hierarchical 
principal/agent relationship between recipient countries, the Global Fund and donor 
governments--and external accountability--“accountability to people outside the acting 
entity whose lives are affected by it.” The thesis argues that the Global Fund with its 
output-oriented legitimacy has an accountability gap.  In other words, there is a 
governance problem that arises when institutional innovation departs from the “doctrine of 
sovereignty” (Keohane 2006, p. 11) particularly at country level where accountability 
flows upwards to the Global Fund and donor governments, but not outwards for example 
to Malawians who are affected by HIV/AIDS.  In other words, the literature fails to come 
to terms with the Global Fund’s departure from a ‘states as members’ model of 
governance, where the answer to the question to whom is the Global Fund accountable 
remains donor governments.  Moreover, this thesis argues that the Global Fund’s model 
creates a double deficit in external accountability:  first the Global Fund’s external 
accountability gap is exacerbated by the mediated space for country ownership created by 
the Global Fund’s elite in country governance model; and second, the influence of the 
Technical Review Panel (TRP)--the group of independent experts which decide on which 
proposals are funded--its apparent activism and absence of accountability to ‘country 
owners’. 
The IR literature on the governance of international institutions reflects their ‘states as 
members’ model.  It has yet to evolve to reflect the Global Fund as more than an 
idiosyncratic GHI, as an institutional innovation within the multilateral order that creates 
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and confers legitimacy in new ways.  The IR literature on global governance related to 
accountability largely bases its analysis on the IFI model, rather than a model like the 
Global Fund’s which includes non-state actors.  Where non-state actors, including the elite, 
and new models of engagement are considered they are assumed to be less powerful.  
Consequently, the Global Fund’s accountability gap--its failure to be accountable to those 
whose lives it affects—is not recognised in the literature as an institutional failure of an 
innovative and authoritative new order multilateral. 
The Mediated Space for Country Ownership: the Aid Relationship and Health Policy 
The recent IR literature on global governance has concerned itself with the global, 
transnational or supra-national view.  The country-level effects of new global institutions 
and governance models like that of the Global Fund tend to be analysed with the ‘global’ 
as the point of reference, rather than the ‘country’.  Developing a picture of the ‘country 
space’ particularly the implications for country ownership, the aid relationship and health 
policy when global politics and country evidence collide requires piecing together policy 
and scholarly literatures and interviews with country-level policy makers and influencers. 
‘Country ownership’ is not a tenet or discourse of global governance in the same way as 
legitimacy or accountability.  Rather it is a term that implies a departure from the failures 
of the economic reforms and a reframing of the nature of the donor/recipient relationship 
associated with the Washington Consensus.  In order to discuss country ownership as it is 
promoted by the Global Fund and realised in countries like Malawi, at least two literatures 
must be consulted.  One literature is not academic in nature; rather, it lies in the policy 
documents, speeches and compacts from international institutions such as the World Bank 
and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  For 
example, in 1998, Stiglitz (1998, pp. 27 and 1) who was then the World Bank’s Chief 
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Economist, described the principle of country ownership as “putting the country in the 
driver’s seat” after the “failures of the Washington Consensus.”  A year after Stiglitz’s 
remarks the World Bank introduced the Comprehensive Development Framework for 
which country ownership was one of four core principles, where it meant citizen 
participation in “shaping development goals and strategies” (World Bank 2003, p. xviii).  
Country ownership was a phrase which intended to symbolise an end to what had been an 
era of ‘IFI ownership’ of failed structural adjustment policies. 
Country ownership is embedded in the OECD’s Paris Declaration and the more recent 
Accra Agenda. These compacts between international institutions, donor governments, 
recipient governments, and in the case of the Accra Agenda members of civil society, were 
meant to set out guidance on how to make aid more effective.  For example, the Accra 
Agenda identifies strategies for strengthening country ownership such as “broadening the 
country level policy dialogue on development” where parliaments are responsible for 
country ownership and all actors including “central and local governments, CSOs, research 
institutes, media and the private sector are engaged in policy dialogue” (OECD 2008, pp. 
16).  Here country ownership is intended to promote a deliberative country-level discourse 
on policy-making but accountability remains with the state.   The policy literature of 
international institutions uses ‘country ownership’ conceptually to signal change in the 
nature of the relationships between international institutions and country governments and 
country governments and their non-state constituencies. Whether or how this change is 
realised is another matter. 
The literature on country ownership and the Global Fund is academic rather than policy 
oriented, but it is in part Global Fund authored. Michel Kazatchkine, the Global Fund’s 
Executive Director from 2007 to 2012, and Rifat Atun, formerly the Global Fund’s 
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Director of Strategy, Performance and Evaluation (2009, p. S68) authored ‘Promoting 
Country Ownership and Stewardship of Health Programs: The Global Fund Experience’ 
where they posit that the Global Fund’s in-country governance model has had a “catalytic 
effect”, responding to deficits by “building the capacity of local health leadership to 
improve governance of HIV programs.” These examples of policy and academic literatures 
which address country ownership demonstrate that there is no governance literature on 
country ownership per se.  It is a term in the policy domain of international institutions and 
promoted by them but the larger global governance literature is largely silent on its 
definition or its effects on policy making and the relationships among international 
institutions, donor governments, recipient country governments and civil society.  This 
thesis endeavours to challenge the implied meaning of ‘country ownership’ and instead 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of agenda setting, authority and 
elite participation that play out on the ground in what is a mediated space for country 
ownership.  Moreover, it makes the case that ‘country ownership’ includes a burden of 
responsibility regardless of where failures occur. 
The literature on aid, its impact and governance is extensive and crosses disciplines and 
sectors. There are a number of ‘sub-sets’ of this larger literature. For example, the IPE 
literature on HIV/AIDS addresses the social and economic impact of the pandemic (for 
example Poku and Whiteside 2004, p. xxi) and consequently the role of aid.  This thesis 
makes reference to aid architecture, another ‘sub-set’ of the larger aid literature, which 
resembles the country ownership literature in the sense that it draws  from the research  of 
policy makers particularly those from international institutions.  In the case of the former, 
this thesis cites work by staff of the World Bank, the Center for Global Development and 
the Overseas Development Institute (for example, Christiansen and Rogerson, 2005, p. 1; 
Birdsall 2007, p. 593; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007, p. 319; Booth 2008, p. 2).  These 
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policy oriented sources provide a critique of aid practices and international instruments 
such as the Accra Agenda with donors as the point of reference—the implications for 
countries are considered but for the most part are generalised. 
The aid architecture literature makes a case for the emergence of a new architecture which 
is described by the World Bank’s Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007, p. 319) as having 
“two features:  one is the country ownership of a development strategy around which 
donors align and the second is the allocation of aid based on performance.”  The literature 
argues different views on the maturity of this architecture (for example, Lele, Sadik and 
Simmons no date, p. 1; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007, p. 319; Birdsall 2007, p. 593; 
Strand 2007, p. 227; Bonnel 2009, p. 165), nevertheless there is agreement that adoption of 
the principles of the Paris Delcaration and the Accra Agenda by donor and recipient 
governments and the influence of new entitities like the Global Fund point to changes in an 
aid environment once shaped by the structural adjustment policies of the IFIs.  Like the 
policy literature on country ownership, the point of reference for aid architecture is  the 
‘global’ or in this instance donors and IFIs-as-architects, rather than the ‘country’ view. 
The donor and IFI perspective as central to the promotion of country ownership and as 
architects of what is ‘new’ in aid is echoed in the health policy literature.  The global view 
dominates (for example Kickbusch 2000, p. 980; Buse, Drager, Fustukian and Lee 2002, p. 
253; Fidler 2007, p. 8; Walt, Spicer and Buse 2009, p. 63), and there is little or no current 
scholarly analysis on how globalisation and the effects of new policy influencers at 
country level like the Global Fund have affected how country health policy is made and by 
whom.  The exception is a literature with one foot in scholarship and another in evaluation 
where the country level outcomes of global level initiatives are analysed in a global 
governance rather than a country health policy context (for example Brugha et al. 2004, p. 
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100).  To fill this country level health policy gap, this thesis refers to a longstanding 
literature on country health policy (for example, Cassels 1994, p. 336; Walt and Gilson 
1994, p. 355; Okuonzi and MacRae 1995, p. 131), Malawi’s health policy documents and 
donor reports (for example, Government of Malawi 2000, p. 2; Government of Malawi 
Ministry of Health Department of Planning 2004, p. 1; Government of Malawi 2004, p. 6; 
Carlson et al. 2008a, p. 63; Carlson et al. 2008a, p. 62) and finally interviews with those 
making and influencing health policy in Malawi.  The country level health policy 
perspective—how policy is made and by whom—is dormant in the current globally 
focused health policy literature and requires piecing together from scholarly and policy 
research as well as key informant interviews. 
Given that ‘country’ is interpreted from the perspective of the ‘global’ in terms of country 
ownership, aid architecture and health policy it is not surprising that the current global 
governance literature pays little attention to the ‘country space’ and how it is mediated.  
Castells (2008, p. 80) describes an “international public sphere,” a space where citizens, 
civil society, and the state interact creating a “global social-political order” where states 
“cling to the illusion of sovereignty despite the realities wrought by globalization.” 
Similarly, other scholars have analysed this ‘global space’ (for example Benner, Reinicke 
and Witte 2004, p. 194; Slaughter 2004a, p.160; Stone 2008, p. 20); however, the 
implications of these suprastate interactions at country level and particularly for national 
governments is not a focus.  This gap in the literature is especially problematic as the 
Global Fund has created, through its country level governance model, a mediated space 
beyond the state where health policy related to the three diseases is made and influenced 
by an elite enclave of actors. This thesis argues that the dilution of the state’s traditional 
accountability for health policy and for the well-being of its population coupled with the 
Global Fund’s hierarchical, internal accountability model has created an accountability 
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gap.  This gap is conceptualised by scholars (for example, Keohane 2002, pp. 14-15; Grant 
and Keohane 2005, p. 34), but the literature analysing how this plays out at country level--
particularly as it relates to elite state and non-state and  national and international actors--is 
silent. 
The departure in the IR literature from the realist-positivist focus on the primacy of states 
to a neo-institutionalist focus on the role of international organisations, and further, 
towards the cosmopolitan ideal of a global government has resulted in losing touch with 
the ‘country space’—what it is and how it is affected by global forces.  This thesis argues 
for a return to country-level analysis which considers the rich ground of how the global 
affects the country—in the instance of Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy where 
global politics and country evidence collide--and in particular the implications for the role 
and accountability of elite and non-elite state and non-state actors in health policy making. 
The Intersection of Global and Country:  The Weak Authority-Accountability Link 
The Global Fund’s distinct sources of legitimacy conferred by wealthy and powerful states 
along with its organisational maturation explain its growing authority at global and country 
levels.  Traditionally, IR locates authority in the domain of states, but this 
conceptualisation has been challenged by the effects of globalisation and the emergence of 
legitimate forms of non-state authority (Mason 2004, p. 2; Ruggie 2004, p. 504; Pattberg 
2005, p. 591).  One example is the literature on authority which posits that “[a]s long as 
there is consent and social recognition, an actor –even a private actor – can be accorded the 
rights, the legitimacy, and the responsibilities of an authority” (Biersteker and Hall 2002, 
p. 204).  The idea that the Global Fund’s legitimate authority can be derived beyond the 
state is accepted in the literature; however, the extent to which this legitimacy can be 
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conferred a ‘publicness’ and contribute to a growth in authority and new territorial claims 
is not reflected. 
This thesis examines the relationship between the Global Fund’s distinct sources of 
legitimacy and its growing authority at global and country levels.  To make a case for the 
Global Fund’s form of non-state authority including the ‘publicness’ conferred on it and to 
explain its rapid rise, it is necessary to complement IR scholars’ notions of authority 
associated with bureaucracy and hierarchy (for example Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 
p.21) and draw on concepts of authority from the Development Studies literature (for 
example Hyden 2008, p. 12; Kelsall 2011, p. 84; Khan 2005, p. 714) which describe the 
role of non-democratic authority in the African country context.  While the hierarchical 
concept of authority applied to international institutions explains the Global Fund’s 
growing authority at global level, the country level dynamic is more complex.  This thesis 
argues that beyond the aid relationship, the Global Fund’s authority at country level takes a 
hybrid form through the CCM.  On the one hand it overrides socially-based authority 
through its bureaucratic approach based on formal institutions and impersonal rules, but it 
also creates a type of social authority through its elite national and transnational character.  
The IR literature alone fails to tell the story of the Global Fund’s distinct sources of 
legitimacy conferred by wealthy and power states and the nature of the ‘publicness’ of its 
authority, its rapid rise and how this serves to both exacerbate and obscure its weak 
authority-accountability link. 
The literature clearly progresses beyond notions of legitimate authority as ‘public’ and 
belonging to the state.  While scholars acknowledge that diffuse structures have an 
accountability challenge (van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004, pp. 157-8; Benner, 
Reinicke and Witte 2004, p. 194), they have yet to address the Global Fund’s weak 
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authority-accountability link where there is a Slaughter describes, a “blurring of lines of 
authority [which] are ultimately likely to blur the distinction between public legitimacy 
and private power” (Slaughter 2004a, p. 169). The question of how those in authority are 
held to account and by whom when global and county level systems fail remains 
unanswered. As one interviewee observed, “[t]he big question is whether the Global Fund 
is set up for this type of burden of responsibility.  And I would argue that it is probably 
not” (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
5. Contribution to Knowledge 
The IR literature on globalisation, governance and international institutions frames the 
discussion in this thesis.  However, given the research questions that were posed, other 
literatures and sources were required to fill gaps where the IR literature either has yet to 
evolve or fails to address certain phenomena.  As a result of synthesising literatures among 
distinct disciplines, and conducting key informant interviews to uncover new insights, this 
thesis makes a contribution to knowledge in three ways:     
1. It provides a basis to evolve the IR literature on globalisation, governance and 
international institutions to consider the nature, significance and effects of the 
Global Fund as a form of institutional innovation which is disrupting the traditional 
multilateral order, particularly for those international institutions working in health.  
IR has largely focused on traditional international institutions as the exhaustive 
analyses of the governance of IFIs, the WHO and the UN writ large indicate.  The 
Global Fund as a financing mechanism for three diseases would then lie outside 
this ‘high politics’ tradition.  Therefore its treatment in this thesis as a maturing and 
institutionally innovative international institution which exercises authority among 
traditional multilaterals is in itself new—in other words making the case that the 
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Global Fund is now ‘one of the club’ contributes to the IR literature on the 
governance of international institutions.  It describes how the Global Fund creates 
and confers new sources of legitimacy, how these sources link to accountability, 
and the troubling double deficit in external accountability that emerges--a deficit 
which is both exacerbated and obscured by the Global Fund’s growing authority at 
global and country levels. 
2. It challenges the use of the term ‘country ownership’ to mean “putting the country 
in the driver’s seat”, and instead notes the double deficit in external accountability 
that arises when global politics and country evidence collide in a Global Fund 
convened mediated space for country ownership.  It describes how the Global Fund 
affects HIV/AIDS agenda setting in Malawi, and the dynamics of the state and non-
state and national and international character inherent in this elite ‘national public 
sphere’.  Its country rather than global, transnational or supranational view coupled 
with the identification of the Global Fund’s double deficit in external 
accountability is a new contribution to the analysis of global health governance 
beyond traditional multilateral institutions. 
3. It synthesises observations from field work in Malawi on the exercise of the Global 
Fund’s authority and its dislocation from external accountability when failures 
occur. The IR literature is silent on the rise of the Global Fund’s authority, its 
legitimating ‘publicness’ and how it is exercised. The Development Studies 
literature informs the analysis of country-level authority, but neither literature 
contends with the challenge of articulating boundaries for this Global Fund 
convened mediated space for country ownership and how country ownership is as 
much about the burden of responsibility as it is about agenda setting. The thesis 
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argues that the dislocation between the loci for authority and accountability remain 
unresolved despite the Global Fund’s growing authoritative territorial claims.   
The puzzle at the centre of this thesis asked how the Global Fund has so rapidly won 
legitimate authority at global and country levels even though the nature of its innovative 
design challenges liberal notions of legitimate state authority in the international system. 
The ‘thick narrative’ that formed the analysis in response to this puzzle makes a 
contribution to knowledge by evolving the current IR literature on globalisation, 
governance and international institutions.  It creates new insight into ‘country ownership’ 
and the elite nature of the new ‘national public sphere’ and synthesises its analysis of the 
Global Fund’s growing authority uncovering the weak authority-accountability link that 
underlies an emergent multilateral order.  
6. Conclusion 
This is a thesis on organisational innovation and systemic change.  It is grounded in IR, 
and in particular it takes a literature-based approach.  Where the main IR literature on 
globalisation, governance and international institutions has gaps or has yet to evolve, the 
arguments and analysis in this thesis turn to the literatures on global and country level 
public health policy which straddle IR, Development Studies and International Political 
Economy (IPE) and the policy literatures including those by international institutions and 
research institutes.  Although rooted in the IR literature, the analysis in this thesis draws on 
and synthesises from other disciplines and academic and policy sources as well as key 
informant interviews to consider the Global Fund as a form of institutional innovation with 
implications for global and country level health governance. 
Because the Global Fund and its effects on global and country level governance are 
nascent, this study takes an exploratory approach using a descriptive, single case study.  It 
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rejects a cause and effect or comparative approach on several grounds:  the Global Fund 
lacks a comparator which precludes a counterfactual analysis; there is little IR country 
level analysis and data related to policy, agenda setting and HIV/AIDS on which to rely; 
and finally, the emergent nature of its subject means that it is too early for summative 
analysis which would facilitate comparison.  A descriptive, single case study method is 
intended to create a ‘thick’ narrative and provide a basis for further research. 
Although the thesis is located in the IR literature on globalisation, governance and 
international institutions, investigating the particular puzzle posed required compensating 
for gaps in and failures of this literature.  These gaps or failures take four forms:  first, IR 
scholarship requires new terms or clear definitions for existing terms to adequately reflect 
the change that is occurring in global health governance.  Second, the Global Fund is 
recognised as a new type of institution, but little analysis exists that explains how it is 
differentiated from or compares to more traditional multilateral health leaders like the 
WHO.  The Global Fund is not recognised as a form of institutional innovation within the 
multilateral order.  Third, while the IR literature reflects the interplay between the national, 
the transnational and the supranational, it does so from a global perspective.  That is, the 
country lens is absent and therefore other literatures and new research are required to tell 
the story of the governance problems of this Global Fund convened mediated space for 
country ownership.  Lastly, the IR literature is silent on the rise of the Global Fund’s 
authority and how it is exercised.  While the Development Studies literature informs the 
analysis of country-level authority, neither literature contends with the challenge of 
articulating boundaries for this Global Fund convened elite ‘national public sphere’ 
beyond the state.  Taken together, these gaps or failures require turning to related 
literatures including the IPE and policy literatures from international organisations and 
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research institutes.  The key informant interviews conducted primarily in Geneva and 
Lilongwe were also an important puzzle piece. 
The contribution to knowledge is made by this thesis in three ways:  it evolves the IR 
literature on globalisation, governance and international institutions to consider the nature, 
significance and effects of the Global Fund as a form of institutional innovation which is 
disrupting the traditional multilateral order; it offers new insights related to ‘country 
ownership’ and the governance problems that arise when global politics and country 
evidence collide in a Global Fund convened mediated country space; and finally it 
synthesises the analysis on the Global Fund’s governance, its organisational maturation 
and its rapidly growing authority to make a case for a problematic authority-accountability 
link in the governance of a new and emerging multilateral order. 
The chapters that follow forward the critical analysis and arguments in this thesis by first 
setting out in Chapter 2 a description of the Global Fund as a form of institutional 
innovation which is disrupting the multilateral order.  Chapter 3 analyses the nature of the 
Global Fund’s legitimacy, and makes the link between its output-oriented nature held in 
the eyes of wealthy and powerful states and its internal accountability model.  This is the 
source of the Global Fund’s external accountability gap. Chapter 4 turns to Malawi, and 
lays out an empirical analysis of Malawi’s intractable circumstances including its 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the nature of the health system that supports its response.  In 
Chapter 5, the notion of ‘country ownership’ is explored.  This chapter presents the case of 
Malawi’s failed 2009 National Strategy Application to the Global Fund and the nature and 
influence of the TRP’s feedback on it HIV/AIDS prevention strategy as an example of the 
collision between global politics and country evidence.  It concludes by describing the 
Global Fund’s ‘double deficit in external accountability’.  The final chapter in the thesis 
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analyses the nature of the Global Fund’s growing authority at global and country levels 
that has accompanied its organisational maturation and how this plays out on the ground in 
Malawi.  It argues that authority as it is exercised by the Global Fund serves to both 
exacerbate and obscure a troubling weak authority-accountability link suggesting the 
Global Fund’s burden of responsibility is greater than its capacity to govern it. 
 51 
Chapter 2 -  The Global Fund:  Institutional Innovation and Disrupted 
Multilateralism 
1. Introduction 
…the old formulas of Westphalian governance have failed and a new generation of 
innovation from many actors is emerging to take its place.  But while the new 
vulnerability provides an increasingly powerful driver, a new world of 
institutionalised innovativeness and multi-centred sovereignty has yet to replace 
the Westphalian order of old (Kirton and Cooper 2009, p. 309). 
The Global Fund is a form of institutional innovation among global institutions that has 
disrupted traditional multilateralism.  Even though as Kirton and Cooper assert a new 
multilateralism has yet to emerge, what is evident is that the Global Fund is shaping this 
new order and in the process irrevocably changing what is left of the old.  The Global 
Fund’s design, its institutional innovation is the catalyst.  In particular, its inclusive 
governance, its transparent and performance-based funding modus operandi and its 
unparalleled resource mobilisation have underpinned the Global Fund’s success and 
contributed to its evolution beyond its initial three disease, vertical focus.  Its form of 
institutional innovation has changed the traditional leadership and division of labour 
landscape among other international institutions working in HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria, particularly the WHO, UNAIDS, UNDP, the World Bank and Roll Back Malaria 
and Stop TB. The nature of the Global Fund’s disruption includes its momentum towards 
policy making at global level, its creation of an ‘unfunded mandate’ for technical 
assistance at country level and finally the competition it has created and faces to sustain its 
resource mobilisation efforts.  The Global Fund emerged from a confluence of events at 
the beginning of the millennium which laid a foundation for change.  It has risen to 
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become a global health leader among traditional multilateral organisations in its scale, size 
and influence and is an example of institutional innovation changing the multilateral order 
that Kirton and Cooper describe.   
This chapter has four parts.  The first section describes the forces at the new millennium 
that prepared the ground for the Global Fund’s emergence.  The second section explores 
the motivations and effects of the inclusion of private actors in what had traditionally been 
a public domain of multilateral institutions governed by states.  The third section makes a 
case for the Global Fund as a form of institutional innovation, focusing on features of its 
design and contrasting them with what is perhaps the most traditional health multilateral, 
the WHO.  The final section discusses the nature of the Global Fund as a disruptive force 
within the multilateral order focusing on policy making at global level, technical assistance 
and coordination at country level and the challenging nature of resource mobilisation. 
2. Preparing the Political, Discursive and Financial Ground 
By the beginning of the new millennium, the UN’s approach to global public health 
concerns had undergone transformation.  Globalisation and its effects including the 
relationship between infectious disease, global security and poverty required international 
cooperation beyond the confines of traditional multilateralism if devastating epidemics like 
HIV/AIDS were to be addressed (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004, p. 127; Ingram 2005, 
p. 381; McInnes and Lee 2006, p. 5; Bartsch 2007b, p. 3; Zacher and Keefe 2007, p. 16, 
2008, p. 19; Kickbusch 2009, p. 323).  For the purposes of this work, ‘traditional 
multilateralism’ refers to a state-centred form of global governance which perpetuates “the 
dominance of states at the top of the hierarchical state system” (Knight 2001, p. 15).   
Given this definition, traditional multilateral organisations are those where states form the 
governing bodies of international institutions, such as the WHO’s World Health Assembly 
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which is comprised of delegations from 193 member states (World Health Organization 
2011c, ‘Sixty-fourth World Health Assembly’).  This section describes the forces of 
transformation at the millennium including the desire of states to cooperate on issues of 
health, particularly in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the discursive arguments for 
global public goods and the availability of new resources to address public health on a 
global scale.  Together these factors contributed to the transition of health from a concern 
of national, social policy to one where global public health became the subject of ‘high 
politics’, in the interests of wealthy and powerful states. 
One outcome of the transformation towards global public health was the creation of a new 
type of global organisation broadly referred to as a Global Health Initiative (GHI).  The 
Global Fund is one among a number of GHIs that have emerged since the late 1990s.  
Despite the burgeoning trend, GHIs are not a new phenomenon.  For example, Tropical 
Disease Research (TDR) was established in 1975 by the WHO, the UNDP and the World 
Bank.  Its goal was to strengthen research capacity in disease-endemic countries and 
support the development of new tools and strategies for neglected tropical diseases 
(Tropical Disease Research, ‘Making a Difference’).  Initially, GHIs were called Global 
Public Private Partnerships (GPPPs) which Buse and Walt (2000a, p 550) defined as “a 
collaborative relationship which transcends national boundaries and brings together at least 
three parties, among them a corporation (and/or industry association) and an 
intergovernmental organization, so as to achieve a shared health-creating goal on the basis 
of a mutually agreed division of labour.” This early definition was an attempt to 
understand a new institutional phenomenon in global public health. 
While some GHIs meet Buse and Walt’s criteria, many do not.  GHIs vary in their 
missions and models and in the range and interests of partners—some advocate, some 
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fund, some develop products, some conduct research and others address market 
weaknesses by creating supply chain and purchasing mechanisms. By comparison to TDR 
the Diflucan Partnership Program is an example of a drug provision and supply chain GHI 
which is run by Pfizer, the global research-based pharmaceutical company, to provide its 
drug free to HIV/AIDS endemic developing countries (The Diflucan Partnership Program 
(2009), ‘Welcome’). The Global Fund (2010a, ‘About the Global Fund’) is also distinct, 
describing itself as “a unique global public/private partnership dedicated to attracting and 
disbursing additional resources to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. 
This partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected 
communities represents a new approach to international health financing.”  New GHIs 
proliferated as the millennium began but they were institutionally diverse, or by the Global 
Fund’s own definition ‘unique’, resisting categorisation.  
The Commitment of Global Leaders 
On June 27, 2001, then-UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan held a press conference with 
Peter Piot, then-Executive Director of UNAIDS (United Nations 2001b, ‘Press Release’), 
to announce the UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS:  Global Crisis — Global 
Action.  The declaration outlined the careful groundwork that had been laid for the UN’s 
special session on HIV/AIDS to get the world’s leaders on board (United Nations 2001a, 
‘Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS’).  This included a series of commitments 
from heads of state in every region of the world in the form of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), the Abuja Declaration and Framework for Action for the 
Fight Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases and 
statements from a host of other summits, conferences and special meetings.  The UN 
declaration went on to describe the creation of a global HIV/AIDS and health fund with 
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financial support from “donor countries, foundations, the business community, including 
pharmaceutical companies, the private sector, philanthropists and wealthy individuals” 
(United Nations 2001, p. 14) for which a Transitional Working Group had been struck 
after a meeting of the Organization of African Unity Summit in Abuja earlier in the year 
(The Global Fund no date-a, p. 8).  The concept of a fund had been endorsed at the 
previous year’s G8 Summit in Okinawa (G8 2000, ‘G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000’) and 
in Genoa, Italy a month after Annan’s press conference the final Communiqué from the G8 
Summit (G8 2001, ‘Communiqué Genoa July 28’) described the launch of what would 
become The Global Fund: 
 …we have launched with the UN Secretary-General a new Global Fund to fight 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. We are determined to make the Fund 
operational before the end of the year. We have committed $1.3 billion. The Fund 
will be a public-private partnership and we call on other countries, the private 
sector, foundations, and academic institutions to join with their own contributions - 
financially, in kind and through shared expertise. 
Despite the rhetoric there was still some distance to go.  The UN estimated that by 2005 
$9.2 bn a year would be needed to respond to the pandemic (Schwartlander et al. 2001, p. 
3).  It’s noteworthy that the United States’ founding commitment to Annan’s efforts was 
only $200 mm or about 1% of its domestic spend on the disease (Schwartlander et al. 
2001, p. 3; Dietrich 2007, p. 278).  The recently elected President Bush was playing to 
conservative political and religious domestic politics emphasising prevention (including 
abstinence) over more expensive treatment and concerns that funds would not be well 
spent.  Nevertheless it could be argued that the policy influence of the United States was 
felt in the Global Fund’s early days through the neo-liberal promotion of the role of the 
private sector and the situating of the Global Fund outside of the UN (Dobbin, Simmons 
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and Garrett 207, p. 457).  It was not until 2003 that the United States announced its bi-
lateral President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) with a commitment of $15 
bn over five years including authorisation to commit $1 bn a year to the Global Fund 
(Dietrich 2007, p. 280; Lisk 2010, p. 95).  By this time, with the controversial engagement 
in the Iraq war at hand, the HIV/AIDS agenda took political moral ground as “a work of 
mercy beyond all current international efforts to help the people of Africa” (The Guardian 
2003, ‘Saddam is ‘Deceiving, Not Disarming’’). As noted in Chapter 3, the United States 
went on to become the largest donor to the Global Fund over its short history and 
consequently its influence has become far more direct.     
2001 then was an initiation, with world heads of state agreeing on a mechanism to respond 
to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and an initially modest commitment, particularly from the 
United States, of funds to this ‘partnership’ between public and private actors.  Annan’s 
feats of diplomacy and the G8’s endorsement meant the Global Fund had a strong and 
wide base of political support from its inception and eventually the domestic politics of 
leading donor nations, particularly the United States, caught up. 
The Global Public Goods’ Nature of Fighting Infectious Disease 
Diplomacy and politics were not the only factors which laid a foundation for the creation 
of the Global Fund.  In the late 1990s the UN through the UNDP fostered a discourse on 
globalisation, international cooperation and global public goods.
3
  This discourse placed 
considerable focus on health and its financing moving health into the domain of other 
global concerns such as security and the environment. In the first of several volumes on 
global public goods edited by Kaul and her associates from the UNDP’s Office of 
Development Studies, Chen, Evans and Cash (1999, p. 297) describe the case for health as 
a global public good: 
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Global health increasingly demonstrates cross-border externalities.  As a public 
good, health risks and responses are increasingly global….Future international 
health cooperation will be influenced by at least three factors—resource 
mobilization, systems of global governance and the creation of institutional space 
for organizational renovation and innovation. 
The global public goods discourse reinforced the prominence of health threats and 
challenges and underscored the multi-actor international cooperation required to address 
them (Kaul and Conceiçäo 2006a, p. 35; Conceiçäo 2006, pp. 274-5).   
This theme of interdependency and its implications for health at global and country levels 
was not new (for example, Walt 1998; Yach and Bettcher 1998a and 1998b); however, 
what was new was the role of private actors in what had been treated almost exclusively a 
public domain.  Positioning health as a global public good provided a theoretical 
framework to argue that the financing and delivery of global public goods was no longer 
exclusively a public function, but an undertaking of both public and private actors, an 
opening up of traditional multilateralism:  “…this growth of private involvement in the 
international public arena has been supported by bilateral, multilateral, and private donors 
who have become increasingly disappointed in purely state-led or market-led 
approaches…”(Forman and Segaar 2006, p. 216).  The global public goods discourse 
paved the way for embracing new notions about the intersection between public and 
private spheres in global public health, diffusing an agenda with neo-liberal resonance 
(Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 207, p. 457) and prophesising (Chen, Evans and Cash 
1999, p. 297) the creation of the Global Fund, a new type of international organisation 
which sought to bring together the public and private spheres to fight the three infectious 
diseases identified in MDG 6. 
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Increased Funding for Health 
In the 1990s, the World Bank arguably had the most influence on health of any of the 
multilaterals including the WHO (Koivusalo and Ollila 1997, p. 85; Kickbusch 2000, p. 
982; Lee 2009, pp. 82, 84). The World Bank (1993, p. 165) estimated that by 1995 it 
would be the “largest single source of external funding for health” among multilaterals  
and its 1993 World Development Report, Investing in Health, laid out the Bank’s 
economic approach to health and health financing.  A departure from the WHO’s Alma 
Ata declaration (WHO 1978, p. 1) that health is a “state of complete physical, mental and 
social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, [and] is a fundamental 
human right”, the World Bank’s Investing in Health (1993, p 6) prescribed an economic 
approach.  Its key messages were cost-effective public expenditure supported by 
decentralisation and contracting out, public financing for a “minimum package” of clinical 
services, and public and private sector competition for the provision of other health 
services such as drugs.  Investing in Health introduced the use of the disability adjusted life 
year (DALY) as a measure of the global burden of disease and the effectiveness of health 
interventions at reducing the disease burden, linking cost effectiveness with measures of 
morbidity and mortality (Abbasi 1999, p. 1005).  Health was subject to decisions about 
allocative efficiency—how to allocate scarce resources to meet system goals—and 
technical efficiency—how to manage delivery of allocated resources more cost effectively.  
The WHO’s human rights framing of health had been displaced by an economic rationale 
and a neo-liberal ethos. 
By the millennium, the WHO was building on the World Bank’s neo-liberal economic 
framing of health making a case for economic development through increased health 
investment.  In December 2001 Gro Harlem Brundtland, then Director-General of the 
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WHO, received the Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, chaired by 
Jeffrey Sachs.   The Commission’s report made the case for the link between health and 
poverty alleviation and proposed a nine item action agenda to meet the MDGs which was 
predicated on scaling up health funding from donors, public-private partnership funds and 
pharmaceutical companies.  The Commission recommended that governments increase 
spending on health projecting that US$30 to $40 per capita in health financing was 
required to address health challenges in developing countries.  It estimated that at the time 
spending was between US$13 per capita for least developed countries and US$24 per 
capita for other low income countries (WHO 2001a, p. 16).  It recommended that donors, 
rather than private sources, close this significant gap in conjunction with efforts from 
developing countries themselves.  In addition to recommending donor and developing 
country financing targets, the Commission advocated for the creation and financing of The 
Global Fund (WHO 2001a, pp. 27-8). The Commission made the economic case that 
significant new resources were needed if the health MDGs were to be realised and donor 
governments would be on point to provide them. 
The WHO’s case for increased funding for health and global advocacy efforts for new 
funds for HIV/AIDS resulted in significant commitments which fundamentally changed 
the positioning of global public health.   The World Bank launched its Multi-Country 
HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) for Africa in 2000 which recognised the urgency and 
exceptionality of HIV/AIDS and led to the “adoption of flexible approval arrangements 
and less stringent eligibility criteria for MAP funding” (Lisk 2010, p. 103).  Lisk (2010, p. 
78) estimates that through the MAP the World Bank contributed more than US$1.5 bn to 
40 low and middle-income countries between 2000 and 2010.  The Global Fund approved 
its first grants in 2002, and as mentioned in the previous section, in 2003 the United States 
Congress passed the “U.S. Leadership Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act”, 
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which was to become PEPFAR.  New resources for HIV/AIDS were made available at an 
unprecedented scale.  
The ground had been prepared for the emergence of the Global Fund politically and 
diplomatically through the UN and the G8, discursively through positioning health as a 
global public good, backed by a neo-liberal economic rationale that argued for an 
increased investment in health, one that could be managed and measured.  At the same 
time significant new funding sources to combat HIV/AIDS were made available.  Global 
public health and HIV/AIDS in particular had moved decisively out of the realm of 
national social policy and onto the world stage, the subject of high politics and in the 
interests of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful states. 
3. Opening the Door to Private Actors 
The UN and the Private Sector 
The UN system through its discourse on global public goods described the cooperation 
between public and private actors needed to address global health challenges.  To consider 
the UN’s relationship with the private sector, it is necessary to consider what the UN views 
as constituting what Forman and Segaar (2006, p. 208) describe as private actors in public 
spaces.  It is best to say at the outset that an accepted wisdom or seminal definition of what 
constitutes private actors including civil society and the more challenging notion of global 
civil society are elusive and the ideas remain deeply contested.
4
  Nevertheless, although 
the UN (1999, p. 1) has acknowledged ambiguity in its definition of the private sector, the 
Joint Inspection Unit’s 1999 report on the involvement of the private sector with the UN 
(1999, p. 1) defined it as a component of civil society which encompasses “members of the 
business community (from small and medium-sized enterprises to major multinational 
corporations and including the informal sector) and their representatives (who may act 
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through not-for profit associations or organizations such as Chambers of Commerce or 
philanthropic Foundations).” This definition excludes NGOs.   
The definition of private sector in the 2004 Cardoso report on civil society relations with 
the UN (2004, p.13) was consistent with the Joint Inspection Unit’s 1999 version, although 
it did acknowledge “boundaries between the actors are porous” noting particular questions 
of whether or not private foundations, internet-facilitated communications and small and 
medium-sized enterprises supported by governments or NGOs are private sector when they 
demonstrate civil society characteristics.  Therefore, while there is no one, accepted UN 
definition of the private sector, it can generally be taken to mean from the UN’s point of 
view firms of all sizes and their representatives excluding NGOs.  Later sections of this 
chapter will address private actors outside of these UN definitions including civil society 
and its role in public health implementation and private foundations, in particular the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
A strong rationale used by the UN to promote cooperation with the private sector was its 
own resource and capacity constraints.  In preparation for the UN Millennium Summit held 
in September 2000, the Secretary-General (2000c, p. 40) released ‘We the Peoples’:  The 
Role of the United Nations in the 21
st
 Century which stated that the UN “has increasingly 
been required to do more with less. This, in turn, has required greater collaboration 
between our agencies and more partnerships with actors in civil society and the private 
sector.”    The Millennium Declaration which arose from the summit underscored this 
intent and in December of the same year, the UN adopted a resolution Towards Global 
Partnerships which acknowledged that efforts to meet the challenges of globalisation 
could “benefit from enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and all relevant 
partners, in particular the private sector, in order to ensure that globalization becomes a 
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positive force for all” (United Nations 2000a, p. 1).  While it was clear from the UN’s 
point of view that it could gain new resources, financial and otherwise from partnerships 
with the private sector, it was less clear, or at least not well articulated what the private 
sector’s interests might be, the magnitude of its contribution or extent of its involvement 
and whether or not private interests could align with the UN’s vision for the positive forces 
of globalisation. 
The resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly at the beginning of the millennium 
reflected the UN’s interest in working with the private sector.5  In health, the examples are 
directed at the pharmaceutical industry and the benefits of public private partnerships.  In 
We the Peoples, developed countries and the pharmaceutical industry were challenged to 
work together to find an effective and affordable HIV vaccine (United Nations 2000c, p. 
28) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) was cited as a model 
of what “innovative public-private partnerships, supported by public incentive systems, 
[to]… stimulate the increased investments…can achieve” (United Nations 2000c, p. 28). 
At the beginning of the millennium the UN had set itself formidable challenges in the form 
of the MDGs and had swung open the door to working with the private sector in order to 
achieve them. 
The UN’s openness to increasing cooperation with the private sector created a tension 
which Slaughter (2004a, p. 169) described as a “merging and blurring of [the] lines of 
authority…[which] are ultimately likely to blur the distinction between public legitimacy 
and private power.”  Bartsch (2007b, p. 3) identifies this tension between the public and 
the private in GHIs like the Global Fund, asserting that these partnerships,  
…contribute to innovative and effective solutions to certain policy 
problems…[but] they are [also] associated with considerable challenges, as they 
 63 
allow private interests to gain significant influence on processes of agenda-setting 
and policy-making in global health. The fact that non-state actors are not 
authorized to do so in the same way state actors are…challenges both the 
legitimacy of GPPPs [Global Public Private Partnerships or GHIs] and of the 
system of global health governance. 
The issue of the dissolution of the liberal notion of legitimate public authority is discussed 
further in Chapter 6.  The UN embraced the notion of working with the private sector and 
for organisations like the Global Fund this created a tension that persists. 
The Gates Foundation and the Power of Philanthropy 
In the 1990s, one private actor appeared which has been especially influential in global 
health.  The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (the Gates Foundation) was created in 
1994 with an initial stock gift of approximately US$94 mm (Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation 2009a, ‘Foundation Timeline’).  By 2009 the Gates Foundation had the largest 
endowment of any private foundation in the world and had distributed over US$12 bn in 
grants to global health research and initiatives (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
‘Grants Overview’, 2009b).  To provide a point of comparison, in 2007 the amount spent 
by the Gates Foundation on global health was almost more than the WHO’s entire budget 
(McCoy, Kembhavi, Patel and Luintel 2009, p. 1645). 
The Gates Foundation derives its influence from the level of financing it provides and also 
through its strategic selection of recipients.  For example, “ActionAid International 
received a grant of just under [US]$11 mm to develop a network of non-governmental 
organisations to monitor and lobby European governments and the European Commission 
to support the right to health” (McCoy, Kembhavi, Patel and Luintel 2009, p. 1647). The 
WHO received 69 grants between 1998 and 2007 worth a total of US$336 mm making the 
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Gates Foundation one of the biggest donors to the WHO, exceeding the contributions of 
most G20 governments (McCoy, Kembhavi, Patel and Luintel 2009, p. 1648).  Some 
grants to the World Bank were channelled to other recipients, but others “seem to have 
been awarded to support World Bank activities related to disease control and health 
systems” and two grants were awarded to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
arm of the World Bank that supports private sector development (McCoy, Kembhavi, Patel 
and Luintel 2009, p. 1648).  The Gates Foundation has funded global health to effect 
change and achieve influence through multiple routes. 
All the key contributors to global health have an association with the Gates Foundation 
through some sort of funding arrangement. Coupled with the large amount of money 
involved, these relations give the foundation a great degree of influence over both the 
architecture and policy agenda of global health. Through its funding of NGOs and policy 
think tanks, the foundation also confers power and influence on select organisations and in 
doing so, establishes some leverage over the voice of civil society (McCoy, Kembhavi, 
Patel and Luintel 2009, p. 1650). 
In addition to the level of financing it provides and its strategic selection of recipients, the 
third way the Gates Foundation asserts its influence is through governance.  It has a seat on 
many of the boards of directors
6
 of the organisations in which it has invested.  This 
includes the Global Fund to which the Gates Foundation pledged US$100 mm in June 
2001 just ahead of the G8 Summit which endorsed the Global Fund’s creation (United 
Nations Foundation 2001).  It has also been involved in setting the agenda of the G8 
(McCoy, Kembhavi, Patel and Luintel 2009, p. 1650) and it participates in a group known 
as the Health Eight (H8) which includes the WHO, the World Bank, GAVI, the Global 
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Fund, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), and UNAIDS.   
Few discussions of how networks function for advocacy, knowledge or policy take into 
account such a deliberate, consistent and multi-pronged effort by a private actor who also 
brings considerable resources.   Keck and Sikkink (1999, p. 100) describe interactions 
among participants in transnational advocacy networks that result in mutual 
transformation.  Benner, Reinicke, Witte and Martin (2004, p. 197) argue that while these 
networks raise questions about accountability, they have created “new venues for 
participation beyond the closed shops of the ‘club model’ of international cooperation.” 
However, the purposeful engagement of the Gates Foundation is closer to the ‘club model’ 
of behaviour then Benner et al. concede.  Stone (2002, p. 8) observes that, “[n]etworks 
behave in a ‘clublike’ fashion. Elitism, gate keeping and the domination of certain interests 
are tendencies that undermine the inclusion of new voices in networks. Participation is 
dependent on cognitive resources, expert status or professional experience.”  In the case of 
the Gates Foundation, it is not just its expertise that wins influence, as other private 
foundations which have been active in global health for many decades like the Rockefeller 
Foundation also have expertise.  Rather, its level of financing, its granting and investment 
strategy and its governance role have succeeded in making it a uniquely influential private 
actor, one that shapes the global health agenda, acts on civil society as well as multilateral 
leaders and distinguishes itself from the traditional patron role that many private 
foundations have played. 
Civil Society and ‘the Thousand Points of Light’ 
Historically as alluded to in the previous section, the concept of civil society has changed 
relative to “the different ways in which consent was generated in different periods, and the 
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different issues that were important at different times” (Kaldor 2003, p. 585).  The  rich 
historical, cultural and epistemological debates on the meaning of civil society and the 
meaning of global civil society remain deeply contested and will not be explored or 
resolved in this thesis (see p. 60), but some conception is needed for the purposes of 
discussion and analysis. Does civil society refer to nationally based non-state organisations 
such as trade unions, schools, churches and clubs, or does it refer to international 
organisations which participate in trade and markets (Kumar 2007, p. 417)?  Is civil 
society a process of activism where “…individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against or 
agree with each other and with the centres of political and economic authority” (Kaldor 
2003, p. 585), or is it a neoliberal conception where “both ‘insiders’ like NGOs and 
‘outsiders’ like social movements” gain access to power (Kaldor 2003, p. 590)?   The 
answers to these questions where this thesis is concerned is, perhaps unhelpfully, ‘yes’.  As 
will be discussed in the next section and in Chapter 3, the Global Fund’s country level 
governance model in particular engages a range of non-state actors in health care delivery 
but agenda setting remains in the hands of the elite.  Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 4 
international NGOs like Médicins sans Frontières have and continue to play a significant 
role in the market for essential medicines like anti-retrovirals, facilitating their 
affordability by and availability in developing countries.  The discussion later in this 
section and in Chapter 4 will highlight the significant activist role of non-state actors in 
changing policy related to HIV/AIDS both that of governments and international 
institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).  And lastly as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, the Global Fund’s global level governance model is an example of a 
“respectable” (Kaldor 2003, p. 590) neoliberal concept of civil society where among the 
non-state delegations on the board, one represents people living with or in communities 
affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria.  What can be taken from these examples is 
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that interpretations of civil society are fluid (Zürn 2002, p. 248); nevertheless, civil society 
is interwoven in the Global Fund’s governance and intrinsic to global and country level 
HIV/AIDS responses. 
Given this ‘fluidity’ it is no surprise then that policy makers have struggled to define this 
social force with which they engage.  The WHO (2001b, p. 3-4) in its 2001 discussion 
paper on the role of civil society in health offered its version: 
In the absence of common understanding or definition, civil society is usually 
understood as the social arena that exists between the state and the individual or 
household. Civil society…provides the social power or influence of ordinary 
people…Within this social domain, individuals and groups organize themselves 
into civil society organizations (CSOs) to pursue their collective interests and 
engage in activities of public importance…CSOs are broadly understood to be non-
state, not-for-profit, voluntary organizations. In reality, however, there may be state 
or market links to CSOs that blur the borders…States or the private for-profit 
sector may play a key role in the establishment of some CSOs or provide 
significant funding, calling into question their independence from the state and 
private sectors…Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are considered part of 
civil society and the term is often used interchangeably with the term CSOs, 
particularly in the health sector. 
The WHO’s definition includes almost every type of non-state activity, but it does not 
allude to what scholars variably call “global civil society” (Keane 2001, p. 23; Kaldor 
2003, p. 596; Kumar 2007, p. 414), or “transnational networks” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 
p. 90), or as Castells claims, a type of international public sphere which exists “within the 
political/institutional space that is not subject to any particular sovereign power but, 
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instead, is shaped by the variable geometry of relationships between states and global 
nonstate actors” (Castells 2008, p. 80).  Piot et al. (2008, pp. 852-3) point to the 
complexity that this rich diversity brings to HIV/AIDS prevention in particular:   
…the challenge has been to join these efforts [to address HIV/AIDS prevention] 
into a coherent movement that is able to shift social norms and sexual and drug-use 
practices. Instead, the demands of these sectors have been competing or 
contradictory: community versus state, religious versus secular, local versus 
international, private versus public and medical versus social. 
Civil society then, particularly related to HIV/AIDS, inhabits a social arena between the 
state and individual and national and international spheres.  Its inherent diversity means 
that it cannot be taken to be a cohesive whole, but rather a diverse and loose collection of 
non-state actors with varied ideologies and interests relative to the political authority of the 
state and international institutions and the economic authority of the market.    
Civil society has long had a role in country level health care service delivery. Boone and 
Batsell (2001, p. 13) describe the rise of civil society in health, and in particular health 
service delivery, as a product of neo-liberal structural adjustment policies: 
In the 1980s, proponents of structural adjustment and state shrinking embraced 
voluntary associations as "the thousand points of light" that could help supply the 
social services and safety nets the state could no longer afford to provide. Across 
the [African] continent, NGO service providers began to solicit and receive direct 
funding from official and non-governmental international agencies. "Development 
funding" bypassed states and went directly into the hands of local, decentralized, 
citizen-controlled organizations. 
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This role was evident in Malawi where the Christian Health Association of Malawi 
(CHAM), a collection of faith-based, private charities provides 26% of the country’s health 
services (Carlson et al. 2008b, p. 24). CHAM is just one slice of non-state actors engaged 
in implementing Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response primarily as sub-recipients of Global Fund 
grants which also includes professional associations, associations for people living with 
disease, business associations and a range of national and international NGOs (the roles of 
these actors are described in Chapter 4).   
The engagement of civil society in health service delivery has been a critical element of 
many countries’ scaled up response to their HIV/AIDS epidemics, featuring strongly not 
only because CSOs offer capacity and community reach but also because they  advocate 
for the rights of those affected by the epidemic (Teixeira, Vitoria and Barcarolo 2004, p. 
S6; Piot 2005, p. 13; The Global Fund (no date-a), p. 39; Piot, Bartos, Larson, Zewdie and 
Mane 2008, p. 854; Doyle and Patel 2008, p. 1931). The Global Fund, for example has 
disbursed approximately 40% of its grants to civil society including NGOs, faith based and 
private sector organisations such as private foundations
7 
providing resources to sustain 
these organisations and also legitimising the role they play. Critics argue that this 
‘bypassing’ of government dilutes state influence with international organisations and 
undermines authority within its own borders (Doyle and Patel 2008, p. 1935). The role of 
civil society in health service delivery in developing countries is unlikely to diminish and 
national CSOs—although this was not in clear evidence in Malawi for this research—may 
contribute to national agenda setting and policy making.  Practically, developing countries 
with weak health systems rely on CSOs to form part of the health system infrastructure for 
their HIV/AIDS responses which in turn facilitates CSOs’ unprecedented access to 
funding. 
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Beyond the practical nature of civil society’s involvement in health care, the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic has highlighted its powerful activism which has had a galvanizing, political 
effect.  Peter Piot (2005, p. 11), Executive Director of UNAIDS from 1994 to 2008 noted 
that, 
[t]he history of the pandemic shows that in virtually every country – rich, middling 
and poor – that has succeeded in curbing its epidemic, or shows the promise of 
doing so, it has been because of the interplay between activism and responsible 
governance.  This is as true of the UK and the US as of Brazil and Thailand…And 
this is true too of the international response, whether in terms of action on 
treatment access, human rights or financing the response. 
It is impossible in the confines of this discussion to do the global and national, developed 
and developing country and historic and present day landscapes of civil society activism 
justice. However, two brief examples related to HIV/AIDS follow for illustration.  In the 
United States, ACT UP was an organisation rooted in the gay rights movement that gained 
prominence in the late 1980s when the epidemic in that country largely affected 
homosexual men.  It is known for its slogan, “silence=death.” ACT UP and organisations 
like it employed civil disobedience, public demonstrations, and informed discussions with 
decision makers to bring pressure to bear on researchers, health officials and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to get access to drugs for HIV infected people before the 
Food and Drug Administration had completed its approval process, lower the cost of anti-
retroviral drugs and secure a considerable allocation from Congress for AIDS research 
(Wachter 1992, p. 129).  Several years later South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign 
succeeded first against pharmaceutical manufacturers to allow parallel imports
8
 of anti-
retroviral drugs and second against its own government to provide access to anti-retroviral 
therapy for mothers to prevent transmission to newborn children and subsequently for 
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people living with HIV/AIDS (Friedman and Mottiar 2005, p. 514).  Treatment Action 
Campaign used the courts, public demonstrations, disobedience and its connections to 
South Africa’s powerful trade unions to overcome a climate of fear and denial including 
opposition from the country’s President.  Piot et al. (2008, p. 852) note that “over the 
history of HIV/AIDS, political processes have often come together to create a mass 
popular demand...[and]…In many instances, this demand has coincided with periods of 
social and political transformation.”  ACT UP and Treatment Action Campaign are only 
two of many examples in countries throughout the world where civil society activism 
related to HIV/AIDS has achieved significant political change. 
The Global Fund involved civil society from its inception (The Global Fund no date-a, p. 
8) although as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 arguably agenda setting remains in the hands 
of the elite.  The Global Fund credits civil society’s HIV/AIDS advocacy campaigns with 
helping to secure a four-fold increase in funding from multilateral and bilateral 
international organisations and donor governments between 2001 and 2006 to fight the 
disease (The Global Fund no date-a, p. 8).  It also claims that civil society’s role in the 
design of the Global Fund “led to a sense of ownership; the Global Fund was an initiative 
that they had helped to create, fund and govern” (The Global Fund 2011a, ‘Civil Society 
and the Private Sector’).  Civil society’s role in global public health and the response to the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in particular has had wide reaching effects both practically in terms 
of its role as a provider of treatment and care as part of the health system infrastructure in 
many developing countries and politically in terms of its successful activism on a global 
scale.  
The Virtue of Independence and a Bias for Action 
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It is possible that the many factors that provided the opportunity for the Global Fund’s 
creation—the broad political support from the UN and the G8, the recognition that fighting 
infectious disease is a global public good requiring international cooperation among public 
and private actors for its provision, the call for significant increases in donor government 
financing for global health, the availability of and influence associated with new sources of 
private funds to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and the pivotal role of civil 
society--could have resulted in a new unit or programme under an already existing global 
health organisations such as the WHO or UNAIDS.  Instead, the UN and donor 
governments chose to create a constitutionally private and independent organisation 
outside of the UN system and the Bretton Woods Institutions.
9
  There was a desire to 
create a new mechanism for global health with an operational model that borrowed from 
the private sector while maintaining public characteristics.  Buse and Walt (2000a, p. 551) 
note that one factor which made a public/private partnership model attractive was the 
“growing disillusionment with the UN and its agencies.”  Kickbusch (2009, p. 323) cites 
the erosion of trust in the effectiveness of the WHO and Buse and Walt (2000a, p. 552) 
describe the perception that “[p]artnerships that are housed outside the UN bureaucracy are 
viewed as a way of getting things done, and, when industry is involved, getting things done 
efficiently.”  There was belief in the virtue of independence from the UN and that 
‘privateness’ lent a bias for action. 
The lack of confidence in traditional multilateral organisations was reflected in the 
principles that emerged from consultations by the Global Fund’s Transitional Working 
Group in 2001.
10
  This included linking resources to the achievement of results (now 
known as performance-based funding) and breaking from “business as usual” to make 
more efficient use of donor resources, with lower transaction costs (WHO 2002, p. 1).  The 
Transitional Working Group was established in July 2001, the board of the Global Fund 
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had its first meeting in January 2002 and the first round of funding for US$565 mm for 55 
programmes in 36 countries was approved in April 2002. The Global Fund moved quickly 
to set up its governance and become operational.  Its ‘private’ nature was evident in its 
initial consitution and in the expectations it set for efficiency which helped it to mobilise 
donor support and set it apart from the negative attributes associated with the slow moving 
bureaucracy of UN organisations. 
The new millennium saw a transformation in how the international system addressed 
global public health concerns.  A confluence of events including political support, a global 
public goods discourse underpinned with a neo-liberal economic framing and an 
unprecedented scale of new resources which were made available for HIV/AIDS in 
particular prepared the ground for the emergence of the Global Fund self-described as a 
public/private partnership.    The next section will describe the Global Fund as a form of 
institutional innovation among traditional multilaterals with specific reference to the 
WHO. 
4. Creating an Innovative International Institution  
The Global Fund’s design is a form of institutional innovation which distinguishes it from 
most GHIs and also from traditional multilaterals like the WHO.  Taken together, the 
Global Fund’s global and country level governance models, its modus operandi of 
transparency and performance-based funding, its unprecedented resource mobilisation and 
distribution and finally its initial, vertically focused mandate comprise its unique design 
and its strategic strength.  As a result, the Global Fund stands apart from traditional 
multilaterals even though it operates among them; moreover, as will be argued in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis, the Global Fund’s design provides new sources of 
legitimacy, underpins its accountability mechanisms and ultimately contributes to its 
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growing authority at global and country levels.  The Global Fund is a form of institutional 
innovation which has disrupted the multilateral order particularly where health is 
concerned, belying its modest inception as a GHI intended to serve as a financing 
mechanism for MDG 6. 
Governance Beyond States 
The WHO, UNAIDS and the Global Fund form a continuum of departure from a 
traditional multilateral ‘states as members’ governance model.  In the section that follows, 
the original constitution of each institution will be briefly described followed by a 
comparison of the WHO and the Global Fund’s governance models at global and country 
levels. 
The WHO, the most traditional among the three organisations, is constituted as an UN 
organisation and is governed by a ‘one member, one vote’ model among states which 
comprise its overarching governing body, the World Health Assembly.  At global level, 
UNAIDS occupies a middle ground.  The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is 
UNAIDS’ parent organisation and it functions as a partnership of UN organisations, 
referred to as co-sponsors, the initial six of which included:  the WHO, UNICEF, the 
UNDP, the UNFPA, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and the World Bank.  Added to these original cosponsors are the United 
Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  UNAIDS is also an organisation with controversial 
beginnings.  It was created in 1996 by moving the Global Program on AIDS out of the 
WHO.  As Lee (2009, p. 62) notes, “[f]or the WHO, the creation of UNAIDS was an 
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institutional “slap in the face,” an expression of the loss of faith by donor governments in 
the organization’s capacity to lead a global disease campaign.”   
The Global Fund’s original constitution departs from the traditional multilateral WHO and 
the quasi-multilateral UNAIDS.  The Global Fund was originally constituted as a private 
foundation in Switzerland and acquired “international juridical personality and legal 
capacity” in 2004 (The Global Fund 2004, p. 2)--status as an international organisation--
even though its governance model at both global and country levels diversifies 
participation beyond states and beyond the UN system.
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   As was discussed earlier in this 
chapter, disillusionment with the UN system and the WHO and a desire to get things done 
efficiently and quickly underpinned the Global Fund’s independence  (Buse and Walt 
2000a, p. 551 and 552; Kickbusch 2009, p. 323), echoing some of the dissatisfaction 
surrounding the founding of UNAIDS.   
The composition of the Global Fund’s board makes evident its intention to diverge from 
the ‘states as members’ traditional multilateral model of the WHO (see Chapter 3 for a 
discussion on the Global Fund’s inclusive governance as a source of legitimacy).  It 
includes delegations representing state and non-state actors such as donor countries, 
recipient countries, developing country NGOs, developed country NGOs, the private 
sector (in this case meaning for-profit business and corporations), private foundations and 
people living with or communities affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria.  Among 
the non-state actor delegations at the end of 2010 were NGOs such as the African Council 
of AIDS Service Organizations (AfriCASO) representing the developing country NGO 
delegation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation representing the private foundation 
delegation, and the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
representing the private sector delegation.  In addition, non-voting members included the 
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WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank (the Global Fund’s trustee), a representative of the 
Global Fund’s partner constituency, its Executive Director and as required to maintain its 
legal status in Switzerland, a Swiss law firm.  The Global Fund’s inclusion of non-state 
actors in its global level governance and their diversity distinguishes it from a traditional 
multilateral and reflects what Kaldor (2003, p. 590) might describe as a “respectable” neo-
liberal engagement of civil society where activist groups gain access to power. 
Even though both the WHO and the Global Fund are global health organisations operating 
in the multilateral order, they have different governing models ‘below’ global level 
particularly with respect to the WHO’s regional structures and the Global Fund’s country 
level governance.  The WHO has a country presence through its country offices which 
report to a Regional Director.  In the case of the WHO, its constitution sets out its regional 
structure and the policy making role of the six regional offices.   As Lee (2009, pp. 31-2) 
describes, in practice this regional structure creates a second organisational entity under 
the World Health Assembly rather than one organisation aligned at global level: 
The six regional offices of the WHO are somewhat unique within the UN system in 
their degree of independence and decision-making power.  Regional committees 
meet annually to formulate policies with a regional dimension, review the regional 
program budget proposed by the Regional Director, and monitor the WHO’s 
collaborative activities for health development in that region.  In principle, 
decisions are then formally approved by the WHA [World Health Assembly] and 
the Executive Board to ensure that they are appropriate to global policies.  In 
practice, the agendas of these bodies have grown to such an extent that tight policy 
and budgetary control is not possible.  This has given Regional Directors and 
committees considerable discretion over their activities. 
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The WHO’s constitution created a management challenge by granting regions the authority 
to set policy and report directly to the World Health Assembly, bypassing the WHO 
secretariat. 
The Global Fund has a significantly different country governance model, notably because 
unlike the WHO and Bretton Woods Institutions, it includes non-state actors and, rather 
than being a form of in-country Global Fund representation similar to the models of the 
WHO and UNAIDS, it is independent. The Global Fund describes its country level 
governance model as ‘country owned’ (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of ‘country 
ownership’ and its practice in Malawi).  At its core are the Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (CCM), Principal Recipients and a Local Fund Agent none of which are part 
of the Global Fund organisation proper.  The Global Fund requires a CCM to develop and 
make applications to the Global Fund and to oversee the Principal Recipients’ 
implementation (The Global Fund, no date-b, p. 2).  The Global Fund’s CCM guidelines 
encourage CCMs “to be broadly representative of all national stakeholders in the fight 
against the three diseases”, and goes on to say that “[t]he role and function of each player 
within the partnership of the CCM will be agreed on by the mechanism” (The Global 
Fund, no date-b, p. 3).  Given this flexible and deliberately non-prescriptive guidance it is 
therefore not surprising that Shakow (2006, p. 25) found that,  
[i]n practice, CCM leadership, composition and practices have varied widely, and 
they have had a mixed record of effectiveness… So while they were designed to 
help increase public participation, and in some cases have done so, in other 
instances they are considered a “real headache” that fragments the management of 
AIDS and broader health work in-country and creates a time-consuming “talk-
shop.” 
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If a grant is approved, the Global Fund enters into a Grant Agreement with a Principal 
Recipient and contracts with a Local Fund Agent in an audit function to monitor, verify 
and report on grant performance.  The fact that CCMs, Principal Recipients and Local 
Fund Agents perform governance functions but are not part of the Global Fund itself, and 
the intent in the case of CCMs that they engage actors from the state and non-state and 
national and international spheres to create a national forum to address the three diseases is 
clearly quite different from the WHO’s more traditional model of regional and country 
presence with formal reporting lines to the World Health Assembly.  
On the one hand the Global Fund’s inclusion of non-state actors at global and country 
levels and the independence of its in-country governance could be seen as providing a 
more participative model of engagement and oversight beyond that of the state.  On the 
other hand, as will be discussed further in Chapters 3 and 5, the ‘national public sphere’ 
created by the Global Fund’s country level governance model takes on an elite identity.  In 
addition, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the Global Fund’s lack of country 
presence creates practical challenges for its partners whose staff provide considerable 
technical assistance to CCMs to prepare applications and report on performance.  The 
Global Fund’s departure from the WHO’s more traditional ‘states as members’ model 
creates all the problems that Slaughter (2004a, p. 169) and Bartsch (2007b, p. 3) raised 
when they described the lines between public legitimacy and private power as blurred.   
Transparency and Performance-Based Funding 
The Global Fund has adopted a transparent and performance-based ‘modus operandi’ (The 
Global Fund 2010c, ‘Global Fund Principles’). (Chapter 3 offers a discussion on the 
Global Fund’s transparency and performance-based funding as sources of legitimacy).  
When the Global Fund was first established, it set new standards for both transparency and 
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performance-based funding among multilaterals.  Its website remains a public accounting 
of its decision making and grant performance that few imitate.  In their analysis of the 
interplay between transparency, participation and accountability of the international 
economic organisations, Woods and Narlikar (2001, p. 575) note a dramatic increase in 
information sharing by these institutions particularly through their websites, although the 
authors caution that increased information sharing does not constitute increased 
accountability.  Transparency in the case of the Global Fund complements a normative 
conception of its ‘publicness’ as an international institution delivering a global public 
good.   However, as Woods and Narlikar point out, transparency is not the same as a 
formal mechanism that holds the Global Fund to account either to donors, to grant 
recipients or to those whose lives it affects.     
Together, the Global Fund’s transparency and performance-based funding approach 
perform a compelling communication and advocacy function, particularly to donors.  As 
one Global Fund Executive (2009, interview, Geneva) observed, “[t]he Global Fund 
achieves concrete results which are easier to communicate to donors and to the media.  It’s 
something that every [donor] Ministry can easily communicate to the public...  it is a 
success story that you may want to be associated with… This is quite significant for 
donors.”  Buse and Harmer (Buse and Harmer 2007, p. 261) citing Lele et al. (Lele et al. 
2005, p. xxii) note the role that communication has in resource mobilisation and allocation: 
GHPs [Global Health Partnerships or GHIs] have been successful in raising the 
profile of certain diseases on policy agendas by concentrating on brand-building 
and public relations. They have been able to mobilise funding commitments by 
allocating proportionately more resources to advocacy and communications than 
conventional international health organisations…Consequently, public attention to 
problems of global health is at an all time high, and significant additional resources 
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have been generated for efforts to combat communicable diseases and to stimulate 
the development of new products. 
The Global Fund’s transparency and its performance-based funding ethos are an element 
of its design that underpin its resource mobilisation and therefore provide significant 
strategic value. 
The Global Fund embedded tracking of and reporting on the performance of its grants 
from inception.  The Global Fund describes its ‘virtuous cycle’ as ‘raise it, invest it, prove 
it’.  The Global Fund is not the only international organisation to adopt a performance-
based approach but it provides an extremely successful example for using it to make a case 
to donors and is credited in some instances with improving country capacity to track and 
report on results (Brugha et al. 2004, p. 100; Bartsch 2007a, p. 160; Lorenz 2007, p. 567; 
WHO 2009, p. 2154).  The Global Fund maintains that grant performance targets are 
‘owned’ by the country, not the Global Fund:  
Importantly, performance-based funding is based on radical country ownership of 
targets and implementation, with limited interference by the Global Fund as the 
donor. Implementation plans and targets are proposed by countries (with no formal 
involvement of the Global Fund), agreed upon by representatives of government, 
civil society, and people affected by the diseases in country (as part of a country 
coordinating mechanism), and reviewed by an international technical review panel. 
Performance is measured against what is realistic to achieve in country in a specific 
timescale (Low Beer et al. 2007, p. 1309). 
The success of the Global Fund’s ‘raise it, invest it, prove it’ model is in part due to the 
vertical nature of its mandate.  As the Global Fund expands beyond this initial focus, 
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‘proving it’--as is discussed in the next section on the scope of the Global Fund’s mandate-
-will become a more challenging task.   
The WHO also tracks performance linking its strategies to indicators and resources against 
which it reports (WHO 2008d).  However, the nature of its operations--some of which 
have challenging-to-communicate outcomes related to technical standards, research or 
advocacy--and the fact it reports on its own performance rather than that of grantees, does 
not always lend itself to the same type of communication engaged in by the Global Fund.  
For example one of the WHO’s indicators in its Medium Term Strategic Plan 2008-2013 is 
the “number of new or updated global norms and quality standards for medicines and 
diagnostic tools for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria” (WHO 2008d, p. 122).  While a 
critical function, from a communications standpoint it may be challenging to convey 
success against this standard outside of the organisation. Compare this to the Global 
Fund’s reporting of the collective results of its grant recipients that “by the end of 2008 
there were two million HIV-positive people receiving lifesaving ARVs [anti-retrovirals] 
(an increase of 560,000 from December 2007)” (The Global Fund 2009c, no page).  While 
both organisations use a performance management approach as a tool of ‘good 
governance’, the Global Fund is accomplished at using this aspect of its operations to 
communicate its recipients’ accomplishments and in turn support its resource mobilisation 
efforts. 
Although the practices of transparency and performance-based funding contribute to 
accountability, as Woods and Narlikar (2001, p. 575) point out they are not enough to 
constitute it.  Rather, the Global Fund’s adoption of its distinct modus operandi and its 
ability to set new standards in this regard among multilateral organisations is a form of 
institutional innovation and one with clear strategic value.  As will be discussed in Chapter 
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3, this modus operandi is also closely linked to the Global Fund’s legitimacy and its 
capacity to legitimise (Barker 2000, p. 9; Baumgartner and Jones 2009, p. xx).  It is 
difficult for the WHO and indeed for most multilaterals to imitate the Global Fund in this 
regard because their organisations and scope are more complex than the Global Fund’s 
original mandate as a financing mechanism for three diseases.  As the Global Fund 
expands its scope and deepens its own complexity, measuring and communicating its 
‘raise it, invest it, prove it’ successes are likely to become more challenging. 
Unparalleled Resource Mobilisation and Distribution 
The scale of the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation and distribution is unparalleled (see 
Chapter 3 for a discussion on the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation as a source of 
legitimacy).  The Global Fund has made more resources available to combat HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria than any other UN or Bretton Woods Institution.  Figure 1 shows 
the resources available to the Global Fund, the WHO and UNAIDS in the 2002 to 2007 
period and although the figures are not directly comparable, they do provide a sense of 
relative scale (see p. 273 for a more detailed accounting and comparison).  As Figure 1 
shows, between 2002 and 2007, the Global Fund received pledges totalling approximately 
US$9.62 bn to fight three diseases.  Of that it disbursed approximately US$7.82 bn.  In the 
same period, the WHO’s entire budget for all programmes, of which nearly half is spent on 
personnel, was approximately US$8.10 bn (WHO 2008d, p. 3).  UNAIDS, a UN 
organisation which is the main advocate for global action to fight HIV/AIDS and related 
diseases such as tuberculosis, had a total unified budget between 2002 and 2007 (a budget 
comprised of commitments from its UN partners, including the WHO, and the World 
Bank) of just US$1.66 bn.   The only fund of comparable size to the Global Fund is the 
bilateral U.S. PEPFAR which describes itself as “the largest commitment by any nation to 
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combat a single disease in history” (PEPFAR 2010a, ‘About PEPFAR’).  PEPFAR 
disbursed US$12.66 bn in the period 2004 to 2008, of which US$2.76 bn went to the 
Global Fund (PEPFAR 2010c, ‘Summary Financial Status’).  The scale of resources 
committed by donor governments collectively and the U.S. government’s unprecedented 
funding through PEPFAR means that more resources than ever before have been disbursed 
to countries not just for health but for the three diseases highlighted in MDG 6 and 
particularly for HIV/AIDS.   The Global Fund might be similar to PEPFAR in magnitude 
of funds raised and disbursed, but its multilateral character is distinct from PEPFAR’s 
bilateralism, its sources of funds and their governance broader. 
The Global Fund and the WHO have very different mandates and models but they do have 
in common their primary source for resources:  donor governments.  Although the Global 
Fund describes itself as a public/private partnership, from a resource perspective it relies 
heavily on public sources.  Through to 2010 donor governments contributed 96% of the 
Global Fund’s pledges (The Global Fund 2010e, ‘Our Resources’). The WHO relies on its 
member states for its assessed funds which in 2006-2007 comprised approximately 25% of 
its budget (WHO 2008c, p. 3).  The remaining 75% of its budget in this period was 
Figure 1:  Select Resource Mobilisation 2002-07 (based on figures from p. 273) 
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comprised of resources mobilised from:   member states (51.5%), UN and 
intergovernmental organisations (25.2%) and the remaining 23.3% from a combination of 
the private sector, NGOs, foundations, local governments, supply of services funds and 
interest income (WHO 2008c, p. 5).  The WHO then, like the Global Fund, relies on 
fundraising and donor governments in particular for its budget and programmes. 
Ravishankar et al. (2009, pp. 2121-2) argue that mobilising resources for health from 
donor governments is a competitive business, the implication being that the Global Fund’s 
success is the WHO’s failure:   
The expansion of resources for global health especially in the past 10 years has 
been accompanied by a major change in the institutional landscape. Two new and 
large channels of resource flows, the Global Fund and GAVI, have attracted a 
growing share of funds, while the proportion of assistance going to UN agencies 
and development banks has decreased during this period… To sustain their present 
role, the UN agencies—especially WHO and UNICEF—have to compete with 
recipient countries, NGOs, and other organisations for available DAH 
[development assistance for health] funds. This steady shift to a competitive model 
of funding runs the risks of undermining their crucial role as trusted neutral brokers 
between the scientific and technical communities on the one hand, and 
governments of developing countries on the other. 
The Global Fund’s competitive edge over traditional multilaterals like the WHO in 
resource mobilisation and distribution lies in its innovative design.  It is an organisation 
created to be a financing mechanism and its transparency and performance-based funding 
underpin the idea, or the image (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, p. 37) that donor 
governments’ resources are used effectively in the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
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and malaria rather than being consumed by large bureaucracies with programme outcomes 
that are hard to isolate and measure. 
Staking a Claim beyond the Vertical 
As its name suggests, the Global Fund’s initial mandate was to fight HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria.  This vertical focus distinguished it from the WHO’s much 
broader mandate and the normative and technical roles the WHO fulfils on behalf of its 
193 member states.  However, both organisations are evolving.  The WHO is flexing its 
convenorship muscle, engaging in sophisticated political negotiation of hard instruments in 
global administrative law and the Global Fund is expanding beyond its vertical 
programmatic interventions towards investing in health systems and a National Strategy 
Approach.  Given these changes, a vertical versus a horizontal comparison between the 
two organisations falls short. 
The WHO’s activities serve its 193 member states which include developed country states 
and least developed country (LDC) states.   The WHO is a normative and technical leader 
on global health issues, however, its most influential functions are arguably that of 
coordination and political persuasion. Although 22 functions for the WHO are laid out in 
its constitution (see p. 270 for a comparison of the WHO’s constitution and the Global 
Fund’s by-laws), debates about the WHO’s mandate have occurred since its inception 
(Brown, Cueto and Fee 2006, p. 66; Lee 2009, p. 9):  “…whether expressed in terms of 
social versus biomedicine, normative versus technical (operational) activities, or as priority 
setting amid limited resources, [different views about what the WHO should do have] 
…remained a defining feature of policy debates within the organization” (Lee 2009, p. 21).  
The WHO’s mandate and its strategies and programmes are not set in isolation.  In 
addition to negotiating the priorities of its 193 member states the WHO must also consider 
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its role relative to a proliferation of other participants in global health (Dodgson, Lee and 
Drager 2002, p. 13; Abbott 2007, p. 7) including other UN agencies such as UNICEF, 
GHIs such as the Global Fund, private corporations such as pharmaceutical companies and 
a host of CSOs, each one with an agenda and many with competing interests.   
Buse in his examination of infectious disease partnerships noted that “approximately half 
of the partnerships report adding value through the development of ‘norms and technical 
standards’. In other words, they are, to some extent, governing substantive issue areas 
which had in the past been the preserve of national policy or fallen under the remit of an 
intergovernmental organization, such as the WHO” (Buse 2004, p. 231).   With this excess 
of specialist ‘leaders’ it is not surprising that the WHO performs an important coordinating 
role at global level.
12
  Zacher and Keefe (2008, p. 97) observe that “WHO financial and 
material assistance programs are undoubtedly vital for the recipients, but what global 
intergovernmental bodies such as WHO contribute most to health assistance is their ability 
to facilitate dialogues and promote cooperation among governmental and nongovernmental 
actors.”  Or, in the words of a UN Executive (2009, interview, Geneva) “[t]he WHO’s role, 
quintessentially, is not just to provide the technical support but also the convenorship that 
ensures buy in.  So it’s managing both the political and the technical processes.” 
Contrasting with the WHO’s broad programmatic scope and its convenorship is the Global 
Fund’s initial ‘vertical’ focus on three diseases.  As a financing mechanism to address 
MDG 6, the Global Fund has been successful, but the feasibility and sustainability of 
investing only in disease programmes in countries with weak infrastructures has put 
pressure on this original mandate.  The idea that the Global Fund would be involved in 
health systems was evident in its Framework Document (The Global Fund, no date-c, ‘The 
Framework Document, p. 4), but the board did not explicitly encourage funding proposals 
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for health systems strengthening until 2007 (The Global Fund 2007 ‘Sixteenth Board 
Meeting’) and its National Strategy Approach which strengthens the Global Fund’s health 
system funding platform was approved in 2008 (The Global Fund 2008, no page). (Chapter 
6 discusses the Global Fund’s role in health systems strengthening and its National 
Strategy Approach as they relate to its growing authority at global and country levels).   
Critics of diseased-focused GHIs cite a number of problems with a vertical approach 
including the inability of countries to absorb disease focused resources without technical 
support, duplication of processes at country level among GHIs and other donors, a lack of 
sustainability especially for long term needs such as the provision of anti-retrovirals, and 
the draining of resources from general health services such as child health and the 
prevention of diarrheal diseases (McKinsey 2005, p. 1; Shakow 2006, p. 36; Veenstra and 
Whiteside 2009, p. 311; Khoubesserian 2009, p. 287).  In addition to the Global Fund’s 
Round 7 call for proposals which encouraged attention to health systems strengthening, in 
early 2009 the Executive Directors of the Global Fund and GAVI in a letter to Gordon 
Brown, then-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Robert Zoellick, then-President of 
the World Bank as Co-Chairs of the International Health Partnership (IHP+),  indicated 
their intention “to begin jointly programming GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) resources towards health systems 
strengthening” (Lob-Levyt and Kazatchkine 2009).  The two organisations staked a claim 
beyond the vertical stating that they were “pathfinder organisations” and had become 
“leading investors in health systems” (Lob-Levyt and Kazatchkine 2009). A UN Executive 
observed (2009, interview, Geneva) “[t]he Global Fund money is increasingly predictable.  
GAVI and the Global Fund have predictable funding for longer than any of the bilaterals.  
Both GAVI and the Global Fund have been ‘learning organizations’--they have responded 
to the world and adapted to what countries want.” 
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This tension that the Global Fund faces between vertical, disease-focused interventions and 
horizontal system needs is nothing new (Gonzalez 1965, p. 9; Mills 2005, p. 315; Cueto, 
Brown and Fee 2006, p. 68; Lee 2009, p. 11; Veenstra and Whiteside 2009, p. 302).  For 
example, the WHO in the 1950s adopted a disease focused approach through its Malaria 
Eradication Programme (Lee 2009, p. 11) to which the organisation committed significant 
resources for a period of 15 years (Lee 2009, p. 49).  “Mass campaigns” as Gonzalez 
(1965, p. 55) described them are feasible when technology exists to combat a disease on a 
large scale but he also cautioned that by itself a mass campaign is not a solution arguing 
that “the conduct of mass campaigns and the establishment or improvement of general 
health services must go hand in hand for many years towards the ultimate goal of a unified 
health programme.”  Despite Gonzalez’s point that both the vertical and the horizontal are 
necessary, vertical initiatives were a strategy adopted among global health actors to 
address the significant threat posed by HIV/AIDS.  “The push to implement vertical 
programmes is indeed stronger where epidemics, poverty and weakened health systems 
coincide.  The burden created by a specific disease, such as HIV/AIDS, can become so 
large that priority interventions will result in huge health status gains” (Veenstra and 
Whiteside 2009, p. 302).   
Disease focused GHIs adopt their vertical strategies not only because the technology might 
be available to combat a disease on a large scale but also because vertical strategies are 
palatable to donors and more conducive to performance-based funding approaches.  
“Rather than countries taking ownership so that investment can be made in long-term 
priority setting and planning, donors focus on quick results and measurable returns through 
vertical programming. The focus on these quick results discourages investment in health 
systems and indicates the need for a country-led process of priority setting” (Sridhar and 
Batniji 2008, p. 1190).  Gonzalez’s well-reasoned argument from 40 years ago was 
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expressed succinctly by one UN Executive (2009, interview, Geneva) who described the 
vertical versus horizontal debate in the case of the Global Fund as, 
…a complete load of nonsense.    It has become ‘vertical’ bad, ‘horizontal’ good 
and there are some functions that have to be carried out that are specific to a 
particular disease programme and there are some functions that need to be 
integrated.  The whole vertical horizontal is about turf and money and not about the 
design of how a health service runs.  If you’ve run a health service, you know that 
sometimes you need some specific facilities and sometimes you need to draw on 
the system. 
The Global Fund’s initial focus on three diseases was closely linked to its performance-
based funding and its resource mobilisation and distribution efforts—in other words it was 
core to its innovative design.  Its expansion of its mandate towards investing in health 
systems could be argued as necessary in order to sustain the gains it has made in the fight 
against the three diseases.  On the other hand, by staking a claim beyond the vertical, the 
Global Fund risks muddying its ability satisfy donors by proving programmatic results.  
From the perspective of institutional innovation the Global Fund’s initial vertical focus 
gave it a foothold to establish its leadership of global and country level public health for 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. While its expanding scope is unlikely to eclipse the 
WHO’s convenorship role in the near future, it could make the Global Fund’s successful 
‘raise it, invest it, prove it’ model more challenging to execute to donors’ satisfaction. 
The Global Fund’s design, in particular its inclusive global and country level governance 
models, its transparency and performance-based funding and its unprecedented resource 
mobilisation and distribution distinguish it from traditional multilaterals and lend it its 
innovative character.  These features of its design have underpinned its success as a 
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financing mechanism for MDG 6 which in turn has aided its maturation towards 
addressing broader health sector concerns. The next section will discuss how the Global 
Fund’s innovative and successful model has been a disrupting force for its multilateral 
partners, particularly where policy leadership related to the three diseases, country level 
technical assistance and competition for donor government resources are concerned. 
5. Disrupting Multilateralism – Changing Health’s Policy Leadership, Technical 
Assistance and Resource Mobilisation Landscape  
The Global Fund has altered the multilateral landscape which has implications for its 
partners such as the WHO, the World Bank, UNAIDS, UNDP, the Roll Back Malaria 
Partnership (RBM) and the Stop TB Partnership (Stop TB) particularly where global 
policy leadership for the three diseases, country level technical assistance and competition 
for donor resources are concerned.  The nature of this disruption is changing as the Global 
Fund matures.  For example, in its early years the Global Fund’s vertical disease focus and 
its political support from donor governments challenged the authority of disease focused 
health initiatives such as RBM and Stop TB.  As its mandate expands and its authority 
grows (see Chapter 6 on the Global Fund’s growing authority), the Global Fund is moving 
towards normative policy making, challenging the WHO’s  and UNAIDS’ traditional 
policy leadership roles.  This transformation is salient because as discussed in Chapter 3 it 
challenges the accepted state-centric basis for legitimate authority exercised by most 
multilaterals and more deliberately opens its own authority to the influence of wealthy and 
powerful states such as the United States and private actors like the Gates Foundation.  The 
Global Fund is a form of institutional innovation but more than that it is an agent of 
change, disrupting the traditional multilateral order and making way for a new order to 
emerge. 
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Policy Making Momentum and Disruption at Global Level 
When the Global Fund was first created, it threatened to overtake the mandates of RBM 
and Stop TB.  Both of these single disease organisations are secretariats within the WHO 
and both were created in 1998.  In the case of RBM, it was founded by the WHO, 
UNICEF, UNDP and the World Bank to coordinate a response to malaria (Roll Back 
Malaria 2010, ‘RBM Mandate’).  Stop TB had more modest beginnings and was originally 
an ‘initiative’ until the WHO’s World Health Assembly formalised it as a partnership in 
2000 with two targets for 2005: to diagnose 70% of all people with infectious TB, and to 
cure 85% of those diagnosed (Stop TB 2010, ‘About the Stop TB Partnership’).   RBM and 
Stop TB do not have seats on the Global Fund’s board like the WHO, UNAIDS and the 
World Bank which have non-voting rights, but they do participate on Global Fund board 
committees or in working groups.  The relationships between the Global Fund and RBM 
and Stop TB have been described as strained in the early years (UN Executives 2009, 
interviews, Geneva).  Donors were giving resources to the Global Fund ostensibly to fight 
three diseases, but it was largely seen as an HIV/AIDS fund.  RBM and Stop TB expressed 
concern that not enough of the Global Fund’s resources were going to their two diseases 
years (UN Executives 2009, interviews, Geneva).  However, over the years, this perception 
has changed as both RBM and Stop TB have advocated to the Global Fund and worked 
with countries to prepare strategic and cohesive proposals (UN Executive 2009, interview, 
Geneva):  “RBM says today that Global Fund resources are its resources.  RBM advocates 
strongly for the Global Fund because it knows that every dollar that goes to the Global 
Fund comes back to … the work …[RBM] does.”  Neither organisation can compete with 
the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation might, so their best strategy is to leverage the 
Global Fund’s capacity and increase country success in securing malaria and tuberculosis 
grants. 
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In addition to increasing the country level financing available for malaria and tuberculosis, 
the Global Fund has enabled policy change related to the two diseases.  This policy 
facilitation and implementation role is evident in the case of the introduction of the malaria 
drug Artemesin.
13
 The Global Fund advocated for its use based on WHO technical 
guidance, countries included its introduction in their proposals to the Global Fund and the 
Global Fund in turn made resources available to countries to quickly implement new 
malaria treatment policies:  “In 2003 it was clear that [Artemesin] drugs were the only 
ones recommended by the WHO [to treat malaria] but no country was using it…[The 
Global Fund’s resources meant] for manufacturers…they could start growing the plants 
and producing the drugs…and that’s when countries moved from chloronique and old 
drugs to effective drugs” (Global Fund Executive 2009, interview, Geneva). For RBM and 
Stop TB, the Global Fund has not only succeeded in securing resources for the two 
diseases, but also supported policy change at a scale that would not otherwise be possible. 
The Global Fund’s leadership in HIV/AIDS has been less straightforward (see Chapter 5 
for a detailed discussion on the Global Fund’s influence on Malawi’s HIV/AIDs 
prevention strategy).  Undeniably the Global Fund has made resources available to fight 
the virus that have, in a relatively short time period, made possible the declaration by 
UNAIDS’ Executive Director in 2010 that “[w]e have halted and begun to reverse the 
epidemic. Fewer people are becoming infected with HIV and fewer people are dying from 
AIDS” (UNAIDS 2010d, p. 5).  However, the magnitude of these resources, particularly 
their scale at country level (see Chapter 4 for a discussion on the Global Fund and its aid 
relationship in Malawi) has lent the Global Fund considerable policy influence, described 
by one UN Executive (2010, interview, Geneva) as, 
…driving the normative agenda [through criteria built into Global Fund 
applications]…They can advance [for example policies related to] gender more 
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proactively than…[our organisation].  We don’t have the carrot of money.  The 
danger is that the Global Fund application becomes the driving force of what is in 
the national response. 
The Global Fund may not be a traditional policy maker in the way that the WHO and 
UNAIDS are able to do with their convenorship, technical expertise and research 
capabilities. But the Global Fund’s aid relationship does give it considerable influence and 
normative policy making muscle. 
Although the Global Fund has the ‘carrot of money’, its resources are limited relative to 
the scale of need.  For example, in 2009 the WHO introduced new guidelines for anti-
retrovirals which recommended that those infected be eligible for treatment sooner and, to 
reduce debilitating side effects of the first line therapies used in most countries, that more 
expensive second line drugs be used (WHO 2009, ‘New HIV Recommendations’).  The 
WHO’s new policy guidelines effectively increased the demand for and cost of treatment.  
Unlike the Artemesin example, the Global Fund was not in a position to enable wholesale 
country-level policy change.  The Global Fund (2010j, ‘Report of the Executive Director’) 
reported in 2010 that “[g]lobal ART [anti-retroviral therapy] coverage was estimated at 36 
per cent at the end of 2009 based on the WHO 2010 treatment guidelines [which include 
prevention of mother to child transmission or PMTCT guidance]; if based on the 2006 
guidelines, global coverage would have stood at 52 per cent.” Strictly speaking the Global 
Fund was not intended to be a policy-maker but a “new, innovative financing 
instrument…;[nevertheless,] over the years we have seen the Global Fund evolve as a 
financing institution and also that with its growing size a larger role in the global health 
discussion has become unavoidable.  So it was not by design but by size, by weight.  So 
therefore today, the Global Fund plays quite a leading role in these discussions” (Global 
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Fund Executive 2009, interview, Geneva).  The momentum of the Global Fund’s policy 
role towards that of policy-maker has challenged the traditional health policy-makers 
including the WHO and UNAIDS.  One UN Executive (2010, interview, Geneva) 
observed, “[a]t global level, there is regular tension in terms of who should be doing what.  
The Global Fund has to keep itself relevant to donors.  From the UN side of things if it 
didn’t exist, it would have to be invented.  There are alternatives to the Global Fund, like 
the World Bank, and they know this.”  The Global Fund’s policy-making is gaining 
momentum as it matures, disrupting the division of labour among traditional health policy 
makers. 
The ‘Unfunded Mandate’ and Disruption at Country Level 
The independence of the Global Fund’s country level governance model and lack of a 
country office presence can be seen as promoting ‘country ownership’ and streaming 
Global Fund resources towards a response to the three diseases and away from overhead 
and personnel costs.  It is also a disruptive force.  One of its side effects is a flourishing 
‘cottage industry’ for technical assistance provided by organisations like UNAIDS and 
UNDP in order for countries to prepare successful grant applications and evaluate and 
report their results.  Another side effect is the challenge of delineating country level roles 
when an organisation like the World Bank also has an HIV/AIDS financing role. 
UNAIDS is one organisation which has stepped in to provide technical assistance to 
Global Fund applicants, which it refers to as its ‘unfunded mandate’ (UNAIDS 2005a, p. 
3).  The Global Task Team on Improving AIDS Coordination Among Multilateral 
Institutions and International Donors called on the UNAIDS Secretariat to lead a process 
with UNAIDS’ Cosponsors to clarify and cost a UN system division of labour for technical 
support to assist countries to implement their annual priority AIDS action plans (UNAIDS 
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2005a, p. 3).  The result included a clarification on who does what, and also processes and 
procedures for managing the division of labour at country level.  However, the complexity 
of the relationship between UNAIDS and the Global Fund goes far beyond UNAIDS’ 
country level role: 
UNAIDS has had to rethink its role.  …There is a changed environment, including 
the Global Fund, PEPFAR—it’s more complex. UNAIDS [has to consider] its 
comparative advantage… [It’s] a little schizophrenic.  UNAIDS supports countries 
in applying to the Global Fund and in implementation.  At the same time it helps 
with eligibility criteria and it’s on the [Global Fund’s] board... it’s an ongoing 
evolution (UN Executive 2010, interview, Geneva). 
UNAIDS’ ‘unfunded mandate’ is a double edged sword—UNAIDS must find the 
resources to provide technical assistance to countries for Global Fund applications, but it is 
also in UNAIDS’ interests if countries, particularly HIV/AIDS endemic countries with 
little capacity, can be successful in securing Global Fund resources. 
Similarly UNDP provides technical assistance for the Global Fund and it also fulfils a 
‘Principal Recipient of last resort’ function.  UNDP like the World Bank has promoted a 
multi-sectoral approach to HIV/AIDS.  UNDP adopted this strategy in the 1980s when it 
recognised the socioeconomic dynamics of HIV/AIDS and that its long term implications 
required more than a traditional public health intervention approach (Harman 2009, p. 
166).   UNDP as a cosponsor of UNAIDS is responsible for activities related to 
“development planning and mainstreaming; governance of AIDS responses; and law, 
human rights and gender, including sexual minorities” (UNDP 2008, p. 3).  UNDP’s 
technical assistance reflects its mandate. For example, it might work with a CCM to 
develop and support a gender transformative programme which can be critical to effective 
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interventions for HIV/AIDS.  As Lisk (2010, p. 97) observed, “[h]alting and reversing the 
spread of HIV/AIDS…is perceived by the UNDP as requiring an operational framework 
that links the causes and consequences of the epidemic to action against poverty and a 
range of development concerns...”  UNDP can be a significant contributor to the success of 
Global Fund programmes at country level.  Through its ‘unfunded mandate’ it places the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, and therefore strategies to address it, in a larger socio-economic 
context. 
At country level, the World Bank has a different kind of technical assistance challenge 
from UNAIDS or UNDP.  The World Bank created its Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program 
in 2000.  The Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program provides financing and technical 
assistance for low- and middle-income countries with a strategic plan to fight HIV/AIDS 
which must include the involvement of non-state actors (Lisk 2010, p. 77). In 2005 the 
World Bank and the Global Fund commissioned a review of their respective efforts 
“intended to help the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the World 
Bank build a stronger and more complementary partnership that will enhance the 
international community’s ability to achieve its ambitious HIV/AIDS goals” (Shakow 
2006, p. 3).  Among the review’s thematic findings were that the Global Fund needed to, 
…give much greater strategic and operational precision to its financing role… Its 
main focus in this regard should be on financing directly the prevention and 
treatment of the three diseases. In differentiation from this, bilateral and 
multilateral donors in the UNAIDS family, including the World Bank, should 
provide more support for policy dialogue, analytic work, project preparation and 
implementation at the country level (Shakow 2006, p. 6). 
The review also indicated that the World Bank should focus on its, 
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systemic health sector capacity building…. [The Bank has] the ability to link the 
health sector to broader macroeconomic and budgetary issues in each country. 
Similarly, the Bank should help governments to be more strategic and selective in 
setting priorities for its AIDS and health activities, encouraging countries to use 
their limited capacities to implement activities that will have the greatest impact on 
the epidemic (Shakow 2006, p. 6).   
Maintaining the clarity of these delineations--the Global Fund providing financing and the 
World Bank providing health sector capacity building—has not taken hold as the Global 
Fund’s expansion into health systems strengthening and National Strategy Approaches 
reveals. 
The ‘unfunded mandate’ for technical assistance necessarily adopted by partners such as 
UNAIDS and UNDP compensates for the Global Fund’s independent country-level 
governance model and its lack of country infrastructure.  A number of remedies for this 
dilemma have been put forward including the U.S. Government’s Grant Management 
Solutions which it funds by deducting 5% from its Global Fund contribution (The Global 
Fund 2010o, ‘Technical Assistance’).  The Global Fund’s claim that its lack of country 
infrastructure is efficient belies the reality of the extent to which other organisations fill the 
technical assistance void.  As the Global Fund matures and its mandate expands from its 
initial vertical focus on three diseases, the extent of the Global Fund’s disrupting effects on 
its country-level partners will intensify.  The demand for technical assistance is unlikely to 
decline and the negotiation of who does what and who funds what will continue. 
Competition for Health Resources:  Disruption beyond the Health Sector 
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Overall, development assistance for health has increased more than four-fold between 
1990 and 2007 (Ravishankar et al 2009, p. 2113).  While this is a good news story for 
recipient countries and their ability to respond to the MDGs that relate to health, it raises 
the resource mobilisation bar, particularly for UN organisations that traditionally have not 
faced much direct sector based competition during replenishment cycles or donor 
conferences. It also brings the notion of competition among health multilaterals for donor 
resources to the fore. 
Figure 2:  2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid (OECD 2009, p. 27) 
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Unravelling aid flows is a complex and inexact undertaking, particularly tracking aid from 
donor governments to multilaterals and then from the multilaterals to sectors such as health 
or to individual countries.  At a macro level, the OECD (2009, p. 12) estimates that in 
2006 a total of US$43 bn in Official Development Assistance (ODA) was routed through 
the multilateral system.  Figure 2 (OECD 2009, p. 27) shows direct and indirect bilateral 
and multilateral aid flows from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
countries between 1997 and 2006.  In principle, the Global Fund ‘competes’ among other 
multilaterals for donor government aid which comprises 96% of the US$21 bn in total 
resources it raised before its most recent replenishment cycle (The Global Fund 2010f, 
‘Pledges and Contributions’).  Forman and Segaar (2006, p. 218) assert that GHIs like the 
Global Fund divert resources away from other health multilateral organisations such as the 
WHO which relies primarily on voluntary rather than assessed contributions: 
Partnerships focusing on a single illness, for example, may divert resources from 
overall World Health Organization (WHO) efforts to develop sustainable national 
primary health care systems.  Arrangements involving private sector provision of 
cheap or free goods and services also require public funds and hence can compete 
with UN agencies’ efforts to obtain funds from the same donor sources. 
In interviews, several Global Health Executives played down the issue of competition 
providing three reasons.  In some cases the scale of funds raised by an organisation was 
significantly less than the Global Fund and therefore their resource mobilisation was in a 
‘different league’.  Others felt that the reputation and legitimacy of their organisations with 
donors meant that if they made a good case for resources they were very likely to be 
successful and therefore they were not duly affected by the Global Fund’s success.  
Perhaps the most positive point of view was that the Global Fund in fact helped other 
global health organisations by making a successful case for the increased need for health 
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funding overall, not just to three diseases or to the Global Fund exclusively (UN 
Executives and Global Fund Executives 2009, interviews, Geneva).  One GAVI Executive 
(2010, interview, Geneva) expressed the view that competition among health multilaterals 
for donor resources was not the issue; rather, the challenge was demonstrating 
coordination and the effective use of those resources:  
Donors want to know that there are synergies between the organisations they are 
funding.  They want to fund a range of instruments and see that their investments 
are complementary.  You don’t want to provide a child ART [anti-retroviral 
therapy] and then have that child die from a preventable illness [which could have 
been treated].  
Although health multilaterals do compete to some extent for donor funds, concern over 
competition was not evident from interviews conducted for this thesis. Rather, the issue of 
coordination among institutions to demonstrate their complementarity was seen as a bigger 
challenge.  
The health envelope relative to other sectors is shown in Figure 3.  It reveals that aid for 
health (which includes aid to fight infectious diseases such as malaria, polio and measles) 
has increased at a slower rate than aid for population and reproductive health (which 
includes aid to fight HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis related to HIV/AIDS).  In comparison, it 
also shows that aid for other sectors such as governance and civil society, which includes 
aid to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and governance as well as for conflict, peace 
and security has increased more rapidly than that for  population and reproductive health.  
Funding for health has increased dramatically relative to its historic levels, but sustaining 
this growth will require health multilaterals to make a compelling case relative to the 
pressures that donor governments face across many demands. 
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The scale of the Global Fund’s resource mobilsation is evident in Figure 4.  When 
comparing it to total health and population and reproductive health ODA, bilateral pledges 
to the Global Fund peak in 2008 at just under 23% of total DAC ODA for the two health 
areas.  The Global Fund’s ODA (meaning the funding it provides) for health and 
population and reproductive health is greater than that of the the United Kingdom.  It is not 
surprising that one observer noted that given the size of the Global Fund’s ‘take’ of health 
ODA, it does not compete with multilateral health organisations for donor government 
funds as much as it should concern itself with other sectors like peace and security, climate 
and food security which have the potential to attract donor interests away from health and 
grow their share of overall ODA (Global Fund Executive 2009, interview, Geneva).  The 
assertion that the Global Fund competes with other multilateral health organisations for 
Figure 3:  ODA by Select Sectors 2002-08 
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donor resources is true but may be missing the larger picture which is that given the scale 
of the ODA the Global Fund commands, its real ability to increase its resources likely lies 
outside DAC, and outside of the health envelope if it is to sustain its success in the face of 
emerging concerns like environment and food security. 
One strategy employed by the Global Fund to sustain its resource mobilisation efforts with 
donors is to look to civil society for its ability to exert political pressure and to advocate 
for its own and the Global Fund’s common interests.  As Bartsch (2007a, p. 170) observed: 
The GF [Global Fund] must mobilize enough resources to ensure that the activities 
supported by its grants are sustainable in the long run and that treatment 
programmes, in particular, will be continued as long as they are needed.  This 
requires strong advocacy efforts by the GF itself and its partners (especially CSOs) 
Figure 4:  Health and Population and Reproductive Health ODA by Donor and Total Bilateral 
Global Pledges as a % 
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to motivate donors to maintain or restore their commitments towards the GF and 
the exploration of new avenues of funding in the future. 
Beyond advocacy, CSOs and NGOs have a very strong self-interest in Global Fund 
resources as they are also often direct beneficiaries at country level where they may be a 
Principal Recipient or sub-recipient of funds and involved in implementation.  As one  
Global Fund Executive (2009, interview, Geneva) noted “…If you have the choice to give 
money to the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank or the Global Fund and you 
know that if you give money to the Global Fund the NGOs will all say great and if you 
don’t do it, you might …have an article in the paper saying you are putting millions of 
lives in danger, then you might think it’s a good idea to support the Global Fund whether 
you like it or not.”  While the advocacy of CSOs and NGOs does not resolve questions of 
sustainability, it certainly acts as insurance for the ‘morally binding’ nature of donor 
commitments to the Global Fund. 
Despite the extent of the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation success, demand among 
recipients shows no signs of abating.  In 2007 the estimated global funding gap for 
HIV/AIDS alone was US$8.1 bn (Lisk 2010, p. 111) and this was before the first wave of 
the global financial crisis that took hold in 2008 and 2009.  In April 2009 the Global Fund 
(2009b, ‘Donors Assess Global Fund Resource Needs’) estimated its funding gap at US$ 4 
bn against its projected 2010 commitments.  In response, a Global Fund working group 
proposed seeking budget reductions from applicants and ‘efficiencies’ of 10% and 25% in 
funding tranches.  Further in 2010, the Global Fund failed to meet its minimum threshold 
of US$13 bn in its third donor replenishment cycle for 2011-2013, achieving pledges of 
US$11.7 bn (The Global Fund 2010g, ‘Press Release:  Donors commit US$11.7 billion’).  
Among the many challenges of raising funds when many donor governments face 
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significant spending constraints is the sustainability of their commitment to HIV/AIDS, or 
what one UN Executive (2010, interview, Geneva) called the ‘treatment mortgage’:   
The big funders are trying to transfer the obligation to whoever they can find.  
PEPFAR wants to transfer it to the Global Fund and the Global Fund wants to 
transfer it to countries.  It’s the hot potato of the AIDS response...The world can’t 
afford to let the model die.  It’s stuck with chronic treatment and it can’t back 
away. 
Achieving supply and addressing demand for resources for AIDS treatment in particular is 
no easy task.  It is a long-term economic, social and moral commitment by donors and 
recipient countries and the Global Fund’s role is to make a compelling case.  As described 
earlier in this chapter, the view that competition for funds is less of a concern than 
demonstrating coordination does not seem to align with the realities of growing demands 
of the pandemic response and the long term nature of the treatment mortgage.  It does 
however support at least in the near term an increasing reliance on and influence of the 
United States (see Chapter 3 for further discussion).  Nevertheless, the pressures faced by 
the Global Fund suggest that sustainability will also involve moving beyond relying on 
traditional resource mobilisation from a few donor governments and require it to compete 
successfully for health resources against other sectors and develop non-DAC and private 
sector sources. 
The rapid rise of the Global Fund as a global health leader has disrupted the multilateral 
landscape in terms of global health policy leadership for the three diseases, country level 
technical assistance and effective resource mobilisation.  Other international institutions 
working in global health and the three diseases--the WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank, 
UNDP, RBM and Stop TB continue to adjust their strategies and reassert their mandates.  
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The Global Fund’s decisions to support health systems strengthening and fund National 
Strategy Approaches signals that it is maturing from a start up financing mechanism with a 
vertical, disease focus to an international health institution with scope and influence 
beyond its initial mandate.  The Global Fund is gaining momentum towards policy-
making, moving towards sector leadership at country level and facing continued pressure 
to mobilise resources to address the ‘treatment mortgage’.  Within the multilateral order 
related to health, the Global Fund is more than an agent of change, it has become a 
disruptive force that is altering the multilateral order of ‘old’ where health is concerned 
and influencing the new order that is taking shape. 
6. Conclusion 
The Global Fund is a form of institutional innovation that has disrupted traditional 
multilateralism where health is concerned; however a new order has yet to emerge.  A 
confluence of events laid the foundation for change from which the Global Fund was 
created.  These included a political and discursive case for change and the availability of 
new sources of funds from donor governments and private actors, predominantly from the 
Gates Foundation, to address HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.  These events together 
with the UN’s desire to embrace private actors and the neo-liberal virtues attributed to a 
‘private ethos’ paved the way for the Global Fund’s unique design and its hybrid 
public/private character.   
The Global Fund’s design including its inclusive governance, its transparency and 
performance-based funding approach and the scale of its resource mobilisation and 
distribution are a form of institutional innovation.   As the Global Fund matures, it is 
expanding beyond its modest beginnings as a financing mechanism for three diseases 
towards broader involvement in and influence on the health sector at global and country 
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levels.  Its form of institutional innovation at once distinguishes it from traditional 
multilaterals like the WHO, and provides a platform for its growth. As a result the Global 
Fund has become a disruptive force.  
The Global Fund has challenged the leadership and division of labour among multilaterals 
and international health institutions including the WHO, UNAIDS, UNDP, the World 
Bank, Roll Back Malaria and Stop TB.  It is gaining momentum beyond policy 
implementer towards policy maker at global level.  At country level, the independence of 
its governance model and its own lack of country infrastructure has created an ‘unfunded 
mandate’ for its partners and its scale and scope will continue to challenge the 
arrangements of who does what.  The Global Fund’s resource mobilisation success goes 
beyond intensifying competition among multilaterals for donor resources.  For the Global 
Fund to sustain its efforts it will need to compete successfully beyond health actors and the 
pressures it faces in this regard are unlikely to diminish. (Chapter 3 will explore the nature 
of this disruption further relative to the legitimate authority of states central to most 
multilateral systems of governance).  In sum, the Global Fund is a form of institutional 
innovation which has disrupted the traditional multilateral order related to health.  It has 
become a ‘game changer’ shaping the new order that is emerging from Kirton and 
Cooper’s “Westphalian order of old.” 
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Chapter 3 -  The Global Fund:  New Sources of Legitimacy and the 
Accountability Link 
1. Introduction 
To anticipate the prospects for global governance in the decades ahead is to discern 
powerful tensions, profound contradictions, and perplexing paradoxes.  It is to 
search for order in disorder, for coherence in contradiction, and for continuity in 
change. It is to confront processes that mask both growth and decay.  It is to look 
for authorities that are obscure, boundaries that are in flux, and systems of rule that 
are emergent.  And it is to experience hope embedded in despair (Rosenau 1995, p. 
13). 
The previous chapter made a case for the Global Fund as a form of institutional innovation 
within multilateralism, one that is a disruptive force shaping an emerging order.  This 
chapter builds on the notion of institutional innovation examining the Global Fund’s 
legitimacy and accountability as examples of how global health governance is evolving.  
The first section explores broad themes arising from the literature on legitimacy and how 
traditional bases are challenged by models of government and governance which do not 
rely solely on the relationship between a democratic state and its citizens.  By contrast it 
examines how traditional multilaterals derive legitimacy through a governance model 
which relies on the representation of states.  It refers to the three features of the Global 
Fund’s institutionally innovative design--its inclusive governance, its transparency and 
performance-based funding and its resource mobilisation and distribution--making the case 
that not only do these features distinguish the Global Fund from traditional multilateral 
institutions but they also provide it with new sources of legitimacy as well as the capacity 
to make claims (Barker 2000, p. 9).  
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The first section of this Chapter argues that despite their input-oriented appearance, Global 
Fund’s sources of legitimacy are largely focused on outcomes and conferred by wealthy 
and powerful states. The second section of this chapter explores accountability, making the 
case for its normative and rational aspects analogous to those of legitimacy.  It links the 
Global Fund’s outcome focused legitimacy with its hierarchical accountability model 
which ultimately holds the Global Fund and its grant recipients accountable to donor 
governments.  It argues that the Global Fund has an accountability gap which lies in its 
inability to reconcile its accountability to its ‘publics’ and the people whose lives its affects 
which is in part obscured by its legitimating claims, revealing the “powerful tensions, 
profound contradictions, and perplexing paradoxes” (Rosenau 1995, p. 13) at play in an 
emerging global health governance order.  The Global Fund’s accountability gap is taken 
up in greater depth in subsequent chapters including Chapter 6 which argues that the 
‘publicness’ conferred on the Global Fund’s authority and its rapid growth at both global 
and country levels not only exacerbates its accountability gap but also obscures it, 
evidence that where the Global Fund is concerned “boundaries are in flux, and systems of 
rule are emergent” (Rosenau 1995, p. 13). 
2. The Nature of Legitimacy and the Challenge of Legitimate Governance 
Legitimacy helps to explain who makes rules and on whose behalf and how this authority 
arises in ways other than by coercion.  According to Hurd (1999, p. 401), “…the character 
of power changes when it is exercised within a structure of legitimate relations, and the 
two concepts of power and legitimacy come together in the idea of “authority.”  This 
discussion will not attempt uncover the vast literature on legitimacy and its many 
tributaries (see for example Barker 2000, p. 8, Beetham and Lord 1998, p. 16; Bernstein 
2004, p. 142), but will locate the discussion relative to those aspects that are most useful in 
understanding the unique nature of the Global Fund’s legitimacy, its relationship to 
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accountability and later, in Chapter 6, its implications for the Global Fund’s exercise of 
authority which has seen a rapid rise both at global and country levels.  The discussion 
introduces select perspectives on the nature of legitimacy, its qualities, its necessary 
conditions and its self-generating capacity.  A final comment will be made on the 
challenge of ascribing and deriving legitimacy outside of the realist-positivist focus on the 
authority of the nation state and state-governed global institutions. As Beetham and Lord 
(1998, p. 15) note, despite a robust scholarly history, legitimacy and its concepts remain 
varied and what emerges is a picture of complexity and challenge. 
Weber (1922, p. 215) describes the qualities of legitimacy as, i) rational, “resting on a 
belief in the legality of enacted rules”; ii) traditional, “resting on an established belief in 
the sanctity of immemorial traditions”; and iii) charismatic “resting on devotion to the 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person.” Like 
Weber, contemporary scholars describe legitimacy as being derived through rule based 
systems, in particular those associated with rule of law and democratic process (see for 
example Green 1988-9, p. 796; Tyler and Darley 2000, p. 724; Slaughter 2004a p. 178; 
Bernstein 2004-5, p. 154), and through beliefs that those rules are valid and desirable 
(Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 318; Ruggie 2004, p. 504; Zürn 2004, p. 261; Bartsch 2007b, p. 
5).  Legitimacy is derived both rationally and normatively, or as Barker (2001, p. 8) 
suggests, through some combination of what is and what ought.   
Legitimacy is also normatively relational.  According to Hurd (1999, p. 381) the idea of 
legitimacy is inherent in the “…belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be 
obeyed.  It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by 
the actor’s perception of the institution.”  Beetham and Lord (1998, p. 16) separate out the 
relational aspects of legitimacy which they associate with liberal democracy by 
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distinguishing between the authority accorded sovereignty and the role of government to 
protect basic rights, the performance of political orders, and the “public recognition or 
affirmation of authority by those qualified to give it.”  An underlying idea here is that 
legitimacy helps constitute what Raz describes as authority ‘over’ and authority ‘given’: 
One can have authority over some people and not over others. If citizens have no 
general obligation to obey the law, then the state has no authority over them merely 
by virtue of their being citizens.  It does not follow, however, that no one is subject 
to the authority of the state.  The state can be given authority by some or all of its 
citizens, and it has authority over those who gave it authority (Raz 1981, p. 188). 
Grafstein (1981, p. 463) points out the tautological problem with this Weberian dynamic 
because it is difficult “…to distinguish the case where the claim to legitimacy is made and 
there is political obedience from the case where there is obedience because of the claim to 
legitimacy.” Although Grafstein (1981, p. 463) goes on to question the need for the 
concept of legitimacy at all, Bernstein (2004, p. 142) makes a case for its renewed 
importance in order to describe authority that arises from new institutional arrangements 
outside of traditional rules of democratic process associated with the nation state. 
Focusing on legitimacy’s qualities and its nature reduces it to a ‘thing’.  However, Barker 
(2000, p. 9) argues that it is also a self-referential and self-generating act:   
Governing is an activity legitimated in a myriad ways, and the absence of 
democratic legitimation will throw into relief how much legitimation is by 
government and for government…where the legitimating activities of 
government…once the justifying ends … are more contested and more varied.”  
If Suchman’s (1995, p. 574) sociological description of legitimacy is accepted as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
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appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
assumptions”, then it follows that perceptions or assumptions can be derived through 
claims.  When the sphere in which legitimation occurs is chaotic, where “[a]genda setting 
is more contested, externalized beyond the nation-state, and open to the input and 
disruption of a variety of political agents” (Stone 2008, p. 26), then claims have a place 
and even a payoff.  In Barker’s (2000, p. 10) view legitimation is not only a characteristic 
of government (here government could be more broadly read as “authority”), but also 
shapes its structure and ethos.   
The allusion to a chaotic sphere suggests a struggle for location when legitimacy arises 
outside of the confines of the rules and beliefs associated with the nation state.  There is a 
large and growing literature on legitimacy and the ‘public sphere’ only some of which will 
be touched on here.  First of all, the definitions for what constitutes a public sphere are 
largely conceptual (see Ruggie 2004, p. 519; Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 315; Castells 2008, 
p. 78).  However, if legitimacy is the “acceptance and justification of shared rule by a 
community” (Bernstein 2004, p. 142) and both the rule maker and the community are 
likely to exist beyond the borders of a nation state and outside democratic processes, then 
traditional assumptions about who makes rules and on whose behalf are challenged.   
In taking up the challenge, scholars differ in their tolerance for the dislocation of 
legitimacy from the realist-positivist focus on the authority of the nation state and state-
governed global institutions.  For example, in considering the legitimacy of the European 
Union, Beetham and Lord (1998, pp. 17-18)  assert that it is acquiring its own, unique 
normative validity one which is closely associated with its impact on citizens, its 
jurisdiction and its effects on the legitimacy of its nation states.  Zürn and Ruggie more 
readily depart from “Westphalian state-centrism” (Zürn 2004, p. 277) , recognising the 
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existence of a public domain as “the arena in which expectations regarding legitimate 
social purposes, including the respective roles of different social sectors and actors, are 
articulated, contested, and take shape as social facts” (Ruggie 2004, p. 504).  Taking 
another step, there is a substantial discourse on democratic legitimation which concerns 
itself with the deliberative processes that occur among the actors in Ruggie’s public 
domain or public sphere. Much is made of civil society in this regard, where “…organized 
civil society has a high potential to act as a ‘transmission belt’ between deliberative 
processes within international organizations and emerging transnational public spheres” 
(Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 323).  Held and McGrew (2003, p. 186) describe this 
dislocation, or perhaps relocation, of legitimacy outside of the system of states as a  
“heterarchy—a divided authority system—with states seeking to share the tasks of 
governance with a complex array of institutions in public and private, transnational, 
regional and global domains, the emergence of overlapping “communities of fate.”” 
Legitimate Governance and Traditional Multilaterals 
The legitimacy associated with the governance of traditional multilaterals retains its 
association with the authority of the nation state but not wholly.  This section highlights 
the debate on what is broadly termed a democratic deficit of multilaterals or put another 
way, whether the IFIs in particular can be said to be sufficiently ‘by the people’ (Scharpf 
1999, p. 2). As Bernstein (2004, p. 142) observes, “[w]hether or not legitimacy was always 
necessary for international stability and patterned behaviour, the extended scope and reach 
of contemporary ‘global governance’ has made that need much more visible.” 
Scharpf (1999, p. 2) describes legitimacy as comprised of “input-oriented authenticity 
(government by the people) and output-oriented effectiveness (government for the 
people)”.  Through his input- and output-oriented dimensions, Scharpf distinguishes 
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between those sources of legitimacy which are reliant on democratic processes and those 
which are reliant on demonstrating outcomes.  Further, Scharpf (1999, p. 6) maintains that 
the former--by the people--derives legitimacy from the “authentic preferences of a 
community” where there is an established collective identity like that found in national 
democracies.  The latter--for the people—“promotes the common welfare of a 
constituency”, where there may be several coexisting identities at play.  Legitimacy then 
for Scharpf is conferred through the ways that constituents are represented to their 
organisations and what actions organisations take in their constituents’ interests. 
The model for legitimate governance among multilaterals resembles Scharpf’s concept of 
input-oriented legitimacy which also has what Bartsch (2007b, p. 5) describes as a 
“normative validity.”  Put simply, this normative validity begins with accepting that nation 
states through democratic processes reflect the ‘will of the people’ and then confer this 
representative legitimacy on the multilateral organisations whose memberships they 
comprise. According to Bartsch (2007b, p. 5), “[i]n the context of the nation state the 
normative validity of the order is established through delegative processes via elections, 
which makes states legitimate actors at global level, too. This is – to a lesser degree – also 
the case for International Organizations, which are comprised of nation states and can thus 
derive legitimacy from their members.”   Thus, similar to Beetham and Lord’s (1998, pp. 
17-18) analysis of the legitimacy acquired by the European Union, Bartsch views the 
legitimacy of the state-centred model of governance of traditional multilateral 
organisations has having a fundamental rational, or process based input-orientation which 
is accompanied by a “normative validity”; or, put another way, the legitimacy of this 
governance model is it conferred through what Keohane (2006, p. 11) calls the “doctrine of 
sovereignty.” 
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As Bartsch suggests, the ‘doctrine of sovereignty’ is not unassailable.  Much has been 
made of the ‘democratic deficit’ of multilateral organisations which is said to arise from 
several causes:  nation state members of these organisations may not be democratically 
governed themselves; the governance structure of the institution--as is the case with the 
World Bank and the IMF--may not have a one state, one vote system rendering some states 
more powerful than others; and, the distance between citizens or ‘the people’ of member 
states and the governance of multilateral organisations is large--decision making by these 
organisations can “exclude large numbers of people…on a global basis” (Keohane 2006, p. 
14, also see Nye 2001, p. 3; Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 315). 
In his discussion of what he terms the democratic deficit of multilateral organisations, 
Keohane (2006, p. 3) argues that “[d]emands for multilateral organizations to become 
more accountable to “civil society” rather than simply to states have proliferated.  Insofar 
as these views become widespread, the sociological legitimacy of statism will decline and 
multilateral organizations will need to find new bases for their claims of legitimacy in the 
21st century.”  Similarly Ruggie (2004, p. 522) notes a dislocation from statism when he 
describes “the progressive arrival…of a distinctive public domain—thinner, more partial, 
and more fragile than its domestic counterpart…but existing and taking root apart from the 
sphere of interstate relations.”  The reliance of multilateral institutions on the ‘doctrine of 
sovereignty’ as a source of input-oriented legitimacy is open to challenge exactly because 
it fails the test of being sufficiently representative or truly ‘by the people’. 
Not all scholars are convinced by arguments that a ‘democratic deficit’ detracts from the 
legitimacy of governance of multilateral organisations.  Moravcsik (2004, pp. 346-7) 
denies the importance of the ‘democratic deficit’ to global level governance mechanisms, 
making a plea for a less utopian and more practical realisation of democratic practice: 
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…social complexity, political uncertainty, and underlying differentials in social 
power – give rise to widespread, consistent, normatively justified exceptions to 
direct democratic participation in decision-making. In each of these cases, under 
many circumstances more insulated and delegated authority of global governance 
structures might be thought of as more ‘representative’ of citizen concerns 
precisely because they are less directly ‘democratic’. 
Börzal and Risse (2002, p. 18) in their discussion of the ‘democratic deficit’ of global 
public private partnerships come down on the side of ‘it depends’, arguing that an 
institution which demonstrates what they describe as inclusive governance arrangements 
and accountable and transparent governance practices may not experience a deficit in 
democracy or legitimacy.  Whether a ‘democratic deficit’ exists and whether it affects the 
legitimacy of multilateral organisations remains contentious.  There is, however, more to 
the legitimacy of the governance models of multilateral organisations than the processes 
and mechanisms of representation and debates on the normative strengths and weaknesses 
of a state-centred approach. 
Multilateral organisations can also create legitimacy through what Bartsch and other 
scholars describe (after Weber) as fostering a “belief in [their] legitimacy” (Bartsch 2007b, 
p. 5 and Hurd 1999, p. 381; also see Zürn 2004, p. 261; Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 
407).   This subjectiveness is similar to Barker’s (2000, p. 9) notion of the act of 
legitimising or making claims. Where input-oriented legitimacy can trace representation 
from citizens to governments to multilateral organisations, output-oriented legitimacy must 
contend with its “thin” collective identity and the “multiple, nested or overlapping” 
(Scharpf 1999, p. 11) concerns of those who participate in global level governance. 
Legitimating can effect a cohesiveness where output-oriented legitimacy arises from “its 
 116 
capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions, because they could not be solved 
through individual action, through market exchanges or through voluntary cooperation in 
civil society.”  In other words, legitimating and output-oriented legitimacy are closely 
linked where the claim to outcomes is a basis through which to bind together the concerns 
of a ‘thin’ global polity.  It also leaves bare the question of whose beliefs or perceptions of 
legitimacy are of concern--legitimacy in whose eyes? 
The three sections that follow will explore the Global Fund’s distinct design as sources of 
legitimacy:  its inclusive global and country level governance models, its transparency and 
performance-based funding modus-operandi and the scale of its resource mobilisation and 
distribution.  These sources of legitimacy are an intrinsic part of the Global Fund’s initial 
mandate as a financing mechanism to address MDG 6 (the Global Fund’s design was 
described earlier in Chapter 2).  Its inclusive governance and its transparency and 
performance-based funding modus operandi are intrinsically linked to its capability to 
mobilise the funds it requires from donor governments and provide assurance that these 
funds are distributed efficiently and effectively.  The Global Fund’s efforts to reflect the 
interests of its many constituencies may not be the input-oriented legitimacy that it first 
appears. The need to satisfy donor governments puts strong pressure on the Global Fund to 
foster a belief in its performance lending its legitimacy an output-oriented character.  
Although its governance model is distinct from that of traditional multilaterals, the Global 
Fund’s legitimacy is nevertheless conferred predominantly by and is therefore reliant on 
powerful donor governments.  Despite the inclusion of non-state actors in the Global 
Fund’s governance at global and country levels, legitimacy in the eyes of donor 
governments takes precedence. 
The Global Fund, Legitimacy and Inclusive Governance 
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The Global Fund describes itself as a public/private partnership. Constitutionally however, 
it was founded as a not-for-profit, private foundation in Switzerland and operated its 
Secretariat through an Administrative Services Agreement with the WHO.  As described in 
Chapter 2, in 2004 the Global Fund concluded a Headquarters Agreement with the Swiss 
Government giving it “international juridical personality and legal capacity (The Global 
Fund 2004, p. 2),” meaning it became an international organisation.14 By the end of 2008 it 
had concluded its agreement with the WHO and operated its Secretariat under its own 
auspices.  Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the Global Fund’s institutional arrangements 
and its board composition. The Global Fund has matured, at least in a constitutional sense, 
from its private foundation beginnings to claim status as an independent, international 
institution. 
 Although the Global Fund’s board representation at global level embraces “communities 
of fate” described by Held and McGrew, its composition has changed since its inception to 
one where donor government delegations dominate.  When the Global Fund was first set 
up, its board had 18 votes comprised of seven for donor government delegations, seven for 
recipient country delegations and four for non-state actors:  one each for delegations 
representing developed country NGOs, developing country NGOs, private philanthropy 
and the private sector.   As Figure 5 shows, by the end of 2005, this balance had shifted.  
Out of by then 20 voting members, eight seats represented donor government delegations, 
the number of recipient country delegations remained the same at seven and one more seat 
for a total of five had been added to those representing non-state actors. The eight 
delegations representing donor governments became Canada/Germany/Switzerland, 
Denmark/Ireland/Netherlands/Norway/Sweden, the European Commission, 
France/Luxembourg/Spain, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom/Australia and the United States.  
The additional non-state actor seat went to a delegation representing the ultimate 
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Figure 5:  Evolution of the Global Fund's Board and Institutional Arrangements 
 
beneficiaries of the Global Fund’s grants, a person or community living with or affected by 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria (The Global Fund 2005, p. 9). 
Given its inclusiveness and diversity, the Global Fund’s board exhibits the “equivalence 
principle” where those affected by a global public good have a say in its provision (Kaul et 
al. 2003, p. 36; Held 2004, p. 371).  Nevertheless, the dominance of donor governments 
raises the question of whether inclusion and ‘having a say’ is enough to serve as a 
legitimising force if the balance of power either functions as or is perceived as a 
“colonisation of power and wealth” (Wallace Brown 2010, p. 530).  Bull (2010, pp. 226-7) 
supports this contention describing the Global Fund as an elite initiative where “the 
magnitude of money they [the elite] may bring in, or the potential influence and power to 
carry out desired policy change that they bring, may in itself tilt agendas toward the 
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priorities of the elite.” Where agenda setting is concerned there is a divergence between 
the idea of inclusiveness and the representation of the elite.   
Therefore, rather than a source of input-oriented legitimacy which provides some form of 
global deliberative equality (Slaughter 2004a, p. 175), the Global Fund’s board can better 
be understood as a source of output-oriented legitimacy.  The balance of voting power in 
favour of donor governments supports the Global Fund’s business model--its capacity to 
solve the problem of infectious disease and provide a collective solution to MDG 6 by 
mobilising and distributing funds. By the conclusion of its third replenishment cycle for 
2011 to 2013, the countries comprising the donor government delegations on the Global 
Fund’s board had contributed 88% of the total pledges to the Global Fund, or just over 
US$26 bn.
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The Global Fund’s country level governance model with its ‘country ownership’ ethos 
might more readily be seen as a form of input-oriented legitimacy (‘country ownership’ 
and the Global Fund’s in-country governance model are discussed in some depth in 
Chapter 5).  Like the Global Fund’s board, it too departs from the ‘doctrine of sovereignty’ 
with CCMs, which act as the primary governance organ for Global Fund grants, 
encouraged “to be broadly representative of all national stakeholders in the fight against 
the three diseases” (The Global Fund, no date-b, p. 3). Even though as discussed in 
Chapter 2, Shakow (2006, p. 25) found that “[i]n practice, CCM leadership, composition 
and practices have varied widely”, at least by design the Global Fund has intended to 
create country-level governance which extends beyond government and expands the 
decision making domain to include national and international non-state actors such as local 
and international NGOs and CSOs.   
 120 
The participation by non-state actors in direction-setting for a country’s response to the 
three diseases could be seen as undermining the authority of government (Doyle and Patel 
2008, p. 1935) and therefore detracting from both the structure and perception of input-
oriented legitimacy associated with representation by and governance through the state.  
However, the inclusiveness and independence of CCMs can be seen as a basis for 
legitimacy to the extent that they create a “national public” (Keohane 2006, p. 16) for the 
provision of a global public good (Lipschutz and Fogel 2002, p. 136).  Or, put another 
way, CCMs could be perceived as providing representation, where “political decisions are 
reached through a deliberative process where participants scrutinize heterogeneous 
interests and justify their positions in view of the common good of a given constituency” 
(Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 315). 
Where a national public is involved in designing and implementing far reaching 
programmes of prevention, treatment and care for the three diseases, its composition could 
be seen as an effort to improve public policy.  However, inclusion of actors beyond the 
state in the Global Fund’s country level governance, similar to the Global Fund’s board, 
serves a highly practical purpose beyond the more normative desire to give voice to non-
state actors. As Chapter 2 describes civil society has historically played a role in public 
health service delivery in weak infrastructure environments.  Therefore, its inclusion in the 
Global Fund’s country level governance is in part a problem solving strategy.   
As the case in Malawi demonstrates, similar to the Global Fund’s global level governance, 
the idea of inclusion may also depart from the reality of the influence of global and 
national elite.  As discussed in Chapter 5, in Malawi in 2010 the CCM was chaired by the 
Secretary to the Treasury, and in addition to representation from national CSOs, it also 
included elite representation from government and the NAC, representation from 
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UNAIDS, the WHO and the Clinton Foundation, and participation from the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States’ 
Center for Disease Control. As a representative on the CCM for an international 
organisation remarked, “[f]or me it’s a bit challenging with the CCM at the moment.  The 
[international] partner constituencies are fairly active and the other constituencies not so 
much and I’d really like to get those voices in, so it’s not seen as an outside body but a 
Malawian institution” (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe). Therefore 
governance at country level offers a mechanism for inclusivity, but in practice, it is more 
directly a source of output-oriented legitimacy involving ‘multiple, nested and overlapping 
collective identities’ but primarily those of elite national and international actors. 
While CCMs are involved in country level direction-setting to fight the three diseases, they 
can only be effective problem solvers to the extent that they are successful in securing and 
overseeing Global Fund grants: 
As the CCM we are responsible for the Global Fund resources in the country 
[Malawi].  The CCM has oversight for the Principal Recipients both in terms of 
programmatic and financial performance…The Global Fund does…hold us 
accountable for the country’s implementation of the grant.  Technically we are a 
Global Fund entity that also has Malawi ownership (International CCM Member 
2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
To remain viable, CCMs must be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the TRP who make grant 
award decisions, the Global Fund’s board who approve the TRP’s recommendations, the 
Local Fund Agents who provide an in-country audit function and the Geneva-based 
country managers who track and rate grant performance. Ultimately, this linking of 
legitimacy to country-level accountability for proper management of the funds and 
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implementation of effective interventions is reassurance to donors that the ‘national public’ 
of a country is behaving in a way that Suchman (1995, p. 574) would describe as 
“desirable, proper, or appropriate.”  Legitimacy in the eyes of wealthy and powerful states 
is imperative for country level governance too. 
The Global Fund’s inclusion of state and non-state, public and private and national and 
international actors in its global and country level governance departs from the ‘states as 
members’ model of traditional multilaterals.  This inclusiveness responds to Keohane’s 
concern with the limits of the “sociological legitimacy of statism” through the participation 
of a range of actors beyond states in decision making. But in the case of the Global Fund, 
this inclusiveness has a twist.  Normatively, it may be seen as a good thing, embracing the 
‘communities of fate’ who are affected by the three diseases and deflecting the criticism 
levelled towards traditional multilaterals that their state-centric governance excludes large 
numbers of people and interests.  But behind this belief in the goodness of inclusion is elite 
participation and influence and a strong output-oriented legitimacy which serves the 
Global Fund’s raison d’être as a financing mechanism to mobilise funds on an 
unprecedented scale primarily from donor governments.  As such, the Global Fund’s 
model of inclusion at global and country levels is a new source of legitimacy distinct from 
multilaterals.  This legitimacy does have an input-oriented character to the extent that it 
fulfils the ‘equivalency principle’.  However, it also has a strong output-oriented function 
and when the question of “legitimacy in whose eyes?” is posed, at both global and country 
levels, the answer is in the eyes of wealthy and powerful states. 
The Global Fund, Legitimacy, Transparency and Performance-based Funding  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Global Fund’s modus operandi of transparency together 
with its performance-based funding model were features of its design intended as a change 
 123 
from ‘business as usual’, a signal that the Global Fund was a departure from what were 
perceived as slow and overly bureaucratic practices of multilateral organisations in which 
some donor countries had lost faith (Buse and Walt 2001a, p. 551; WHO 2002, p. 1, 
Kickbusch 2009, p. 323).  Like the Global Fund’s inclusive governance model, 
transparency and performance-based funding which are inextricably linked to ideas of 
participation and accountability, are new legitimising forces distinct from those of 
traditional multilaterals (Woods and Narlikar 2001, p. 575; Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 323; 
Fidler 2004, p. 802; Steffek and Nanz 2007, p. 10; Sridhar, Khagram and Pang 2008, p. 9).   
As Chapter 2 describes, beyond being seen to provide an opportunity for participation from 
a broad public, transparency and performance-based funding inform a critical advocacy 
and communications function, a legitimising force, helping to make the Global Fund’s case 
to donor governments and other partners.  
Transparency through its association with participation and accountability is construed as 
making processes of international organisations more deliberative or more democratic 
particularly where the inclusion of NGOs and CSOs is concerned (Woods and Narlikar 
2001, p. 575; Moravcsik 2004, p. 342; Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 321; Slaughter 2004a, p. 
169; Sridhar, Khagram and Pang 2008, p. 9).  These arguments characterise NGOs and 
CSOs as constituents of a ‘public sphere’ which is comprised of overlapping transnational 
communities beyond the boundaries of states (Castells 2008, p. 78).  As discussed earlier 
in this Chapter, NGOs and CSOs are seen as providing a two-way “transmission belt” with 
international organisations, “giv[ing] voice to citizens’ concerns and channel[ing] them 
into the deliberative process of international organizations” and “mak[ing] internal 
decision-making processes of international organizations more transparent to the wider 
public” (Steffek and Nanz 2007, p. 8). This faith in the powers of transparency is related to 
a belief in the capacity of deliberative processes to make better decisions and better policy 
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(Woods and Narlikar 2001, p. 574; Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 317; Held and Koenig-
Archibugi 2004, p. 127; Slaughter 2004a, p. 175; Wallace Brown 2010, p. 513).  
Transparency presented in this context is a form of input-oriented legitimacy, where it is 
seen to strengthen participation by non-state actors and diversify the discourse beyond the 
natural boundaries of state-centric representation. 
Not all scholars agree that deliberative governance processes give rise to ‘better’ 
governance.  Risse (2004, p. 311) argues that deliberative strategies of inclusion still have 
the problem of determining who the stakeholders are (or should be), whom they actually 
represent, and to whom they are accountable. Kahler (2004, p. 153) echoes this sentiment 
noting that affording NGOs, particularly those originating in developed countries, greater 
participation in the governance of international organisations could further augment the 
power which accrues to wealthy states.  Held  (2004, p. 370) observes that for poor 
countries or delegations, having a seat at the table does not ensure effective representation:  
“…developed countries have large delegations equipped with extensive negotiating and 
technical expertise, while poorer developing countries often depend on one person 
delegations, or have even to rely on the sharing of a delegate.”  Given these criticisms, it’s 
not surprising that Moravcsik (2004, p. 343) maintains that deliberative democracy is a 
normative, utopian ideal.  Stone (2008, p. 23) provides some perspective by describing a 
continuum with hierarchically based realist-rationalist views of governance at one end and 
deliberative models with an idealist cosmopolitan character at the other and a “…complex 
range of state capacities, public action and democratic deliberation fall[ing] in between 
these two extremes.”  While transparency is argued by some to support more deliberative 
processes, not all agree that deliberative processes make for inherently ‘better’ governance. 
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The Global Fund has as one of its principles to “…operat[e] in a transparent and 
accountable manner based on clearly defined responsibilities” (The Global Fund, no date-
c, ‘The Framework Document, p. 2). The Framework Document repeatedly describes the 
Global Fund’s processes as transparent—those for applications, channelling of funds, 
monitoring and evaluation and fiduciary arrangements and audits.  In and of itself, this 
intention to make available information about oversight, decision-making and performance 
does not necessarily make the Global Fund more representative, more responsive or more 
accountable.  In Hale’s (2008, p. 73) words, “[i]f “democracy deficit” is the catchphrase 
for global governance’s problem, “transparency” is its buzzword solution.”  As a 
legitimising force, transparency has legitimising and output-oriented qualities to the extent 
that it makes apparent internal decision-making and outcomes to a ‘global public’ and is 
therefore perceived as contributing to greater representativeness, fairness, and equity 
(Woods and Narlikar 2001, p. 583).  However, critics (Kahler 2004, p. 144; Risse 2004p. 
312) challenge these normative attributes as overly idealised. 
Performance-based funding forms the basis for the Global Fund’s capability to measure 
and report results achieved through its grants, making the case to donors that by investing 
in the Global Fund meaningful progress can be made towards achieving MDG 6.  The 
Global Fund is not unique in its drive to demonstrate outcomes.  As discussed in Chapter 
2, the WHO and other UN organisations also mobilise donor funds and seek to present 
‘value for money’ arguments for their programmes and initiatives.  Piot (2008, p. 527) 
described this process for UNAIDS: “…the span of public and political attention is 
generally short… To maintain the AIDS response as a priority we need to show continual 
results on the ground—i.e.…the major investments made in fighting AIDS are having a 
commensurate effect in terms of averted infections, illness, and deaths.”  Proving 
performance or laying claim to the results of its own good works lends legitimacy to the 
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Global Fund particularly in the eyes of donors by reinforcing the belief or ‘proving’ that 
investing substantial resources yields results in the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria. 
As described in Chapter 2, the Global Fund was initially conceived as a vertical, disease-
focused financing mechanism.  Vertical programming lends itself to performance-based 
funding because it is possible to isolate and monitor and evaluate results such as how many 
people began anti-retroviral treatment, or whether prevalence or incidence of HIV/AIDS is 
trending up or down in a given population.
16
  However, more complex questions of health 
system performance are challenging to measure in part because so many dynamic and 
interrelated factors are at play, and also because of the long time horizon necessary for 
these types of investments to yield change. As Gonzalez noted in his 1965 work for the 
WHO on mass campaigns (vertical programming), “…mass campaigns are useful….in 
breaking the vicious circle…[but mass campaigns] are temporary expedients…and…there 
is a need to establish… an organized scheme of general health services which, though not 
yielding spectacular results, form an essential component of the permanent public services 
of the community” (WHO 2005, p. 318).  Sridhar and Batniji (2008, p. 1190) take things a 
step further positing that donor interest in “quick results and measurable returns through 
vertical programming” actually discourages investments in longer-term and “essential” 
health services and infrastructure.  In the words of Brugha et al. (2004, p. 100), 
[t]he pressure to show results through performance based disbursement is 
understandable, as a prerequisite for accountability. A similar condition underlies 
the Fund’s [the Global Fund’s] own relation with its contributors, in that its ability 
to attract additional contributions will depend on it showing results. Excessive or 
too frequent reporting requirements will be beyond the capacity of countries with 
weak systems that have the greatest need for additional funds. 
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Performance-based funding is an output-oriented legitimising force particularly in the eyes 
of donors, a blessing in the Global Fund’s virtuous cycle of ‘raise it, invest it, prove it’.  
However, performance-based funding will be difficult to maintain if it cannot be 
reconciled with essential and more complex investments in health systems and 
infrastructure that will yield less ‘spectacular’ results. 
For the Global Fund, transparency and performance-based funding have two legitimising 
functions. Transparency, in theory at least, relates to creating ‘better’ policies through 
facilitating more deliberative governance and discursive processes and from this 
perspective can be seen to be input-oriented.  Whether or not this is in fact the case, the 
belief in or perception of the goodness of transparency has a legitimising effect.  
Performance-based funding on the other hand is a more consistently output-oriented force 
where results--particularly related to disease-focused interventions—are the basis for the 
case to donors for sustaining their investment. 
The Global Fund, Legitimacy and Resource Mobilisation and Distribution 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, the scale of the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation 
for three diseases is without precedent.  By the end of 2009 the Global Fund had mobilised 
more than US$21 bn in commitments and approved US$19.3 bn in grants to 144 countries 
(The Global Fund 2010k, ‘Resource Mobilization’), making more resources available to 
combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria than any other UN or Bretton Woods 
institution.  Chapter 2 describes the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation including 
increased donor government funding for the health envelope overall, and competition for 
ODA over and above health among other sectors such as climate change and food security.  
The sources of the Global Fund’s legitimacy, its inclusive governance at global and 
country levels, and its transparent and performance-based funding modus operandi serve to 
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reinforce the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation and distribution, which lie at the heart of 
its mission, its design and its sustainability. 
As a financing mechanism to achieve MDG 6, the Global Fund as it was first conceived 
was an emergency response to a humanitarian disaster; however donors have signalled a 
change in this approach.  In 2001 there were estimated to be 28 million people living with 
HIV/AIDs, and 20 million of those were in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2010d, p. 180).  
By 2009 these figures had grown to 33 million people living with AIDS worldwide of 
which 22 million were in Sub-Saharan Africa.   Since 2004, largely due to the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR, almost 5 million people have access to treatment reducing deaths by 19% 
(UNAIDS 2010c, p. 8).  Despite these astonishing figures, or perhaps because of them, 
donors have signalled a move away from funding an ‘emergency response’ to a longer 
term view of their commitments with a focus on effectiveness and efficiency, the 
responsibilities of recipient countries, and more specifically, their accountability.  Simply, 
the more people who begin to receive treatment for AIDS the more people there are on 
these drugs for their lifetimes.  This means donors, some of whom like the United States 
which have annual commitment cycles, must consider long term investment horizons.  As 
a 2010 UNAIDS report (2010b, p. 2) which contextualised the HIV/AIDS response 
relative to all the MDGs stated, 
 [f]or decades, HIV has been addressed as a global public health crisis requiring an 
emergency response. This approach has been a powerful motivator for mobilising 
resources and expanding HIV programmes, and it remains relevant in many 
contexts. Donor priorities, however, appear to be shifting, often away from MDG 6 
and towards other health-related MDGs and development challenges. Donor 
allocations are increasingly subsumed in sector-wide funding, used for health 
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systems strengthening or are being allocated to those MDGs considered to be 
veering the farthest off track, like maternal and child health. 
For the Global Fund with its distinctly output-oriented legitimacy, this change in donor 
strategy means that the nature of the case it makes for resources must also change. 
The Global Fund’s “capacity to solve problems which require collective solutions” 
(Scharpf 1999, p. 11) is fundamentally dependent on powerful states.  The United States 
has provided 28% of donor government resources since the Global Fund’s inception.  For 
example, the United States pledged US$4 bn towards total donor government 
commitments of US$11.7 bn in the Global Fund’s third voluntary replenishment cycle for 
2011 to 2013. This contribution came with an agenda for reform which is being 
implemented by the Global Fund under the banner of “The Agenda for a More Efficient 
and Effective Global Fund” (The Global Fund 2010m, p. 15).  Among the conditions laid 
out by the United States were reforms to the Secretariat to “…improve quality control, 
transparency, [and] accountability”, and to “Board constituencies and the institutions they 
represent…to improve Global Fund processes and policies around proposal development, 
review, and funding…[and for ]…the Secretariat, grant recipients, development partners, 
and UN and other technical partners…[to] improve how we work together at country 
level…”  Lastly, the United States laid out the task for implementing countries of  
“…leadership in defining and advancing reforms that will result in true improvements at 
the country level to support the development, implementation, and review of strategic, 
high-quality, and cost-effective grant programs” (PEPFAR 2010b, ‘Investing for Impact’).  
In essence, the United States defined its expectations of the Global Fund, other donor 
governments, non-state actors and recipient countries in order for the Global Fund to 
continue to receive the level of investment it requires. Legitimacy in the eyes of donor 
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governments is important for the Global Fund, but legitimacy in the eyes of one of its 
voting board members, the United States, is of a higher and more far-reaching order. 
In times of fiscal constraint the expectations set by donor governments for how their 
money will be spent means that for recipient countries the nature of country ownership is 
becoming increasingly associated with accountability.  The General Assembly of the UN 
resolved in its 2010 review of progress towards achieving the MDGs “to promote and 
strengthen national ownership and leadership of development as a key determinant of 
progress...with each country taking the primary responsibility for its own development” 
(United Nations 2010, p. 7).  A similar sentiment was expressed in a report to the United 
States government by the Institute of Medicine (2010 ‘Sharing the Responsibility’):  
“Shared responsibility between the United States and African nations will empower these 
nations to take ownership of their [italics mine] HIV/AIDS problem and to work to solve 
it.”  While the solution may be collective, the problem is becoming increasingly isolated, 
attributed to poor and disease endemic countries. 
Recipient countries are being challenged to prove that the significant investment they have 
received to address HIV/AIDs and the other diseases are in addition to their own 
commitments amid concerns that increased development assistance for health has been 
accompanied by a decline in spending by recipient governments on health (Lu et al 2010, 
p. 1382).  Sridhar and Woods (Sridhar and Woods 2010, p. 1326) have sounded a note of 
caution about these conclusions, particularly where the heavy hand of donor governments 
might influence a recipient government’s budget priorities in an effort to direct donor 
investments more explicitly:  
…who should decide and who takes responsibility for setting priorities?...Messing 
up good intentions are vested interests, pressures to disburse funds, a prioritising of 
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efforts most likely to show measurable results in a short-time scale, and political 
incentives to announce new initiatives even if that means abandoning successful 
policies. 
The reminder here is that international institutions like the Global Fund are not above 
“messing up good intentions” or immune to the “realities of power politics” (Keohane 
2006, p. 5), particularly when proving their own cases to powerful and wealthy states. 
For the Global Fund the legitimacy it derives from mobilising and distributing resources is 
changing. While it has always been donor driven, it is becoming more explicitly dependent 
on the United States to confer it.  The case that underlies the Global Fund’s resource 
mobilisation is also on shifting ground.  In addition to reporting on how its investments 
have scaled up prevention, treatment and care for three diseases and saved lives, the Global 
Fund must make a much broader case for  the efficiency and effectiveness of its 
investments.  It must place its achievements in the context of factors that are within its 
scope of influence, like better grant processes, as well as those that are outside of its 
control but perhaps subject to influence, such as the national budget allocations of recipient 
countries.  The Global Fund’s distinct form of output-oriented legitimacy is becoming 
inherently more complex as donor interests move away from that of an emergency 
response.  “The gap between U.S. ability and patient needs is one reason that the [United 
States’] administration has emphasized a need to get other donors on board... Kazatchkine 
[the Global Fund’s Executive Director from 2007 to 2012] called it "a big test for 
multilateralism and the move to multilateralism for the administration"” (Dickinson 2010, 
p. 4). 
The nature of the Global Fund’s legitimacy may not be as it initially appears or as it might 
claim.  Its inclusive governance at both global and country levels in particular would seem 
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to distinguish it from the ‘doctrine of sovereignty’ model of traditional multilaterals, and 
normatively at least suggests that rather than “exclude large numbers of people…on a 
global basis” (Keohane 2006, p. 14), it can claim to include them.  However, at global 
level in particular, the domination of donor governments on the Global Fund’s board 
suggests that in addition to serving the “equivalency principle”, the board reflects the 
nature of the Global Fund’s output-oriented legitimacy and in particular serves its resource 
mobilisation efforts.  At country level, inclusiveness can be seen to support a more 
deliberative approach to decision-making.  In addition to being a practical strategy to 
include non-state actors on which successful service delivery depends, it is also in 
Malawi’s case largely an inclusion of government and international elites.  In both cases 
what initially appears to be input-oriented legitimacy offers strong normative overtones 
implying inclusion and participation, but it is in essence output-oriented legitimacy which 
is held in the eyes of donor governments. 
Similarly, the Global Fund’s transparency and the information it makes available about 
oversight, decision-making and performance can be seen as having input-oriented qualities 
to the extent that it contributes to greater representativeness, fairness and equity; however, 
transparency does not necessarily result in ‘better’ governance than that practised by 
traditional multilaterals.  Like inclusive governance, transparency lends a normative ideal 
and grounds for legitimising claims by the Global Fund of deliberative decision making 
and discourse.  Performance-based funding on the other hand is more consistently an 
output-oriented force, nevertheless it also lends itself to claim-making, in this case about 
the Global Funds own good works.  It forms the basis of the Global Fund’s case to donor 
governments particularly for vertical, disease-focused interventions and as such is 
intrinsically tied to the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation and its legitimacy in the eyes 
of donor governments. The Global Fund’s legitimacy then in terms of transparency and 
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performance-based funding is derived both normatively and rationally and is distinctly 
output-oriented. 
Inclusive governance at global and country levels, transparency and performance-based 
funding all serve to underpin the Global Fund’s resource mobilisation efforts.  As the tenor 
of donor governments and particularly the Global Fund’s largest donor, the United States, 
has changed from that of providing an emergency response to one of efficiency, 
effectiveness and country responsibility, the nature of the Global Fund’s legitimacy, 
despite claims of inclusiveness and transparency not only becomes more explicitly output-
oriented but also more explicitly held in the eyes of the most powerful and wealthy states.  
As Kazatchkine noted,  it’s a big test for multilateralism (Dickinson 2010, p. 4), one that 
although lacking the legitimacy conferred by the doctrine of states nevertheless must 
provide a collective solution to MDG 6 on which millions of lives, or ‘communities of 
fate’, depend.  
3. The Global Fund, Legitimacy and the Accountability Link 
Before discussing the link between legitimacy and accountability, some clarification of 
what is meant by accountability is necessary.  Accountability is variously associated with 
legitimacy, transparency, democracy, responsibility and a host of other concepts, and is 
attributed to individuals, organisations, and sectors.  Although an in-depth analysis of 
accountability is beyond the scope of this discussion, Bovens offers a conceptual 
framework for accountability which provides a useful lens.  He differentiates between two 
types of accountability.  The first is what he calls an active form of accountability—
accountability as a virtue (Bovens 2010, p. 949).  The second is what he calls a passive 
form of accountability—accountability as a social mechanism (Bovens 2010, p. 948).  In 
the case of the former, accountability is “…a normative concept, a set of standards for the 
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evaluation of the behaviour of public actors” (Bovens 2010, p. 951).  Bovens (2010, p. 
949) notes that the normative use of accountability conveys an image of transparency and 
trustworthiness, but it is also highly contested because it “lacks standards for accountable 
behaviour, and because these standards differ, depending on role, [it also lacks] 
institutional context, era, and political perspective.” This normative aspect of 
accountability is analogous to the normative qualities of legitimacy.   
In the case of the latter type of accountability—as a social mechanism—Bovens (2010, p. 
948) defines it as “an institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to 
account by a forum.”  This type of accountability has historical roots which Dubnick 
(2007, p. 14) ascribes to the Norman conquest of England when property holders listed 
their assets in the Domesday books, or provided their ‘account’ to the sovereign.  The 
principal-agent legacy is embedded in this historic and mechanistic interpretation of 
accountability.  Accountability as a mechanism is often characterised as determining who 
it is that should be held to account, to whom they are accountable and what sanctions can 
be employed to hold an individual or an institution to account (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 
2004, p. 127; Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 426; Bartsch 2007b, p. 6).  As Buse and 
Walt (2000b, p 705) note in their work on global public private partnerships, 
accountability in its mechanistic form may seem straightforward in concept, but may prove 
difficult to achieve: 
…accountability within public-private partnerships may be less straightforward, 
partly because of the distance between the global partners and the beneficiaries, 
and the length of time needed for any impact to be felt…partnerships whose goals 
and division of labour are vaguely defined will lack accountability.  Moreover, 
actually holding a partner accountable presents difficult challenges.  At the moment 
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systems of sanctions that can be applied to negligent partners do not appear to have 
been developed. 
Conceptually then, accountability resembles legitimacy in the sense that it has two aspects. 
It is normative, conferring virtue shaped by the belief or perception that an individual or 
entity is accountable.  It is also rational, derived through mechanisms or processes that 
embed a principal-agent relationship between the accountable and those who hold them to 
account.  
In the case of the Global Fund, both concepts of accountability—as a virtue and as a 
mechanism—are relevant.  Accountability as a virtue fosters belief in the Global Fund’s 
legitimacy:  it imbues the Global Fund with the qualities of a ‘good governor’, one that is 
seen by its constituents to practise inclusive governance and provide a voice to non-state 
actors, embracing both global and country level publics; one that practises transparency 
and can demonstrate human and moral outcomes in terms of lives saved; and one that can 
effectively mobilise and distribute resources on an unprecedented scale.  The output-
oriented nature of the Global Fund’s legitimacy relies on accountability as a mechanism.  
The Global Fund must have in place the processes to provide assurance that it is managing 
donor money responsibly and effectively and donors are realising the results they intend.  
According to Bovens (2010, p. 962), both types of accountability have to do with 
“…transparency, openness, responsiveness, and responsibility. In the former case 
[accountability as a virtue], these are properties of the actor, in the latter case 
[accountability as a mechanism] these are properties of the mechanisms or desirable 
outcomes.”  
Because of its predominantly output-oriented legitimacy, the Global Fund emphasises 
the mechanistic aspects of its accountability, but its normative character is not lost. 
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Kazatchkine (Council on Foreign Relations 2010, ‘A Conversation with Michel 
Kazatchkine’) described the accountability embedded in the Global Fund’s grant award 
process:  
…everything that we would fund is evidence-based, so all of the requests that come 
to the Global Fund are screened and then carefully assessed by an independent 
panel of international experts from the north and from the south...that will look for 
how programmatically, epidemiologically, scientifically and financially a proposal 
is sound…[The grant application and review process] allows our board to decide 
on investments that actually have 85 per cent chance for the programs to reach their 
objectives.  And that's I think a very strong message to our donors.  
Normatively, Kazatchkine claims the validity, or virtue, of the Global Fund’s decision-
making processes as both inclusive and valid.  He also emphasises the Global Fund’s 
results orientation, its output-oriented legitimacy, linking it to the board’s accountability to 
donor governments to spend their money wisely.  The legitimacy of the Global Fund’s 
model is bound closely to accountability, both as a ‘virtue’ and as a ‘social mechanism’.  
The Global Fund’s Accountability: Mechanistic Strength 
The historic notion of a principal-agent relationship is embedded in several conceptions 
of accountability applied to international organisations.  Cox and Jacobson (1973) make 
a connection between the design of an organisation and the nature of its accountability 
or decision-making.  Grant and Keohane (2005) take a different approach, focusing on 
the nature of the decision making processes themselves, describing them as being either 
modelled on participation or delegation.  Keohane (2002) examines the accountability 
of traditional multilaterals from the perspective of their internal accountability practices 
and their external accountability to those affected by an institution’s decisions.  These 
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perspectives on accountability may seem divergent, but what they share is what Bovens 
would describe as their mechanistic orientation. 
Cox and Jacobson (1973, pp.429-30) describe three types of models for the structure of 
influence and decision-making or accountability in international organisations:  i) the 
monarchic model which is “characterized by the importance of the executive head and 
of the other actors who belong to the organization’s establishment, regardless of 
whether they are members of the international bureaucracy, representatives of states and 
other entities, or independent personalities”; ii) the oligarchic model where the 
“activities of such agencies are considered highly salient by the most powerful 
states…[and where these] agencies create rules with important consequences which 
apply to the states and others”; and iii) the pluralistic-bargaining model where influence 
is “diffuse and fluid [and] [w]hat goes on in the organization can be explained largely in 
terms of the participant subsystem, but there is no single network through which this 
subsystem is manipulated, no cohesive establishment.” From the earlier discussion on 
the Global Fund’s sources of legitimacy, the Global Fund’s inclusive governance 
suggests that it takes on the characteristics of the third model, that of pluralistic-
bargaining.  However, Cox and Jacobson (1973, pp.430) assert that since the activities 
of pluralistic-bargaining organisations do not affect powerful states this reduces the 
interest of these states in playing a leadership role and moreover might contribute to 
them conspiring to limit the power of these organisations.  This is not the case for the 
Global Fund.   
If the dominant representation of donor country delegations on the board and the 
influence of the United States in setting performance expectations are considered, then 
the Global Fund could be said to resemble an oligarchic organisation where its tasks are 
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“carefully monitored by representatives of the states” and “state policies rather than the 
participant subsystem” (Cox and Jacobson 1973, pp.430) explain decision-making. In 
practice, the Global Fund’s model is found somewhere in between Cox and Jacobson’s 
concepts of pluralistic-bargaining and oligarchic models.  Arguably, this straddling or 
mixing of ‘bottom up’ and a ‘top down’ is due to the effects of globalisation which have 
emerged more strongly since Cox and Jacobson’s work—and in the case of global 
health governance, the realisation that “states alone cannot address many of the health 
challenges…[including] [i]nfectious diseases [which] are perhaps the most prominent 
example of this diminishing capacity” (Dodgson, Lee and Drager 2002, p. 7).  
Grant and Keohane (2005, pp. 31) distinguish between two models of accountability:  
participation and delegation.  They describe the fundamental difference between the two 
as lying in the answer to the question “[w]ho is entitled to hold the powerful 
accountable?” In the participation model, the performance of what Grant and Keohane 
call a ‘power-wielder’, is evaluated by those who are affected by its actions. In the 
delegation model performance is evaluated by those entrusting an entity with power.  In 
ascribing either model to the Global Fund, the challenge lies in defining the ‘who’ in 
terms of who is affected by or who entrusts the Global Fund with power.  According to 
Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 33), in the global context this ‘who’ is a challenge because 
“[i]n the absence of a public whose boundaries are defined by participation in a polity, it 
is very difficult to specify either who should be entitled to participate or how they 
would do so.”  In other words, depending on one’s point of view, the Global Fund has 
different principal-agent identities.  As principals, donor governments hold the Global 
Fund to account.  As the principal itself, the Global Fund holds recipient countries to 
account.  But there is no principal-agent relationship that embraces broader global or 
country level ‘publics’. 
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This challenge in defining a global public for the purposes of accountability is perhaps 
why Grant and Keohane find that multilateral institutions adopt a mix of both 
participation and delegation models of accountability.  For the Global Fund, the 
inclusive nature of its global and country level governance models suggests 
participatory accountability where state and non-state, public and private and global and 
country actors have a say in decision-making.  However, the influence of powerful 
states particularly on its board and its predominantly output-oriented legitimacy are 
evidence that a more delegative form of accountability is at play.  Grant and Keohane 
(2005, p. 33) note that the role of powerful states is particularly complex where 
accountability in international institutions is concerned because “…governments are 
accountable to their citizens and to an array of domestic interests and institutions, 
but…this does not assure accountability to outsiders.”  In terms of participation and 
delegation, the Global Fund’s accountability model is similar to that of traditional 
multilaterals in the sense that it exhibits aspects of both and faces the challenge of 
balancing the influence of wealthy and powerful states with the interests of ‘outsiders’--
those who are reliant on donor government funding and Global Fund grant processes to 
provide prevention, treatment and care for the three diseases. 
The nature of the Global Fund’s output-oriented legitimacy--its problem-solving and 
outcome focus--supports a hierarchical form of accountability which Keohane (2002, p. 
14) describes as ‘internal’: where “entities [can be held] accountable because the 
principal is providing legitimacy or financial resources to the agent…[and] the principal 
and agent are institutionally linked to one another.”  The Global Fund’s internal 
accountability has several components. At country level, not only do countries report 
their results in order to release further tranches of funding, but these results are overseen 
by the Principal Recipient, the CCM and audited by a Local Fund Agent.  At global 
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level a TRP comprised of independent experts determines grant awards and Secretariat 
staff score grant performance.  In addition, there is an independent Office of the 
Inspector General, which serves an audit role for the Secretariat and country grant 
portfolios and reports directly to the board.  All of these bodies and processes not only 
support the nature of the Global Fund’s output-oriented legitimacy, but in and of 
themselves are mechanisms for a principal-agent model of accountability.   In this 
hierarchy, the donor government dominated board can hold the Global Fund to account 
for its operational efficiency and the effectiveness of its grants to recipients.  The 
Global Fund in turn can hold its Principal Recipients to account for exercising their 
fiduciary responsibilities and for achieving goals for the three diseases.  The Global 
Fund’s legitimacy, particularly that conferred by its global and country level 
governance models and its performance-based funding approach, is reinforced by its 
ability to demonstrate what Keohane defines as an internal form of accountability, or 
what Kazatchkine describes as “…a very strong message to our donors.” 
The Global Fund’s Accountability Gap:  The Necessity of Virtue 
The Global Fund’s ‘publics’ challenge the neatness of a principal-agent concept of 
accountability (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2004, p. 198; Slaughter 2004b, pp. 133-4; Zürn 
2004, p. 273; Grant and Keohane 2005, p. 33; Bartsch 2007b, p. 8).  As its inclusive 
governance model demonstrates, the Global Fund is not purely a state-centric multilateral 
in terms of the state and non-state delegations who vote on its board or in terms of the 
‘national publics’ it has created at country level.  As Scharpf described, it must contend 
with a “thin” collective identity and the “multiple, nested or overlapping” constituencies 
who have an interest in the resources it invests and the results its grant recipients achieve.   
According to Held (2004, p. 371), there is a breakdown “…between decision-makers and 
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decision-takers, between decision-makers and stakeholders, and between the inputs and 
outputs of the decision-making process.”  Keohane (2002, pp. 14-15) describes the 
accountability of an entity relative to its publics as ‘external’ accountability, or 
“accountability to people outside the acting entity, whose lives are affected by it.”  (The 
external accountability challenge as it relates to country ownership is discussed in Chapter 
5).  He argues that in the case of multilateral organisations, it’s not that they are not 
accountable, because they have internal accountability processes.  Rather, it is a question 
of to whom they are accountable beyond the states that comprise their formal governance 
and then how they are held to account.  “These organizations are subject to accountability 
claims from almost everybody, but in the last analysis they are in fact accountable, through 
internal processes, only to a few powerful states and the European Union”  (Keohane 2002, 
p. 19).  The Global Fund then, despite its inclusive approach to governance, has a gap in its 
external accountability.  Like traditional multilaterals, its external accountability relative to 
its ‘publics’ and people whose lives it affects is lacking. 
From an internal accountability perspective, the sanction that the Global Fund faces for 
poor performance or ‘bad governance’ is a restriction, reduction or delay in contributions 
from donor governments.  From an external accountability perspective, much has been 
made of the power of transparency to enable a form of reputational sanctioning (Florini 
2003, p. 196; Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 170; Koenig-Archibugi 2004, p. 237; 
Scholte 2004, p. 217; Grant and Keohane 2005, p. 39).  Through Bovens’ lens, 
transparency can confer virtue on an organisation, or form the basis of a normative claim 
(Barker 2000, p. 9) that it is ‘open, responsive, and responsible’. The premise for the virtue 
of transparency is that civil society, for example NGOs and CSOs who deliver services to 
or advocate on behalf of those infected with HIV/AIDS in a developing country, can 
access information on oversight, decision-making and performance and then use this 
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information to influence the beliefs or perceptions about the Global Fund’s ability to make 
fair and effective decisions about the grants it awards or the funds it releases.  While in 
concept, civil society can use the power of information and advocacy to play a sanctioning 
role (Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 321; Scholte 2004, p. 219; Blas et al. 2008, p. 1686; 
Castells 2008, p. 79), for the Global Fund this may not be as potent in practice.  Wallace 
Brown (2010, p. 525) observes that, 
…there also seems to be an even larger deliberative gap between the Global Fund 
as an organisation and those most affected by its decisions (stakeholders outside of 
the Global Fund board). In most cases, the opportunities for deliberation are 
seldom and when they do exist, they are generally informal…It is only at the 
Global Partnership Forum every two years, where stakeholders might be able to 
communicate directly with members of the Global Fund secretariat, the Global 
Fund board and in some rare cases, high level representatives of donor nations.  
There are examples in the international realm where civil society has had significant effect 
exercising its sanctioning power however, even in some of the most cited examples such as 
the World Commission on Dams (Khagram 2000, p. 83), the process has taken decades 
and is anything but a neat, linear cause and effect model. In addition, in most 
organisations, including the Global Fund, there are a range of activities and decisions taken 
where those affected are unlikely to impose any form of reputational sanction either 
because they are not privy to all or at least some pertinent information or they do not 
participate in certain fora. Moreover, in the case of the Global Fund, civil society 
organisations may be beneficiaries and their own interests in the aid relationship may 
discourage them from a sanctioning role.  Apart from the potential barriers to NGOs or 
CSOs, there is also an inherent bias against the sanctioning power of the broader ‘public’ 
and particularly the poor who are unlikely to have access to information and exercise 
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reputational sanctions because of a lack of technology, education or social status.  So while 
in theory, the power of transparency to address the external accountability gap may be 
compelling, in the case of the Global Fund it is unlikely to be entirely satisfactory in 
practice.  As Cardoso (2003, ‘UN High Level Panel on UN-Civil Society’), the Chair of 
the UN’s High Level Panel on UN-Civil Society noted:  “In the final analysis, they [civil 
society] are what they do. The power of civil society is a soft one. It is their capacity to 
argue, to propose, to experiment, to denounce, to be exemplary. It is not the power to 
decide.”  
For the Global Fund, its internal accountability in particular reinforces the output-oriented 
nature of its legitimacy.  It is a ‘social mechanism’ form of accountability hierarchically 
linking who is accountable to whom between recipients and the Global Fund and the 
Global Fund and donor governments. However, the Global Fund also relies on 
accountability as a ‘virtue’ which has an interdependent relationship with its sources of 
legitimacy, in particular its inclusive governance model and its ethos of transparency.  This 
‘soft power’ form of accountability can ease the Global Fund’s external accountability 
gap--if not address it--by reinforcing the belief in, or perception of the Global Fund as 
‘open, responsive and responsible’ a claim which in turn obscures its external 
accountability gap.  As Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 40) maintain, accountability for 
international organisations is not straightforward and some ingenuity is necessary as is 
some tolerance for imperfection:  “accountability that is both effective and widely viewed 
as legitimate will remain elusive.” 
4. Conclusion 
The Global Fund’s innovative design provides for its distinct sources of legitimacy. At first 
glance, the Global Fund’s efforts to reflect the interests of its many constituencies and its 
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inclusiveness beyond the traditional ‘states as members’ model of many multilaterals 
appears to be a form of input-oriented legitimacy.  However, on closer examination, the 
Global Fund’s legitimacy is largely output-oriented, strongly focused on donor 
governments and the necessity of ‘proving’ its outcomes and accomplishments.  
Consequently, despite its innovative design and the inclusion of non-state actors in its 
governance at global and country levels, the Global Fund’s legitimacy is conferred 
predominantly by and is therefore reliant on donor governments.  
The Global Fund’s inclusive governance and its transparency and performance-based 
funding underpin the success of its resource mobilisation.  As the tenor of donor 
governments and particularly the Global Fund’s largest donor, the United States, has 
changed from that of providing an emergency response to one of efficiency, effectiveness 
and country responsibility, the nature of the Global Fund’s legitimacy not only becomes 
more explicitly output-oriented and subject to the Global Fund’s own legitimating, but also 
more explicitly held in the eyes of the most powerful and wealthy states.  As Kazatchkine, 
noted, the tension created by what was described in Chapter 2 as the ‘treatment mortgage’ 
for donor governments is a big test for multilateralism and one on which millions of lives, 
or ‘communities of fate’, depend. 
For the Global Fund, its strong internal accountability model is reinforced by the output-
oriented nature of its legitimacy.  It hierarchically links who is accountable to whom 
between recipients and the Global Fund and the Global Fund and donor governments. 
However, the Global Fund also relies on accountability as a ‘virtue’ which has an 
interdependent relationship with its sources of legitimacy, in particular its inclusive 
governance model and its ethos of transparency.  This more normative form of 
accountability supports the belief in or perception of the Global Fund as a ‘good governor’.  
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These normative and legitimating aspects of its accountability serve in part to obscure the  
Global Fund’s external accountability gap  rather than  lay bare what Rosenau describes as 
the “powerful tensions, profound contradictions, and perplexing paradoxes” of an 
emergent global governance model.  
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Chapter 4 -  Malawi:  Intractable Circumstances and an Elusive Aid 
Architecture 
1. Introduction 
Donor influence in policy development raises a number of questions concerned less 
with the technical merit of alternative policy options for such issues as health 
financing strategies and the composition of essential drugs lists, than with issues of 
accountability, sovereignty, information, sustainability and appropriateness in the 
health policy domain (Okuonzi and MacRae 1995, p. 130). 
Malawi is a landlocked country of 14.9 million people (World Bank 2010b, ‘World 
Development Indicators:  Malawi’) in south east Africa bordered by Tanzania, 
Mozambique and Zambia. It is a new democracy challenged by intractable circumstances 
including a weak agricultural economy which renders the population vulnerable to food 
insecurity, a stable but precarious debt situation, a burgeoning population and one of the 
highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at just under 12% (World Bank 2010, 
Health Nutrition and Population Statistics).  In light of its political, economic and social 
challenges, Malawi’s scaled up HIV/AIDS response and the Global Fund’s role in 
financing it could offer evidence of an emerging aid architecture which Bourguignon and 
Sundberg (2007, p. 319) describe having two features:  one is the country’s ownership of 
its development strategy [here implying that the strategy is reflective of the priorities 
identified and set by a country] around which donors align and the second is the allocation 
of aid based on performance.   
The trajectory of Malawi’s response to its HIV/AIDS epidemic, from its early history and 
initial, imperfect policy framework to its subsequent achievements in reducing prevalence 
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to just under 12% (World Bank 2010, Health Nutrition and Population Statistics) and 
dramatically scaling the number of people receiving treatment tell a story of significant 
new investment and intensified institutional complexity. While results have been achieved, 
Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response and the Global Fund’s role demonstrate the practical 
challenges that arise when a “combination of new aid instruments and the emergence of 
new players” (Bonnel 2009, p. 165) occur in a low income country with weak 
infrastructure.  Although Malawi, with the Global Fund’s support, has dramatically scaled 
up its HIV/AIDS response, those whose lives are affected remain vulnerable.  Their needs 
and circumstances are subject to the political interests and interplay among an elite 
collection of state and non-state and national and international institutions including the 
Global Fund suggesting that an emerging aid architecture may be more elusive than some 
believe. 
The first section of this chapter describes Malawi’s intractable circumstances, its early 
HIV/AIDS history and its reliance on aid particularly for health.  The second section 
describes the context for Malawi’s scaled up HIV/AIDS response, situating it within the 
broader health sector, its reliance on donor support and the challenges associated with the 
Global Fund’s ‘fit’ with and influence on Malawi’s Health Sector Wide Approach 
(SWAp).  The last section of the chapter describes the complexity and dynamics of 
Malawi’s institutional landscape, and its vulnerability to the sustainability of Global Fund 
support. The chapter concludes with observations on the practical challenges that Malawi’s 
intractable circumstances and critical HIV/AIDs response present making the case for a 
traditional rather than emergent aid architecture and donor/recipient relationship.  The 
policy literatures related to aid and specific to Malawi are drawn on in this chapter to fill in 
the space between the ‘high politics’ of international institutions and their governance 
reflected in the IR literature and the institutional, policy and financial reality in Malawi. 
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2. Intractable Circumstances 
Nascent Democracy 
Malawi is a formative democracy with a political legacy of colonialism and totalitarianism.  
In 1891, Malawi was known as the Nyasaland and District Protectorate and claimed as a 
territory by the British.  As Nyasaland, it was granted self-government by the British in 
1963 and Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda was appointed Prime Minister, beginning over 30 
years of autocratic rule.  In 1964, Dr. Kamuzu Banda became President of the Republic of 
Malawi and by 1966 he had constitutionally established Malawi as a one-party state.  In 
1971 he became President for Life.  Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch 1990, 
‘Malawi’) described Malawi as a  
…totalitarian state where independent associations and free expression - indeed all 
the manifestations of independent civil society - are effectively forbidden. It is at 
the same time a personal despotism in which the state apparatus is directly 
answerable to one man. Although many states in sub-Saharan Africa suffer from 
greater political violence than Malawi, there are few African countries with such a 
combination of totalitarianism and personal despotism. 
Emancipation from colonial rule in the early 1960s marked the beginning of three decades 
of repressive government shaped by the authority of one man. 
A series of events in the early 1990s led to Malawi’s first multi-party elections in 1994.    
In 1992, the country’s Catholic bishops authored a Lenten Pastoral Letter which was read 
in the country’s Catholic Churches which condemned Malawi’s political and human rights 
situation (Thompson 2005, p. 575) and later that year, a number of donors suspended aid 
(van Donge 1995, p. 231).   Pressure from religious leaders and the international 
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community was brought to bear on Banda who was experiencing failing health (van Donge 
1995, p. 234) and in 1993 he was persuaded to hold a referendum on the one party state 
which Malawians rejected.  As a consequence, the Republic held its first multi-party 
election the following year.  Dr. Bakili Muluzi, leader of the opposition United Democratic 
Front (UDF) and a former cabinet minister under Banda won the election and served the 
constitutional limit of two terms as President.  In 2004, Dr. Bingu wa Mutharika,
17
 also 
from the UDF party was elected with a promise to clean up corruption.  Donors and the 
IMF had again suspended support to Malawi in 2002 due to financial mismanagement and 
overspending (Ford 2004, p. 57) and Muluzi was eventually arrested on fraud and 
corruption charges in 2006.  Mutharika broke with the UDF in 2005 and formed the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and was re-elected in 2009.  Malawi’s short 
experience with democracy has been tumultuous and the exercising of independent and 
accountable government, distinct from party politics and divorced from a history of 
corruption and repression, is far from secure.
18
 
Agricultural Economy 
Malawi remains an underdeveloped agricultural economy despite its bold long-term vision.  
Vision 2020 was developed over a two year process
19
 from 1996 to 1998 and lays out an 
ambitious 20 year trajectory:  “By the year 2020, Malawi as a God-fearing nation will be 
secure, democratically mature, environmentally sustainable, self-reliant with equal 
opportunities for and active participation by all, having social services, vibrant cultural and 
religious values and being a technologically driven middle-income economy” 
(Government of Malawi 1997, ‘Malawi Vision 2020 Mission Statement’).  Progress has 
been slow.  52% of Malawi’s population are poor and one in five people are ultra-poor, 
meaning they cannot afford to meet the minimum standard for daily-recommended food 
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requirements (Government of Malawi National Statistical Office 2005, p. 139).  80% of 
Malawi’s workforce is employed in the agricultural sector which contributes over 80% of 
Malawi’s foreign exchange earnings (Government of Malawi 2007, p. xv).   Its main 
exports are  tobacco, tea and sugar and its balance of trade has declined consistently from 
MK -1,401 mm (or US- $314.30 mm) in 1994 and reaching MK -65,981 mm (US -$477.24 
mm) in 2008 (Government of Malawi Reserve Bank of Malawi (no date)).
20
    Agriculture 
in Malawi is characterised by “low and stagnant yields, over dependence on rain-fed 
farming which increases vulnerability to weather related shocks, low level of irrigation 
development, and low uptake of improved farm inputs” (Government of Malawi 2007, p. 
xv).  
A drought that affected Malawi in 2005 exemplifies its vulnerability to external shocks and 
in turn how health expenditure is affected.  Malawi’s GDP growth was interrupted because 
it was necessary to import maize, a food staple, to prevent starvation and malnutrition 
(Government of Malawi Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 2005, p. 1).  As 
Figure 6:  Malawi's Health Expenditure and GDP Growth - 2003-2007 
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Figure 6 shows, the budget spent on importing maize resulted in reduced expenditures on 
health with both total health expenditure and health expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
declining in 2005. 
Not only does the weakness in Malawi’s economic structure expose its population to the 
risk of food insecurity it also exacerbates its vulnerability by compromising the resources 
available for other sectors such as health.  As long as Malawi remains an importing, 
agricultural economy, economic development will be at the effect of conditions outside of 
its control and social development, such as improving health services, will falter as 
resources are focused on pressing food security needs.  
Managed but Precarious Debt Exposure 
Malawi has reduced its exposure to external debt, but its circumstances remain precarious.  
In 2006, Malawi received external debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPC) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).  Its external debt was 
reduced from 136% of nominal GDP in 2005 (IMF 2006, p. 64) and in 2007 was 17% of 
GDP, projected to rise to 20% by 2009 (Government of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2009, 
p. 20), well within sustainable thresholds.  Domestic debt has proven to be more 
problematic.  The ratio of domestic debt stock to GDP was 19.8% in 2009, just below the 
sustainability threshold of 20% (Government of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2010, p. 29).  
Malawi’s domestic debt has in the past been attributed to poor financial management and 
more recently to delays in the release of donor funds which require Malawi to borrow to 
finance public spending primarily through treasury bills with short-term maturities 
(Government of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2009, p. 27).  While Malawi’s overall debt 
picture is stable, it is vulnerable to shocks and analysis by the Government of Malawi 
indicates that “ non-concessional financing and low GDP and exports growth could lead to 
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a steady increase in the debt ratios and thus breach the external debt sustainability 
thresholds by 2014” (Government of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2010, p. 28).  
Burgeoning Population 
The projected rate of growth of Malawi’s population has serious implications for the cost 
to and the capacity of the Government of Malawi to provide food security, deliver social 
services such as primary education and essential health services, and facilitate GDP growth 
and employment opportunities. If population growth continues at its current rate, which 
considers mortality from HIV/AIDS, Malawi’s population is expected to grow to 40.5 
million by 2040 (Government of Malawi Ministry of Development Planning and 
Cooperation 2010, p. 5).  Should the total fertility rate reduce from its current level of six 
live births per woman to three live births per woman, the population by 2040, considering 
HIV/AIDS mortality, would be 30.7 million or almost 25% smaller (Government of 
Malawi Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation 2010, p. 5). 
More people, even when moderated, means increased demand for resources and services.  
This has implications for Malawi’s economic and social development and its ability move 
towards its vision of being a “technology driven, middle-income economy.”  Consider the 
example of human health resources:  in 2007, Malawi had 4,450 trained nurses, and 
approximately 3,000 midwives, or approximately one nurse or midwife for every 1,800 
people.  If the population continues to grow at its current rate, just over 22,500 additional 
nurses or midwives would be required just to sustain this already inadequate ratio 
(Government of Malawi Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation 2010, p. 14).  
The rate of growth of Malawi’s population, even if it is moderated and even if innovative 
approaches to service delivery can be found, is a crucial consideration for policy and 
planning and threatens to undermine economic and social development. 
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A Devastating HIV/AIDS Epidemic  
Malawi has the ninth highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world (UNAIDS 2008, 
‘Adult (15-49) HIV prevalence per cent by country, 1990-2007’) which has profound short 
and long term economic, social and psychological implications for the envisioned 
development of the country and the well-being of its population.  The first HIV/AIDS case 
was diagnosed in Malawi in 1985 and prevalence at that time was estimated at 2% 
(Government of Malawi 2004, p. foreword). By 1995, HIV prevalence in antenatal women 
was estimated at over 30% in urban areas, HIV/AIDS was the leading cause of death in the 
most productive age group (20-48 years) and it accounted for over 40% of all in-patient 
admissions (Government of Malawi no date; p. 4). The number of people infected 
continued to grow.  In 1987 there were 52,251 people living with HIV/AIDS.  By 2003 
there were 760,000 adult Malawians aged 15-49 years living with HIV/AIDS, 58% of 
whom were women; moreover, 900,000 Malawians were estimated to be HIV infected, 
including 70,000 children under the age of 14 (Kamanga 2006, p. 2).   
As is the nature of HIV/AIDS the biomedical and social features of Malawi’s epidemic are 
closely linked.  Malawi’s epidemic primarily spreads through heterosexual intercourse 
among couples in stable and in discordant relationships.  More often it is women and 
adolescent girls who are infected making prevention of mother to child transmission an 
important element of the biomedical response (UNAIDS 2009, p. 1) and increasing the 
numbers of orphans and children living in child-headed households.  As in virtually every 
other part of the world, reducing prevalence and incidence of HIV/AIDS is not just a 
medical undertaking.  It requires changes to cultural and sexual practices. While Malawi 
has made gains in reducing prevalence and increasing access to treatment, its incidence 
rate remains between 1.2% and 1.6% (Government of Malawi Office of the President and 
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Cabinet 2009, p. 11) meaning the number of new infections continues to increase.  As in 
other countries particularly low income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where substantial 
proportions of the economically productive population are affected by the epidemic, 
Malawi risks a “hollowing out of state structures” (Poku and Whiteside 2006, p. 253).  
Malawi’s epidemic, where HIV/AIDS is spread through sexual transmission, women and 
girls are particularly vulnerable and reducing incidence will require changes to sexual and 
cultural practices.  This makes evident why UNAIDS (2010e, p. 5) claims that “in virtually 
every country where marked progress in preventing new infections has been documented, 
a combination structural, behavioural and biomedical prevention approach has been used.” 
In the early years of the epidemic in Malawi, the public health response focused on 
information, education and communication to reduce transmission, blood screening and 
collecting epidemiological data.  The high cost of drugs, which were available and proven 
effective in developed countries, made treatment inaccessible for developing countries like 
Malawi. However, early in the 2000s, several events which pitted the interests of public 
health supported by vocal CSO and NGO communities against those of patent holding 
pharmaceutical manufacturers contributed to a dramatic decline in the cost of first line 
anti-retrovirals.  These events included a declaration in 2001 on the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Doha which acknowledged the role of patent protection but 
supported members’ rights to protect public health and provide access to essential 
medicines (‘t Hoen 2003, p. 53); a failed legal challenge in 2001 by multi-national 
pharmaceutical manufacturers against the South African government for enacting a legal 
framework that provided for the generic substitution of off-patent medicines, transparent 
pricing for all medicines, and the parallel importation of patented medicines (‘t Hoen 2003, 
p. 43); the withdrawal of a WTO challenge by the United States against Brazil for Brazil’s 
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patent law which provided for compulsory licensing to manufacture drugs locally without 
the permission of the patent holder (‘t Hoen 2003, p. 45); and also in 2001, the offer by 
Cipla, an Indian generic manufacturer, to sell a triple therapy combination anti-retroviral 
for US$350 per patient year to Médecins sans Frontières if it was provided to patients for 
free and for US$600 per patient year to governments. At the time multi-national 
manufacturers offered the same drug therapy for US$3,617 (MSF 2001, ‘NGOs denounce 
the lack of transparency in multi-national/UNAIDS anti-retroviral drug deal for Kenya’).  
The hold on anti-retroviral therapy drug prices by patent owning multinational 
pharmaceutical companies had been broken and poor countries and their affected 
populations now had a better chance of accessing life-saving treatment. 
By 2004, the pressure brought to bear on the price of anti-retroviral drugs coupled with the 
availability of funds to purchase them from the Global Fund and later from PEPFAR made 
the scale up of treatment programmes possible, and this was the case in Malawi.  Despite 
the magnitude of its epidemic, Malawi made gains in its response as Figure 7 shows, 
dramatically scaling up the number of people on anti-retroviral therapy by 2009 to almost 
two thirds of adults and children in advanced stages of AIDS (Government of Malawi 
Office of the President and Cabinet 2010, p. 202 ) and reducing the overall HIV/AIDS 
prevalence in the adult population from 14.6% in 2000 to just under an estimated 12% by 
2007 (World Bank 2010, Health Nutrition and Population Statistics).  20 years after the 
first case of HIV/AIDS was reported in Malawi, just over 11% of adults and children with 
advanced HIV/AIDS were receiving anti-retroviral therapy (Government of Malawi Office 
of the President and Cabinet 2010, p. 202).  Over the following years, this number 
continued its dramatic increase challenging if not abating the devastating economic, social 
and psychological impact of the epidemic.  
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An Initial, Imperfect Policy Response 
The Strategic Planning Unit in the National AIDS Control Programme in Malawi’s 
Ministry of Health began development of the first strategic framework to address 
HIV/AIDS in the late 1990s (Government of Malawi 2004, p. 6) creating the National 
Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS:  2000-2004.  At that time there was recognition that 
despite efforts by government and donors “…there has not been much improvement in the 
HIV/AIDS situation. The incidence of HIV infection has continued to be high especially in 
adolescent females, the levels of stigmatization have continued to be high and there are 
inadequate care and social support services for people living with HIV/AIDS” 
(Government of Malawi 2000, p. 2).  The first strategic framework focused on reducing 
transmission, reducing impact at the individual, community and national levels and special 
programmes aimed at youth, values and culture, media and widows and widowers.  
Figure 7:  Malawi - Select HIV/AIDS Indicators 2001-2007 
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“Reducing impact” included anti-retroviral treatment but it was not a priority because of 
the prohibitive cost of drugs at the time.  “The response of the affluent countries and their 
institutions—from aid agencies, non-governmental organisations, and the pharmaceutical 
industry—has been insufficient…[it] has consisted of the promotion of education and 
condom distribution to prevent HIV transmission” (Farmer et al 2001, p. 404).  Malawi’s 
early HIV/AIDS strategy reflected this reality. 
Aid Reliance and New Sources of Aid 
As Figure 8 indicates, Malawi is highly dependent on aid and this dependency shows no 
signs of abating.  In 2004/05, aid comprised 22% of government expenditure and this rose 
to 43% by 2008/09 (Government of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2009, p. 18).  While 
Malawi characterises this rise as an indication of donor confidence in the Government’s 
ability to manage aid effectively (Government of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2009, p. 18), 
it is also indicative of a weak economic structure and an inadequate tax base to support 
public expenditure. 
Aid to Malawi reflects donors’ response to the country’s HIV/AIDS crisis as much as 
donors’ interests in the promotion of economic growth.  In 2008/09 Malawi’s health sector 
received almost 32% of total donor support provided to the country, more than any other 
sector.  The Global Fund, which focuses on three diseases, was the third largest donor 
overall providing 14.6% of all aid after the EU at 18.1% and DfID at 14.7% (Government 
of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2009, p. 5).  Given its weak economic foundation and 
inadequate tax base, Malawi’s spending on health and its response to its HIV/AIDS 
epidemic will remain reliant on donor support and in particular that of the Global Fund. 
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Aid to Malawi provides evidence of a changing landscape particularly for HIV/AIDS 
endemic countries:  the overall amount of aid has increased significantly, there is a 
proliferation of donors and bilateral aid providers and the Global Fund, a new type of aid 
provider, plays a significant and influential role (Bonnel 2009, p. 162; Lele, Sadik and 
Simmons no date, p. 1).  While some argue that these changes are signs of a new, 
emerging aid architecture which promotes ‘country ownership’ (a concept discussed in 
Chapter 5) and results-based funding (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007, p. 319; Bonnel 
2009, p. 165), others argue that the gap between donor intention and reality remains 
significant (Christiansen and Rogerson, 2005, p. 1; Birdsall 2007, p. 593).  As will be 
discussed in the following sections, while Malawi benefits from and achieves results with 
its aid for HIV/AIDS, this aid comes with the challenge of managing a highly fragmented 
donor landscape (Government of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2009, p. 15) and the politics 
and practicalities of institutional complexity.  In other words Malawi’s response to its 
HIV/AIDS epidemic provides evidence of the gap between the “ambitions and rhetoric 
Figure 8:  Malawi - Aid Disbursements 2005-2009 
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about broad donor reform…and the reality of how donors actually behave” (Birdsall 2007, 
p. 593). 
Malawi faces an array of intractable circumstances including a short and tumultuous 
democratic history following a long period of totalitarian rule, food insecurity risks 
associated with its weak agricultural economy, its managed but precarious exposure to 
debt, and its burgeoning population all of which exacerbate its ability to respond to a 
devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Donors have responded to Malawi’s circumstances by 
dramatically increasing aid over a relatively short period and entrenching its aid reliance.  
One result has been significant progress in Malawi’s scaled up response to its HIV/AIDS 
epidemic which includes providing access to anti-retroviral therapy to over 300,000 adults 
and children in the advanced stages of the disease and reducing the overall prevalence rate 
in the population to just under 12%.   The next section will describe the health sector in 
more detail including the participation of and funding by development partners that have 
formed and informed Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response. 
3. Malawi’s Health Sector:  Evidence of an Emergent Aid Architecture? 
Towards the end of the 1990s and into the early years of the 2000s, Malawi put in place a 
governance, policy and financing architecture that would support its scale up of its 
HIV/AIDS response.  This section describes the health sector overall, including its 
planning, oversight and funding frameworks, its financing particularly the level of 
contribution of donors, and finally the broader context in which Malawi’s HIV/AIDS 
response is situated.  It provides a picture of how donors have shaped Malawi’s health 
programme, both mechanistically through instituting a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) and 
then by significantly growing donor contributions through the SWAp.  What emerges is a 
picture of a rise in donor funding accompanied by a decline in government support, an 
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ambitious implementation agenda and an intensification of institutions, interests and 
politics associated with governing resources and policy.  The question remains whether 
this constitutes an emerging aid architecture or if it is more akin to the power dynamics in 
the traditional donor/recipient relationships ‘of old’. 
Governing Malawi’s Programme of Work and the Health SWAp 
The Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) leads policy development for health which 
has been most recently guided by the Programme of Work for 2004-2010.  While planning 
appears to be well coordinated, the funding, implementation and oversight of the 
Programme of Work is complex, involving facilitating and overseeing a range of internal, 
donor and NGO relationships.  The Programme of Work includes the Essential Health 
Package which “…refers to a prioritised but limited package of services that should be 
available to every individual in Malawi. It comprises eleven key components…and these 
cover those health services that address the major causes of death and disease in Malawi, 
together with the essential supporting structures and systems to enable delivery” 
(Government of Malawi Ministry of Health Department of Planning 2004, p. 1).  The 
Programme of Work determines ‘what’ comprises the Essential Health Package.  The 
SWAp provides the ‘how’, the funding and management for the Programme of Work. 
The Health SWAp was adopted to provide “a single health strategic framework, a common 
expenditure framework, a common monitoring framework and better coordinated 
procedures for funding and procurement. The purpose of bringing in a sector-wide 
approach is to “improve the harmonisation of different actors’ interventions…and to 
increase alignment with government policies and procedures” (Carlson et al. 2008a, p. 63).  
In Malawi, despite the SWAp mechanism, institutional and political complexity remains. 
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There are a number of governance fora and mechanisms for managing the Health SWAp in 
Malawi and delivering the Essential Health Package services.  For example, donors have 
Memoranda of Understanding with the government and participate in formal Health 
SWAp governance groups including the Health Sector Review Group with government.  
NGO and private sector providers, and in some cases donors may also provide advice 
through their participation in Technical Working Groups which provide advice to higher 
level fora.  In addition, donors have a Health Donor Group which while not part of the 
formal Health SWAp governance structure does inform it and is attended by the MoHP.  A 
mid-term review of the Health SWAp acknowledged the importance of having a 
Programme of Work with an Essential Health Package facilitated by a SWAp (Carlson et 
al. 2008a, p. 62) but also noted the challenges that come with managing its oversight and 
implementation in a complex, resource constrained environment: 
...there is a sense of crisis and uncertainty about the future of the [Health] SWAp. 
This being the case, there is a need for urgent attention to resolve…challenges and 
to put the SWAp partnership and programme back on track…. This will require the 
MOH [Ministry of Health and Population] committing itself to ensuring that the 
agreed to governance committees and procedures are adhered to, and development 
partners holding each other and government to their commitments as detailed in the 
MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] and in international agreements (Carlson 
et al. 2008b, p. 268). 
Two years after this mid-term review, interviews for this research did not reveal the same 
sense of urgency to strengthen the Health SWAp and donors and ministry staff were 
engaged in negotiating its successor; nevertheless, the findings of the mid-term review do 
show that while the MoHP might lead and own strategy development, governing the 
strategy and realising its implementation requires successfully managing the alignment and 
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commitment of a range of partners and interests across several donor and government fora 
over a sustained period. 
Declining Government and Increased Donor Financing for Health 
Although the Government of Malawi provides funding for health and in particular the 
Health SWAp, resources largely come from donors.  Since 2002, overall support to the 
health sector has increased; however, the proportion contributed by government to the total 
health expenditure—which includes public and private expenditure--has been declining. 
An analysis of Malawi’s National Health Accounts for 2002 to 2004 showed that while per 
capita expenditure on health rose from US$15 in 2002/03 to US$20 in 2004/05, the 
government’s contribution to the Total Health Expenditure in this period declined from 
35% to 25%, donor support increased from 45% to 60% and households on average 
contributed 10.3% (Government of Malawi Ministry of Health 2007, p. xviii).  The 
Programme of Work was costed at US$735 mm or US$17 per capita which was later 
revised to US$22 when overhead and other costs were factored in (Carlson et al. 2008b, p. 
25 and p.227).  In 2006/07, per capita funding for the Essential Health Package was 
estimated at US$10 (Government of Malawi Ministry of Finance 2007, p. 108)
21 
which 
excluded funding received by the National AIDS Commission (NAC) for its HIV/AIDS 
strategy and the NAC Programme of Work, which in the same year amounted to 
approximately US$1.15 per capita (African Development Bank 2009, p. 7).
22 
  Taken 
together, this per capita funding of the overall Programme of Work is not only 
significantly less than the estimate of US$22 per capita to provide Malawi’s Essential 
Health Package but also much less than the US$34 per capita required to provide essential 
health services estimated by the Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
in 2001 (WHO 2001a, p. 11).  While the Essential Health Package is likely to remain 
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‘underfunded’ relative to its initial costing, it’s important to keep in mind that donor 
resources for health contributed to Malawi are considerable and reflective of a consistent 
increase in Official Development Assistance resources and Development Assistance for 
Health since the new millennium (African Development Bank 2009, p. 2; Ravishankar et 
al. 2009, p. 2113).  While more can be understood to be good, more is only good when 
capacity exists in the system to absorb these resources (Carlson et al. 2008b, p. 220) and 
govern them to achieve better health outcomes for Malawians. 
Conceptually, the Health SWAp is intended to reduce donor transaction costs by applying 
a pool of funds to an agreed upon Programme of Work.  In practice, the mode of donor 
support does not always align with this intent.  First of all, there are two types of donors:  
pool donors as well as donors who contribute outside of the pool.  Contributions to 
Malawi’s Health SWAp include pooled funds provided by donors such as DfID, the 
Government of Norway, and UNFPA; pooled funds with conditions and restrictions 
provided by donors such as the World Bank and the Global Fund; and discrete support 
from donors such as USAID and AfDB (Carlson et al. 2008a, p. 57).  Second, the 
proportion contributed by pool donors, as Figure 9 shows, is increasing. The proportion of 
funding to the Health SWAp provided by the government has declined from 2004/05 from 
70% to 45% while the contribution by pool donors has increased from 14% to 52% 
(Carlson et al. 2008b, p. 220).   
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Lastly, donor support for the Health SWAp is significant compared to other sectors and 
within the Health SWAp the Global Fund contributes a large proportion.  In 2008/09 11% 
of all donor support to Malawi across all sectors went to the Health SWAp (Government of 
Malawi Ministry of Finance 2009, p. 9).  In this same period the Global Fund made the 
largest contribution to the Health SWAp providing 39% of all donor funds.  The Global 
Fund’s ‘pooled’ support was for interventions related to health systems strengthening, 
malaria and tuberculosis (its support for HIV/AIDS is largely accounted for through the 
NAC’s SWAp).  The Health SWAp mid-term review described the Global Fund’s 
contribution akin to that of a bilateral donor: 
…being ‘in’ the pool, but not ‘of’ the pool. Global Fund planning cycles are 
separate to those of the MOH [Ministry of Health and Population], and resemble 
more the bilateral planning exercises undertaken by USAID or ADB [referring to 
the African Development Bank], albeit at least with more MOH and other donor 
participation than is the case with either ADB or USAID. The Global Fund also 
sets ‘conditions precedent’ bilaterally with the MOH without discussion with other 
Figure 9:  Malawi's Health SWAp Funding - 2004-2006 
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health donors. Finally, in order to monitor progress towards meeting these 
conditions precedent (as well as to set further ones) the Global Fund/LFA [Local 
Fund Agent] may initiate their own assessment processes. The results of these 
assessments may not be communicated to either government or other health 
donors, except to say whether the conditions are deemed to have been met and 
funds can be disbursed, or that conditions have not been met (or new conditions are 
to be imposed) and therefore funds cannot be disbursed (Carlson et al. 2008b, p. 
258). 
The nature of the Global Fund’s programmatic and performance based funding model does 
not fit easily with the concept of pooled funding for a Health SWAp and the practical 
nature of allocating resources and attributing results to deliver an Essential Health Package 
with broader reach than the Global Fund’s disease and health systems strengthening focus: 
One of the things [the Global Fund wants to look at is] how participating in a 
pooled fund [the Health SWAp] works because the Global Fund still wants to 
count its beans.  That is an issue of contention and tension between the Global 
Fund and the rest of the donors because …the money loses its colour, but the 
Global Fund wants to say, “where did my dollar go?” for their reporting 
requirements (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
The Global Fund’s support for Malawi’s Health SWAp is crucial and given its relative 
magnitude, influential; however, the nature of its participation in the Health SWAp is a 
good example of the collision between setting and measuring health outcomes through 
vertical programming and the efficiencies for recipient countries that a ‘pooled’ Health 
SWAp approach is intended to provide.  From the perspective of the overall health sector, 
it’s unclear whether the aid architecture that Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007, p. 319) 
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envisioned is in fact emerging in Malawi.  There is an argument to be made for donor 
alignment around a health strategy and the notion that donor support is based on 
performance; however, the extent to which the agenda is owned by the country or directed 
by influential donors like the Global Fund remains open.  
4. A Scaled Up HIV/AIDS Response and an Elusive Aid Architecture 
A Strategic Approach and a Successful Response 
A lot changed from Malawi’s ‘imperfect’ policy response in the early years of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic by the time the National HIV/AIDS Action Framework (NAF) for 
2005-2009 was developed.  The country’s HIV/AIDS response was situated in a larger, 
multi-sectoral context through the 2002 Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) which 
identified HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting theme and promoted decentralisation of 
government services more broadly in order to foster the “…empowerment of the people 
for effective popular participation and decision making in the development process in their 
respective areas” (Government of Malawi 2002, p. xv).  Malawi established a National 
AIDS Commission (NAC) in 2001 to coordinate leadership of the country’s response to 
the epidemic and the NAC developed the country’s first HIV/AIDS policy in 2003 as well 
as a monitoring and evaluation approach, making it a focal point for ‘the three ones’:  one 
national HIV/AIDS coordinating authority, one national HIV/AIDS action framework, and 
one monitoring and evaluation framework. Malawi developed policies for Orphans and 
Other Vulnerable Children, an Anti-retroviral Equity Policy and guidelines for Anti-
retroviral and Voluntary Counselling and Testing (Government of Malawi 2004, p. xi).  In 
addition, Malawi received its first Global Fund resources in the 2003/04 year from its 
successful Round 1 grant application for HIV/AIDS which allowed it to take advantage of 
the reduced costs of anti-retroviral therapy and plan for scaled up treatment.  Finally, in 
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2004, the MoHP developed its Programme of Work to deliver the Essential Health 
Package and established the Health SWAp to fund service delivery to a decentralising 
health system.  The goal of decentralisation was to make health planning responsive to 
local needs, allow resources in the Essential Health Package including scarce human 
resources to be allocated according to need and to alleviate pressure on primary care 
delivery by helping to strengthen rural service delivery infrastructure (Government of 
Malawi 2002, p. 62).  The HIV/AIDS response was situated within the context of the 
PRSP which provided the macro economic framework for the country, and was defined 
through specific HIV/AIDS policies and plans within an overall plan for the health sector.  
The adoption of decentralisation and the extent of the macroeconomic contextualisation 
reflected both the devastating nature of the epidemic, and the magnitude of the effort 
required to address it. 
Malawi scaled up its response to HIV/AIDS in a short period of time and exceeded the 
initial targets it set.  This section discusses how Malawi did so in an environment of 
institutional complexity, which included the newly created NAC, the national coordinating 
body, and a range of implementing stakeholders at national, district and community levels.  
It will also describe challenges including that of absorption of significant new resources, 
the capacity to scale quickly enough to allocate them and implement programmes, and the 
tension between persistent need and uncertainties associated with Global Fund grants. 
In the early 2000s, despite the progress made in Malawi, there was little impact on the 
overall epidemic.  In 2003, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate remained virtually unchanged at 
an estimated 14.4% compared to 14.6% in 2000 (Government of Malawi 2004, p. xi).  The 
first NAF for 2005-2009 had to be an effective strategic framework with social and 
biomedical outcomes and one that supported a scaled up response. The 2005-2009 NAF 
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focused on prevention, treatment and reducing the socio-economic and psychosocial 
impact of the epidemic and on the underlying capacity, research, monitoring and 
evaluation, resource mobilisation and policy and planning that would be necessary to 
effect change.  Its goal was  “[t]o prevent the spread of HIV infection among Malawians, 
provide access to treatment for PLWHA [People Living with HIV/AIDS]  and mitigate the 
health, socio-economic and psychosocial impact of HIV/AIDS on individuals, families, 
communities and the nation” (Government of Malawi 2004, p. 16).  Its targets included:  
reducing HIV/AIDS prevalence to from 14.2% in 2004 to 13.5% by 2009 (Government of 
Malawi 2004, Annex 1-p. 1); increasing the number of people testing for and receiving 
their serostatus results (which tests the presence or absence of antibodies in the blood) 
from 177,726 tested and 66,182 receiving their results in 2004 to 993,000 tested and 
794,400 receiving their results in 2009 (Government of Malawi 2004, Annex 1-p. 7); and 
increasing the number of people with advanced HIV receiving anti-retroviral therapy from 
13,183 in 2004 to 80,000 in 2009 (Government of Malawi 2004, Annex 1-p. 8).  Against 
these initial estimates, some significant achievements were made in the implementation of 
the 2005-2009 NAF and the scale of the response to the epidemic (see Figure 7).  By 2009, 
the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate had stabilised at 12%, 1.5% lower than targeted 
(Government of Malawi 2009, p. 8) and the number of people receiving anti-retroviral 
therapy was 147,000 (Government of Malawi 2009, p. 25), exceeding the initial target by 
75%. 
Institutional Complexity 
As Figure 10 indicates, implementing the 2005-2009 NAF took place in a complex 
institutional environment.  At national level the primary organisations were the NAC, the 
Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), 
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and the MoHP.  Roles and responsibilities among these organisations have not always been 
clear.  The NAC is an independent trust with a Board of Commissioners appointed by the 
Minister responsible for HIV/AIDS in the OPC, currently the country’s President (National 
AIDS Commission 2003, p. 6).  The NAC leads and coordinates the country’s HIV/AIDS 
response, but it is not an implementing agent itself.  The NAC also serves as the Principal 
Recipient for Global Fund HIV/AIDS grants received by Malawi and, in what has been 
noted as a conflict of interest (Dickinson et al 2008, p. 34), has also chaired the Global 
Fund’s CCM.  Within the OPC lies the Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS which is 
responsible for “policy, oversight and high level advocacy” (Government of Malawi 2009, 
p. 13).  The MoHP through the Department of HIV/AIDS provides “technical direction 
and service delivery in biomedical areas of prevention, treatment and care…which 
includes 1) Developing Policies and Guidelines on biomedical HIV and AIDS 
interventions; 2) Planning and implementing biomedical HIV and AIDS interventions; 3) 
Coordinating health sector thematic areas; 4) Providing technical support for HIV and 
AIDS policy development; 5) Providing technical support in implementation of health 
related HIV and AIDS interventions; and 6) Surveillance for HIV/AIDS/STI [Sexually 
Transmitted Infections]” (Government of Malawi Office of the President and Cabinet 
2010, p. 44) . 
 Among the NAC, the OPC Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS and the MoHP, roles 
and responsibilities have required clarification as the country’s HIV/AIDS response has 
evolved (Dickinson et al 2007, p.19): 
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…But the issue with that unit [Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the 
OPC] is capacity.  There weren’t that many HIV/AIDS experts in policy or health.  
Mary Shawa [Principal Secretary] is a nutritionist by training, not a health 
expert…NAC is just an implementer.  It is not a policy setting body.  So the issue 
there is coordination. There was a fight for a long time between the HIV/AIDS 
Unit [OPC] and the Ministry of Health.  The Ministry of Health has an HIV/AIDS 
unit headed by a director.  So you had two government departments both dealing 
with HIV/AIDS policy so there was a turf war for a while but now obviously you 
would say the OPC is in charge of policy setting (International CCM Member 
2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
What has emerged is an arrangement where the NAC coordinates the overall HIV/AIDS 
response including HIV/AIDS funding from the Global Fund and other donors. The 
Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the OPC has overall policy and high level 
advocacy ownership and the MoHP provides technical and biomedical leadership.   
Figure 10:  Institutional Governance of Malawi's National HIV/AIDS Framework 
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However, as will be discussed in relation to agenda setting in Chapter 5, the relations 
among the NAC, the Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the OPC and the MoHP 
has at times been fraught and remains dynamic.  In particular, there was a recognised 
“…power play, particularly when it was Mwale [NAC] against Shawa [Department of 
Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the OPC]” (International CCM Member 2010, interview, 
Lilongwe).  Mwale was considered influential and a strong leader, but left NAC in 2010 
for a post with UNAIDS.  His successor, was considered upon his appointment as “…not a 
serious player in the country” (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe).  
Also by 2010, the MoHP was seen as weak, lacking the leadership, vision, direction and 
accountability it exhibited in the early days of the HIV/AIDS scale up which was attributed 
to Professor Harries
23
 who has since left his role (Government of Malawi/NAC 
Representative 2010, interview, Lilongwe).  Adding to these interplays of personality and 
institutional politics was Malawi’s proposed HIV/AIDS legislation which among other 
things has recommended moving the NAC directly under the OPC, consolidating 
ownership and authority under Shawa and the President (International CCM Member 
2010, interview, Lilongwe).  Explanations for leadership and ownership of Malawi’s 
HIV/AIDS response which focuses on formal organisational roles belie the dynamic 
institutional competition that exists among national institutions and the personalities of 
their leaders.  The agenda setting, policy making and oversight for a healthy proportion of 
the government’s budget lie in an elite institutional domain led by politically influential 
individuals. 
Given the influx of resources and multiplicity of international and national agendas of the 
variety of organisations engaged in Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response, it would not be 
unreasonable to expect that institutional competition is also alive and well among others.  
These include government ministries such as the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry 
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of Economic Planning and Development, the Department of Human Resources 
Management and Development, the Law Commission and the Human Rights Commission. 
The Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the OPC works to ‘mainstream’ 
HIV/AIDS within line ministries and ministries are to commit 2% of their budgets to 
address HIV/AIDS (Dickinson et al 2008, p. 33; Government of Malawi/NAC 
Representative 2010, interview, Lilongwe).  In addition to government and parastatal 
organisations, the international community through donors and NGOs exercises formal 
influence through mechanisms such as the Health SWAp, the NAC SWAp, or as members 
of the CCM which applies and provides oversight for Global Fund grants. There are many 
institutional interests and priorities at play, both among state and non-state and national 
and international actors when it comes to governing Malawi’s HIV/AIDs response and the 
resources that come with it. 
Because of Malawi’s decentralisation of its health service planning and delivery, local 
authorities also play an important role in this aspect of the HIV/AIDS response by 
providing coordination at district and community levels.  These include Community Based 
Organisations, Support Groups, Community AIDS Committees, District Development 
Committees, Area Development Committees and local NGOs (Government of Malawi 
2009, p. 14).  Faith based organisations and community based organisations are the 
primary implementing agencies and apply to the NAC for funds.  They work at national, 
district and community levels to help communities advocate, plan, mobilise resources and 
develop capacity.  The Malawi Business Coalition on AIDS has the responsibility to 
mainstream HIV/AIDS into workplace policies and programmes (Government of Malawi 
2009, p. 14).  Finally there are the associations for People Living with HIV/AIDS which 
work at national, district and community levels and through the CCM to advocate on 
behalf of people living with and affected by the disease. As expected from a decentralising 
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system, district and community based organisations are critical to coordinating and 
implementing the country’s HIV/AIDS response.   
In addition to the complex formal institutional structure there is a sphere of less formal 
activity comprised of national and international non-elite actors.  As Swidler (2006, p. 279) 
remarks, perhaps cynically,  
[i]t takes only a brief period on the ground in Malawi to run into groups of 
American church members who are travelling around the country looking for 
villages that need boreholes…dug, a group of international students doing a 
summer AIDS project in a village…So bureaucracy at the top often monitors a 
bevy of independent actors on the ground.  Paperwork may flow both to the 
national and international offices of the NGO and to the government, describing 
the number of programmes underway each month or each quarter, the number of 
youth involved or homes visited and so forth, but the actual practices on the ground 
are closer to the patron-client arrangement in which what the clients provide their 
NGO patrons is evidence that the programme actually has participants, households 
or needy children that it serves. 
Somewhat evocative of Boone and Batsell’s thousand points of light, these individuals or 
organisations as Swidler points out in some cases feed up into more formal and elite 
institutional structures, but they are just as likely to have locally based relationships and 
operate outside of more formal governance mechanisms making their scope and influence 
difficult to assess and clearly reflect.   
Within this complex, layered environment, the NAC operates the Malawi Partnership 
Forum which acts as the primary vehicle through which the NAC manages and coordinates 
planning and implementation.  The Malawi Partnership Forum is informed by a series of 
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technical working groups which develop strategy, plan and oversee implementation and 
track outcomes.  The NAC’s coordination remit is no small task requiring attention to the 
division of labour among the primary leaders at national level, managing relationships with 
donors including through the CCM, as well as coordinating and overseeing a decentralised 
implementation landscape with diverse interests.  This institutional diversity and 
complexity provides community level infrastructure to support implementation on a large 
scale.  As discussed earlier in this chapter and as Figure 7 shows, Malawi has navigated the 
intensification of interests and institutional politics, and a complex institutional landscape 
including at local levels to scale up its HIV/AIDS response and achieve results. 
Investment, Results but Continued Vulnerability 
Like the health sector overall, funding of Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response is reliant on donor 
support and predominantly that of the Global Fund.  The 2009 Government of Malawi 
UNGASS Report identified four sources of funds for the national response:   
First is through voted expenditure. The GoM [Government of Malawi] National 
Budget covers most of the basic infrastructure and human resources for 
implementation in the public sector response. Second, resources are pooled into the 
NAC Pool Fund, which is a harmonized pool of primarily donor funding which is 
allocated annually for implementation of the NAF through the Integrated Annual 
Work Plan (IAWP). Third, are resources from the Health SWAp Pool 
Fund...Finally there is direct funding to implementers from discrete donors or other 
funding sources…NAC is not accountable for… [this fourth source of] funds 
(Government of Malawi Office of the President and Cabinet 2010, p. 111). 
The NAC is charged with resource mobilisation for the HIV/AIDS response.  Like the 
Health SWAp, the NAC uses a pooled funding approach which includes the Government 
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of Malawi and the Governments of Norway and Sweden, DfID, CIDA, the World Bank, 
and as of 2006/07, the Global Fund.  The AfDB, CDC, UNDP and JICA remain discrete 
funders.  With the addition of the Global Fund to the pool in 2006/07, pool funders 
contributed approximately 98% of the NAC’s development assistance (African 
Development Bank Group 2009, p. 7).  The NAC, as the Principal Recipient for 
HIV/AIDS Global Fund grants, flows funds to the Health SWAp for MoHP 
implementation activities related to HIV/AIDS (Dickinson et al 2008, p. 33).  The Global 
Fund is the largest single donor to Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response and was projected to 
provide just over 40% of Malawi’s HIV/AIDS funding in the 2010 to 2012 period with the 
United States’ CDC providing just over 27% and the Ministry of Finance just over 1% 
(Government of Malawi Office of the President and Cabinet 2009, p. 53).
24
 
Approximately 80% of all Global Fund disbursements to Malawi from 2003 until June 
2010 were for HIV/AIDS related grants.
25 
  As Table 1 indicates, Malawi’s Round 1 grant 
for HIV/AIDS had an initial Phase 1 budget of US$41.74 mm.  This grant was re-
negotiated in 2008 subsequent to the completion of its second phase into what the Global 
Fund calls a Rolling Continuation Channel grant.  The Global Fund introduced the Rolling 
Continuation Channel option in 2006 to extend high performing grants beyond their 
second phase to facilitate lower transaction costs, longer funding periods and greater 
predictability (The Global Fund 2006, p. 10).  The Rolling Continuation Channel grant 
remains the main source of funding for Malawi’s national HIV/AIDS response.   
Table 1:  Summary of Malawi's Global Fund HIV/AIDS Grants Including Disbursements from 2003 to 
June 2010 
Summary of Malawi’s Global Fund HIV/AIDS Grants (US$) (Source:  Global Fund Grant 
Performance Reports) 
Round and Focus 
 
Lifetime 
Budget 
Phase 1 Phase 2 RCC Total 
Disbursed as 
of June 2010 
Round 1 & Rolling $544,233,360 $41,751,500 $136,862,764 $163,943,331 $136,176,829 
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Summary of Malawi’s Global Fund HIV/AIDS Grants (US$) (Source:  Global Fund Grant 
Performance Reports) 
Round and Focus 
 
Lifetime 
Budget 
Phase 1 Phase 2 RCC Total 
Disbursed as 
of June 2010 
Continuation Channel – 
HIV/AIDS 
Round 5 – Orphans and 
Other Vulnerable 
Children (Orphans and 
Other Vulnerable 
Children) 
$17,589,438 $7,708,331 $9,881,107  $16,105,063 
Round 7 – Behaviour 
Change and 
Communication (BCC) 
$36,025,380 $15,078,417 -  $13,258,014 
Totals $597,848,178 $64,538,248 $146,743,871  $165,539,906 
Both the 2005-2009 NAF and the extended NAF for 2010-2012 are costed significantly 
above the resource estimates to fund the plans but this is not the whole story.  For example, 
the 2005-2009 NAF was costed at US$619.65 mm (Government of Malawi 2004, Annex 
1-p. 13).  Donors were projected to provide 96% of the resources with the Government of 
Malawi providing the remainder including the 2% commitment to HIV/AIDS from line 
ministries (Government of Malawi 2004, Annex 1-p. 18).   The projected funding gap for 
the 2005-2009 NAF was approximately US$198 mm or almost 32% (Government of 
Malawi 2004, p. 39).  Similarly, the extended NAF for 2010-2012 projects a gap of 
US$235.91 mm or 36% of the plan. One cost driver, particularly in the extended NAF for 
2010-2012, is Malawi’s commitment to provide universal access to anti-retrovirals.  
Despite Malawi’s significant accomplishment in increasing the number of people with 
advanced HIV/AIDS infection receiving anti-retrovirals from just over 13,000 in 2003 to 
just over 196,000 in 2009, the universal access target is 280,000 for 2010 and the NAF’s 
own target is 360,000 for 2012 (Government of Malawi Office of the President and 
Cabinet 2009, p. 48).  Given these ambitious goals, the NAC’s own budget indicates 
challenges with what is referred to as absorptive capacity, meaning its systems and 
programmes are not at a scale to spend the resources it has.  The NAC underspent its 
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budget by 64% in 2005/06, 31% in 2006/07 and by 29% in 2007/08 (Government of 
Malawi Office of the President and Cabinet 2009, p. 52) suggesting that the organisation 
and its implementing partners did not execute against the magnitude of the plan and the 
scale of available resources. More resources are essential to achieve universal access, but 
that is not the whole story as there must be capacity to keep pace which requires both time 
and investment.  
The NAF for 2010-2012 proposes a continued scale-up of Malawi’s response to its 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, but the existing Global Fund Rolling Continuation Channel grant 
will not suffice.  Even though Malawi’s anti-retroviral therapy programme depends on 
Global Fund resources, Malawi was not successful in its application to the first Global 
Fund National Strategy Application round in 2009 even though it was one of the countries 
selected to apply for this first ‘learning wave’ (see Chapter 5).  In 2008/09 procurement for 
the HIV/AIDS programme was estimated at US$3 mm per month which included 
treatment for opportunistic infections, drugs for sexually transmitted infections and HIV 
test kits (Government of Malawi Office of the President and Cabinet 2010, p. 113).  While 
Figure 11:  Malawi NAC's HIV/AIDS Projections 
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the Rolling Continuation Channel grant can be received for up to six years, Malawi’s 
reliance on donor funding, as Figure 11 suggests, makes each Global Fund grant 
application critical to continue its HIV/AIDS programme and sustain the gains that have 
been made.  Subsequent to its failed National Strategy Application, Malawi was also 
unsuccessful in its Round 10 application submitted in the summer of 2010 which proposed 
to continue to scale up its HIV/AIDS response, including its goals related to increasing the 
Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission.  Failing two Global Fund grant rounds 
demonstrates that Malawi’s scaled up response remains dependent on governing a complex 
landscape of institutional interests and politics, but is also vulnerable if donor support and 
in particular Global Fund support is not sustained at or increased beyond its current levels.   
5. Conclusion 
If a new aid architecture is emerging as Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007, p. 319) suggest, 
in practice as Malawi’s experience demonstrates, it may be in its early days. Malawi’s 
ownership of its strategic development priorities and funding tied to performance are 
subject to the vagaries of achieving implementation and outcomes in a country faced with 
intractable political, economic and social circumstances, a challenging biomedical and 
socially rooted epidemic, and despite a weak infrastructure, a complex institutional 
landscape of interests and priorities in which donors participate.  As Christiansen and 
Rogerson (2005, p. 4) advocate, before an aid architecture can be said to serve an internal 
coherence among donors, Malawi’s institutions, and Malawians affected by HIV/AIDS, 
“…we need to go beyond the development system’s longstanding internal narratives and 
constructions. We need to engage with the powerful political forces that shape the 
institutional and behavioural parameters in which aid is occurring.”  In other words, 
Malawi’s aid dependence and its reliance on and vulnerability to its Global Fund 
relationship in order to respond to its devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic are a lot like the aid 
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architecture of old.  The emergence of a new aid architecture envisioned by Bourguignon 
and Sundberg remains elusive. 
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Chapter 5 -  Malawi:  The Mediated Space for Country Ownership and 
the Double Deficit in External Accountability 
1. Introduction 
The question is, what is a country (Government of Malawi/NAC Representative 
2010, interview, Lilongwe)? 
‘Country ownership’ is a term that crops up often in donor literature but its meaning is 
usually implied rather than made explicit.  The concepts and practices associated with 
country ownership are varied and encompass a broad interpretation of ‘who’ is meant by 
country, ‘what’ is meant by ownership and ‘how’ this ownership is conferred.  The first 
section of this chapter explores how country ownership recasts the historic neo-liberal 
relationship between IFIs and developing countries, its association with more effective aid 
and its technical definition in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda.  It describes how 
the Global Fund’s country level governance model creates a mediated space for country 
ownership.  It looks at how in Malawi the elite character of country leadership and country 
ownership unfolds, a character that is at odds with normative ideals of broad citizen 
participation associated with country ownership. Finally, this section concludes by 
observing that the Global Fund’s internal accountability mechanisms create a rational 
‘plumb line’, ultimately aligning the interests of actors in the mediated space for country 
ownership to the Global Fund and its donors.   
The second section of this chapter describes Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application 
to the Global Fund and the criticism of its HIV/AIDS prevention strategy which elucidates 
the country ownership and external accountability challenges that arise when global 
politics and country evidence collide. The chapter argues that country ownership is 
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conceptually convenient because it implies liberal democratic values associated with 
participation (Strand 2007, p. 227).  In practice, the Global Fund’s country ownership 
model occurs in a mediated space where legitimate government authority and 
accountability for a country HIV/AIDS agenda is dispersed among elite state, non-state, 
national and international actors.  As a consequence a double deficit in external 
accountability arises where no mechanisms exist for Malawians affected by HIV/AIDS to 
hold to account the Global Fund and its organs including the independent TRP and 
similarly to hold to account elite decision makers in Malawi’s mediated space for country 
ownership particularly non-state national and international actors.  The failure at the feet of 
this double deficit in external accountability accrues to those whose live are or will be 
affected, who are without redress or recognition when prevention and treatment 
programmes can’t be scaled and in the longer term may even be at risk.  As noted in 
Chapter 3, while the solution to the HIV/AIDS pandemic may be collective, the problem is 
becoming increasingly isolated and attributed to poor and disease endemic countries like 
Malawi. 
2. Country Ownership:  A Break with the Past 
Redress for the Failures of the Washington Consensus 
Country ownership in its most general sense implies a departure from the mode of lending 
historically attributed to the IMF and the World Bank which tied loans to country 
governments to conditions for economic reform and structural adjustment.  Without going 
into the robust and lengthy debate on these practices, in a nutshell structural adjustment 
loans have been criticised as, “a mechanism of forcing free market economics on countries 
through coercion” (Abbasi 1999, p. 1003); further, the increased economic activity and 
material output predicted by the IFIs either did not materialise, or did not necessarily lead 
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to better policy or a better quality of life for the majority of the people who were intended 
to benefit from them (Ugalde and Jackson 1995, p. 529; Burnside and Dollar 2000, p. 864; 
Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 2001, p. 6).  Country ownership then, implies a different 
relationship between lender or donor and recipient from that historically practised by IFIs 
where countries were required to implement neo-liberal macroeconomic policies in order 
to receive loans. 
Accepting country ownership as something other than a top down or coercive relationship, 
tells us what is not implied by the term, rather than what is.  The OECD’s  Development 
Assistance Committee’s (DAC) 1996 report Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of 
Development Co-operation (OECD 1996, p. 13) reflected a donor government vision for 
aid in the new millennium which emphasised the role of “partnerships” and a “people 
centred, participatory and sustainable development process” where “[p]aternalistic 
approaches have no place…and local actors should progressively take the lead while 
external partners back their efforts to assume greater responsibility for their own 
development.”  The notion of wider participation in decision-making particularly from 
civil society at country level was echoed, albeit faintly, in the UN’s 1997 manifesto for 
reform Renewing the United Nations (1997, clause 84) which stated that “[t]he global 
commons are the policy domain in which this intermingling of sectors and institutions is 
most advanced.” Notionally, OECD countries were pushing for a more deliberative space 
to facilitate coherent development policy making in partnership with developing countries.  
The UN’s more restrained endorsement may have reflected the cautiousness of some states 
towards shifting control in the relationship between donors and recipient governments and 
recipient governments and non-state actors (see Chapter 6 for a discussion on legitimate 
public authority beyond states as it related to the Global Fund’s growing authority).  
 183 
By the end of the 1990s, the World Bank had become an advocate for the type of 
development reforms set out by the OECD.  In 1998 Stiglitz (1998, pp. 27 and 1), then the 
World Bank’s Chief Economist, promoted “putting the country in the driver’s seat” after 
the “failures of the Washington Consensus.”  In laying out his vision for a “new 
paradigm”, Stiglitz (1998, p. 21) advocated that,  
[d]evelopment cannot be just a matter of negotiations between a donor and the 
government. Development must reach deeper. It must involve and support groups 
in civil society; these groups… give voice to often-excluded members of society, 
facilitating their participation and increasing ownership of the development 
process. 
In 1999, under President Wolfensohn, the World Bank introduced its Comprehensive 
Development Framework.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was the 
Comprehensive Development Framework’s mechanism for implementing equitable, 
sustainable development and to redress the “painful realization of development agencies, 
recipient countries, and aid analysts…[that] the full potential of international aid to reduce 
poverty by achieving positive, sustainable development results was not being fulfilled” 
(World Bank 2003, p. xvii).  Among the four principles underpinning the Comprehensive 
Development Framework were country ownership—in this case meaning citizen 
participation in “shaping development goals and strategies”, and country-led partnership—
in this case meaning a reduction in the “inefficiencies, asymmetrical power relationships, 
and tensions of donor-led aid initiatives” (World Bank 2003, p. xviii).  The World Bank 
declared its leadership for a new type of aid relationship which was to include participation 
from donors, recipient governments and non-state actors alike.  
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Even though it marked a departure from past IFI practices, the concept of country 
ownership advocated by the World Bank was just that, a concept.  Its practice was a more 
delicate matter. Booth (2008, pp. 2) describes country ownership as “the kind of political 
leadership, developmental vision and willingness to transform state structures that have 
been associated with successful development in the past.”  It is a more nuanced 
understanding than Stiglitz’s often repeated phrase of “putting the country in the driver’s 
seat.”  Booth acknowledges that fostering country ownership of this nature is challenging 
for both donors and recipient countries.  For donors, the challenge lies in “abandoning the 
quest for guarantees” and accepting more risk while at the same time engaging with 
countries to develop institutional systems and policies that support development, rather 
than taking a hands-off approach.  For countries, Booth (2008, pp. 3-4) suggests that the 
challenge lies in leading development efforts which he maintains are unattractive to 
politicians because “getting re-elected is a complicated business in which slicing up the 
national cake is usually more important than enlarging it”, or put another way, neo-
patrimonialism (discussed further in Chapter 6) is “profoundly anti-developmental” (Booth 
2008, p. 2). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, when legitimate authority is dislocated from the realist-
positivist focus on the nation state, agenda setting is “open to the input and disruption of a 
variety of political agents” (Stone 2008, p. 26).  Country ownership promotes the notion of 
citizen participation as a ‘good thing’, the exercise of liberal democratic values.  But as 
discussed later in this Chapter, the normative ideal may depart from the reality on the 
ground where decision making remains in the hands of the elite. Poku and Sandkjaer 
(2007, p. 12) note the “…widening gap between Africans at large and African elites 
[where] [i]n many countries elite control of the state systems ensures their access to both 
the dwindling economic opportunities and the mechanism for state power (military and 
 185 
police forces) ensuring that economic and political privilege are protected.” Buiter (2004, 
no page) in his scathing analysis of country ownership observes that “[c]ountries subject to 
IFI programs and the associated conditionality often have political systems that are 
unrepresentative and repressive…The political leadership and the elites supporting it are 
often corrupt and economically illiterate…[and] [p]ublic administration is weak, corrupt 
and has very limited implementation capacity.”  At first blush, the notion of country 
ownership paints a virtuous picture of the extent of participation of non-elites in decision 
making.  It fails to acknowledge those that Stiglitz called the ‘often-excluded’ may remain 
so. 
What is evident from the successive campaigns which advocate for country ownership is 
that they reflect a past left behind, a rejection of the ethos of the structural adjustment era.  
As Khan and Sharma (2001, p. 14) observe, “[t]here is unlikely to be “full” ownership, and 
the problem is really one of trying to maximize ownership within the context of 
conditionality.” In other words, country ownership lies in a mediated space, where the 
‘who’ of country may include non-state actors but this may be far from the ‘often-
excluded’, and ‘what’ is meant by ownership and ‘how’ this ownership is conferred is 
somewhere between ‘full’ ownership and little ownership at all.  More cynically Buiter 
(2004, no page) contends that this mediated space is so large as to make the term country 
ownership meaningless, where it is anything from “… ‘the country has designed and 
drafted the programme’…[to] ‘the authorities of the country are kept informed of how and 
when the program has been implemented’.”  In practice the boundaries of country 
ownership, and in particular those that demarcate the legitimate authority of a country’s 
government to design and achieve equitable, sustainable development are not clearly 
drawn.  
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Technocracy and an Emerging Aid Architecture 
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is a compact between donors and 
recipient countries outlining a series of commitments to improve aid effectiveness which 
ultimately are intended to result in all countries achieving the MDGs.  What distinguishes 
the OECD’s Paris Declaration from the World Bank’s efforts to recast the delivery of aid 
and achieve sustainable development is that the Paris Declaration marked the first time that 
both donors and recipients endorsed one framework:  the ‘we’ of the Paris Declaration is 
“Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development 
and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions” (OECD 2008, p. 1).  This 
inclusion signified the emergence of a new aid architecture (see Chapter 4 which discusses 
the extent to which an aid architecture can be said to be emerging in Malawi), involving 
both donors and recipient governments where a country’s ownership of its development 
strategy was a core feature (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007, p. 319). 
With its focus on aid effectiveness, the Paris Declaration takes a technical approach to 
development, defining commitments and actions, measurable indicators and a monitoring 
and evaluation approach.  Country ownership is front and centre as the first of five themes, 
with “partner countries” (read recipient governments) committing to exercise “effective 
leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development 
actions” (OECD 2008, p. 3). Similar to the OECD’s 1996 donor driven vision for aid 
delivery and the World Bank’s 1999 Comprehensive Development Framework, the Paris 
Declaration proposes that country ownership require recipient governments to: 
[e]xercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development 
strategies through broad consultative processes[; t]ranslate these national 
development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as 
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expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets…[; t]ake 
the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development 
resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil society 
and the private sector (OECD 2008, p. 3). 
Donors’ commitment involved exercising “respect [for] partner country leadership and 
help[ing to] strengthen their capacity to exercise it” (OECD 2008, p. 3).  The indicator 
associated with country ownership was the proportion of recipient governments which 
have “operational development strategies” (OECD 2008, p. 9), and although donors 
committed to respecting country leadership, it is of course highly subjective as to how or 
whether or not this occurred. While the subject of the Paris Declaration is national 
development strategies, its focus is very much on process and measurement which Booth 
(2008, pp. 2) warns “will not crack the problem of the non-developmental priorities of the 
politicians who lead poor countries.”  In other words, achieving equitable, sustainable 
development is a complex and  nuanced undertaking, and seeking compliance to a set of 
proclamations is not enough to achieve it. 
Three years after the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action told a similar country 
ownership story under the headline “[w]e need to achieve much more if all countries are to 
meet the Millennium Development Goals…” (OECD 2008, p. 15).  Like its predecessor, 
the Accra Agenda identified country ownership as “key” in order for “[d]eveloping 
countries [to] determine and  implement their development policies to achieve their own 
economic, social and environmental goals.”  It identified three strategies to strengthen 
country ownership:  1)  “broadening the country level policy dialogue on development” 
where parliaments are responsible for country ownership and all actors including “central 
and local governments, CSOs, research institutes, media and the private sector are engaged 
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in policy dialogue”; 2) strengthening capacity of institutions, systems, and local expertise, 
where developing countries are responsible and donors support these efforts; and 3) 
“strengthen[ing] and increas[ing] the use of country systems” where developing countries 
are responsible for improving these systems and donors assist this process through using 
them (OECD 2008, pp. 16-17). In the language of the Accra Agenda, the ‘who’ of country 
ownership is developing country governments and ‘what’ is owned are development 
policies and systems for governance and implementation. Actors beyond government 
participate in policy deliberation and the role of donors, although more robust than that 
outlined in the Paris Declaration, for all intents and purposes changed little from the 
OECD position twelve years earlier, where donors “back their [recipient country] efforts to 
assume greater responsibility for their own development” (OECD 1996, p. 13).   
Donors, recipient countries and non-state actors made up the 1700 participants at the Third 
High Level Forum on Development Effectiveness which endorsed the Accra Agenda.  Not 
surprisingly then the Accra Agenda includes a specific commitment to deepen engagement 
with civil society (OECD 2008, p. 18), although the ‘we’ taking action remain donors and 
recipient governments. As Stiglitz (1998, p. 21) cautioned when he advocated for a new 
development paradigm which “reaches deeper” than the donor and recipient government 
relationship, although non-state actors are critical to achieving desired country “ownership 
and transformation”, they are not necessarily representative.  Booth (2008, p. 2) takes this 
caution a step further noting that the inclusion of non-state actors in determining country 
development priorities does not necessarily lead to equitable and sustainable development 
as non-state actors “face incentives [which are]…not always more conducive to 
progressive policy actions than those motivating presidents and ministers”; further, he 
suggests that from a donor perspective, the extent to which donors contribute to positive 
development outcomes depends on how they approach country ownership. In other words 
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they are “complicit in the prevailing political arrangements:” just because actors are not 
the ‘state’ does not necessarily mean that citizen participation is enhanced or achieved or 
non-elite, ‘often-excluded’ actors have a role.   The Accra Agenda sidesteps questions of 
the representativeness of non-state actors by limiting those committing to action to donors 
and recipient country governments.  As a result, country ownership, and it follows 
accountability for development, rests almost entirely with recipient country governments.  
‘How’ donors engage with or are complicit in the “prevailing political arrangements” is the 
clue in an otherwise neat, technical vision that the country ownership space may be a 
mediated one. 
The Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda speak to the emergence of a new aid 
architecture where country ownership is key, donors and recipient country governments 
endorse their respective commitments to improve the quality of aid, and civil society 
participates in the development discourse. The technical approach of these compacts 
delineates the intentions of both donors and recipients and infers that if there is compliance 
aid quality will be realised and all countries will meet the MDGs.  But as Booth suggests 
and as discussed later in this chapter, in practice the incentives and interests of donors, 
recipient governments and non-state actors make for a much more complex and messy 
reality.  The mediated space for country ownership escapes explicit definition and remains 
subject to “the powerful political forces that shape the institutional and behavioural 
parameters in which aid is occurring” (Christiansen and Rogerson 2005, p. 4). 
The Global Fund has promoted the principle of ‘national ownership’ from its inception.  Its 
Framework Document claims, “[t]he Fund will base its work on programs that reflect 
national ownership and respect country-led formulation and implementation processes” 
(The Global Fund, no date-c, ‘The Framework Document’, p. 1).  The language is 
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reflective of the dominant aid effectiveness narrative, but the term ‘national ownership’ (or 
country ownership) lacked definition.  It is not clear from the Global Fund’s perspective, at 
least in its Framework Document, ‘who’ is meant by national and ‘what’ it is that is 
owned.
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The Global Fund is signatory to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda (The Global 
Fund 2010d, p. 1) and as such it promotes the notion of national or country ownership but 
with a distinct Global Fund flavour.  On the one hand the independence of its country level 
governance mechanisms “put the country in the driver’s seat.”  On the other hand, the 
participation and influence of national and international non-state actors in governance and 
decision making goes beyond notions of ‘engagement’ and ‘consultation’ recognising 
‘country’ to be more than its government.  Advocating for country ownership may be 
conceptually convenient because it implies alignment to democratic liberal values (Strand 
2007, p. 227).  In practice, however, it is a more complicated matter. 
Three features of the Global Fund’s country level governance model help to shape its 
practice of country ownership: 
 The Global Fund has no country office and therefore the CCM and the TRP 
through the Global Fund application process help to set the agenda for and define 
county programmes related to the three diseases and health systems strengthening.  
A locally contracted Local Fund Agent provides independent monitoring of the 
Principal Recipients’ implementation and stewardship of funds; 
 The Global Fund’s inclusive governance approach is manifest in the delegations 
which it encourages comprise the independent CCM such as government ministries 
and national and global NGOs, faith based organisations and CSOs (see Chapter 3 
for a discussion on legitimacy associated with inclusiveness and transparency); and 
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 The TRP, comprised of individual experts, is also independent from the Global 
Fund secretariat and board and makes recommendations to the board on grant 
awards. 
The CCM then becomes a locus for setting the agenda and funding a country’s HIV/AIDS 
response especially, as discussed in Chapter 4, in a country like Malawi there the Global 
Fund is not only the major funder of this response but a significant donor overall.  The 
TRP enables this agenda because it recommends whether or not CCM proposals are 
funded or declined and therefore although it is independent from the Global Fund 
secretariat, its individual experts are particularly influential over what happens at country 
level.  Like the TRP, the CCM is not part of the Global Fund secretariat and neither is it a 
government organisation.  The Global Fund structures its country level governance so that 
‘national ownership’ (or ‘country ownership’) occurs in a mediated space beyond 
government where state and non-state and national and international actors convene.  In 
Malawi the CCM took an elite form.  Civil society is typically weak in Malawi and even 
though Malawi’s CCM included Malawian CSOs, several CCM members acknowledged 
that this was not the same as having a voice or exerting influence over agenda setting 
(International CCM Members, 2010, interviews, Lilongwe). The fact that the country 
ownership space is mediated is one thing but that does not necessarily mean it is 
constituted or functions in a way that is more inclusive or deliberative as the ideals 
associated with country ownership suggest.  The nature of this mediated space for country 
ownership has implications for both the leadership and ownership of a country’s 
HIV/AIDS response. 
Country Leadership and Setting the HIV/AIDS Agenda 
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Country leadership as laid out in the Accra Agenda is a critical component of ownership:  
“[d]eveloping country governments will take stronger leadership of their own development 
policies, and will engage with their parliaments and citizens in shaping those policies” 
(OECD 2008, p. 15).  Leadership of an HIV/AIDS agenda, because of the economic, social 
and biomedical nature of the disease, necessarily rests in multiple ministries and parastatal 
organisations and the inter-institutional dynamics can be contentious, as Malawi’s example 
shows.   
Malawi exerts strong central policy leadership for its HIV/AIDS response claiming 
ownership for both its development and the oversight of its implementation:  As described 
in Chapter 4, the Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the Office of the President 
and Cabinet (OPC) has overall policy ownership.  The NAC develops and oversees the 
implementation of the National Action Framework for HIV/AIDS and the Ministry of 
Health and Population (MoHP) oversees the broader Programme of Work for health 
including the Extended Health Package and the Health Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) 
and provides biomedical expertise and leadership for the HIV/AIDS response:  
Up until now, the government says do this and everybody does it, and that’s that.  
The government is clear that it is in charge and everyone has to do what the 
government or President says.  It is very hierarchical. ‘The boss has said therefore 
we do without question’ approach seems to be very typical of this country.  It’s 
more than just the old man [the then President of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika]. It 
seems that culturally they are very hierarchical (International CCM Member 2010, 
interview, Lilongwe). 
Walt and Gilson (1994, p. 355) reinforce this observation with their claim that setting 
policy is a function of context and the actors involved:   
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Context is affected by many factors such as instability or uncertainty created by 
changes in political regime or war; by neo-liberal or socialist ideology; by 
historical experience and culture. The process of policy-making (how issues get on 
to the policy agenda, how they fare once there) in turn is affected by actors, their 
position in power structures, their own values and expectations. And the content of 
policy will reflect some or all of the above dimensions. 
Malawi’s central leadership of HIV/AIDS policy may in part be a function of culture and 
history.  What is evident is that the three pivotal state and parastatal organisations in 
Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response make a strong ownership claim for setting its priorities. 
Despite the formal roles attributed to the Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the 
OPC, the NAC and the MoHP, the balance of power among these organisations and the 
underlying dynamics between their leaders has at times been contested.  Historically, there 
has been an “institutional tug of war” between the NAC and the Department of Nutrition, 
HIV and AIDS in the OPC, which has been in part due to the institutional independence of 
the NAC and in part due to the leaders involved: 
NAC used to have a very strong leader, Bizwick Mwale…[and there is also] the 
OPC, with Dr. Mary Shawa, who is the head of the Department of Nutrition, HIV 
and AIDS who more clearly wants to position the OPC as the overseer and 
direction giver to everyone else.  NAC has given lip service to following that but 
has been doing their best not to, as much as I can tell, at least until recently…OPC 
should be doing the strategic work, the policy work, leaving the programmatic 
oversight to NAC, though NAC has been much more of an implementer than they 
should have been (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
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Malawi’s Law Commission has drafted HIV/AIDS legislation which proposes to further 
consolidate leadership for the country’s HIV/AIDS agenda.  The legislation proposes to 
create a “legal institutional framework for the regulation and coordination of matters 
pertaining to HIV/AIDS” (Malawi Law Commission 2007, p. 2), with a provision to move 
the NAC directly into the OPC thereby removing its independence.  Some anticipate that 
this erosion of the NAC’s parastatal status will be regressive (NGO Representative 2010, 
interview, Lilongwe) but any ambiguity about leadership of the HIV/AIDS agenda would 
be resolved.   
Another change for the NAC is that its status as the only Principal Recipient for Global 
Fund HIV/AIDS resources is coming to an end.  At the recommendation of the TRP, the 
CCM has recently approved three new Principal Recipients: “It will erode their [NAC’s] 
power.  They will have to give in some” (NGO Representative 2010, interview, Lilongwe).  
While Malawi has exhibited strong central leadership, the balance of power between the 
OPC and the NAC has been on shifting sands.  The proposed transition of the NAC from 
an independent organisation to part of the OPC and the inclusion of additional Principal 
Recipients are likely to contribute to further consolidating authority in the OPC for agenda 
setting, weakening the NAC’s leadership and implementation oversight role. 
While biomedical leadership for the HIV/AIDS response is attributed to the MoHP, in 
practice observers have noted poor coordination between the OPC and the MoHP and to a 
lesser extent the NAC, and a diminishing of MoHP leadership capacity: 
Mary Shawa’s office [OPC] has been talking about a cadre of HIV/nutrition 
workers that should also take up HIV/AIDS testing and counselling and ARV 
[anti-retroviral] refills in the community…When you talk to the MoHP about these 
plans, they don’t know, or they have never heard about it... Sometimes you observe 
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there is not enough communication going on between departments…To have a 
Principal Secretary for Nutrition, HIV and AIDS when you have a MoHP with an 
HIV/AIDS department is a bit strange (Government of Malawi/NAC 
Representative 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
Others have postulated that the MoHP’s weak leadership has affected its ability to 
negotiate an appropriate role with partners: 
In general, the relationship between the MoHP and the NAC has been 
good…But…there are areas where it has not gone well.  And I think it’s to do 
with…at the MoHP a lack of leadership overall…there is a lack of leadership and 
there is a lack of vision and a lack of direction and a lack of accountability…a lot 
of the well experienced senior managers in the ministry were made to leave over 
the years…[and as a result] there was very little expertise in public health and 
health care delivery.  This has weakened the position of the Ministry vis à vis the 
NAC…[and the MoHP is] not always a strong negotiation partner (Government of 
Malawi/NAC Representative 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
Cassels (1994, p. 336) describes the dynamic of weak leadership in developing country 
ministries of health more generally: 
The capacity to make strategic or operational decisions in many ministries of health 
and health care institutions is often constrained by the fact that no one is in overall 
charge.  In the absence of clear management structures, consensus has to be 
reached between technical staff and generalist administrators, different professional 
cadres, and competing programme managers.  Organizational structures frequently 
reflect the success of these different groups in lobbying for status rather than the 
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need for managerial control.  Similarly, the process of resource allocation is 
dominated by provider rather than managerial or societal interests. 
As Cassels observes, the challenges of resource constrained and socially and economically 
vulnerable environments like Malawi extend to the country’s leadership capacity and 
capability.  In Malawi’s case, underneath the formally articulated division of leadership, 
there are ebbs and flows in the dynamics among the OPC, the NAC and the MoHP, with 
the current trend moving towards greater consolidation of leadership in the OPC.  Poor 
communication in particular between the OPC and the MoHP and weak leadership 
capacity at the MoHP reinforce the ability of the OPC to direct the HIV/AIDS agenda.  On 
the surface, ‘government’ leadership for and ownership of agenda-setting seems clear but 
underneath this mantle, the inter-organisational dynamics reveal that even for the state 
‘country ownership’ is a political and contested landscape of who leads and who 
influences what.   
Country Ownership and Setting the HIV/AIDS Agenda 
The Global Fund’s country level governance model expands who has a say in setting the 
agenda for nation’s response to its HIV/AIDS epidemic and who has a stake in its 
implementation; however, this model does more than broaden the discursive space—it also 
dilutes the fiduciary financial function of government and the accountability at work in 
democratic processes.  In the case of the former, the Global Fund awards its grants to 
Principal Recipients which in Malawi’s case for HIV/AIDS has been the NAC, not the 
Ministry of Finance or even the Ministry of Health.  The NAC in turn awards funds to state 
and non-state organisations alike (see Chapter 6 which discusses the role of CCMs in 
democratising or eroding the power of the “parochialisation of the political realm” (Poku 
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and Sandkjaer 2007, p. 13)).  For non-state actors this expanded role conflicts with their 
traditional source of legitimacy derived from independent advocacy:   
[i]ndirect affiliation through funding binds, however subtly, any NGO to the 
political profile and ...agenda of the donor…Any loss of independence on the part 
of a NGO inevitably questions the legitimacy of their claim, emphasising the 
critical need to be seen to be in an empathetic tie with the beneficiaries (Webb 
2004, p. 31). 
From an accountability perspective, the CCM disperses the legitimate authority of 
government by distributing it among or sharing it with national and international non-state 
actors, none of whom have accountability to Malawi’s citizens (see Chapter 6 which 
discusses the ‘publicness’ of the Global Fund’s authority). In this mediated space, country 
ownership--by whom and of what—contends with diverse interests, new and distributed 
authorities, multiple constituencies and accountability which accrues to the Global Fund. 
This explicit and intentional broadening of who has a say in developing Global Fund 
proposals in a country and therefore implicitly in shaping a country’s HIV/AIDS agenda 
has been positioned by some as a positive evolution in development practice: “The Global 
Fund would insist that they deal with the country, not the government.  Most of the 
institutional space where health policy is negotiated is dominated by government and they 
have shifted that space in a helpful way I believe” (UN Executive 2009, interview, 
Geneva).  In the case of newly democratic states like Malawi where government capacity 
may be weak, “…the parallelism between statism and nationalism has a limited role” 
(Poku and Sandkjaer 2007, p. 13) and a mediated space for country ownership may counter 
these effects.   
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The Global Fund sees wider participation as having a “catalytic effect”, responding to 
deficits by “building the capacity of local health leadership to improve governance of HIV 
programs” (Atun and Kazatchkine 2009, p. S68).  Wider participation, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, in theory at least serves to water down systems of patronage among the political 
elite, thereby reducing the potential for resources to be channelled away from the 
vulnerable in favour of the powerful and wealthy or worse, displacing them through 
corruption (Poku and Sandkjaer 2007, p. 12).  This watering down was not evident in 
Malawi where an elite enclave of government representatives and international donors and 
NGOs led the CCM and the agenda setting. The discursive space that the CCM model was 
intended to catalyse may be broader than the state but in practice not broad enough to 
mean that citizen participation reaches the ‘often-excluded’. 
The Mediated Space for Country Ownership:  Anarchy or a Rational Force? 
The mediated nature of country ownership was evident in Malawi: 
There are many partners involved, all with slightly different roles and different 
agendas which relate to country leadership.  The question is what is a country?  
What is a national discussion? It is heavily influenced by the different partners.  It 
comes from inside the country and outside the country.  If you talk to the country 
leadership, it is basically ‘what is the national discussion?’ which is not always 
completely agreed to by the Malawian Government.  A good example is the whole 
discussion about male circumcision which was not initiated or supported in the 
country, but through long term pressure and support and being put on the agenda 
by international partners, it has become part of the national agenda (Government of 
Malawi/NAC Representative 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
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While the government in Malawi claims to retain strong ownership of policy and the 
HIV/AIDS response, the reality is that the CCM is a locus of influence because of its role 
in creating applications to the Global Fund and then overseeing the grants that are 
received:  “I sit on the CCM and it acts as a pretty good coordination body on 
HIV/AIDS…And although its purpose is quite clear, it also acts as a forum for HIV/AIDS 
issues beyond the Global Fund grants” (International CCM Member 2010, interview, 
Lilongwe). The dynamics in Malawi of agenda setting for HIV/AIDS and the role of the 
CCM in this process demonstrate that the Global Fund’s country level governance 
stretches the country ownership notion far beyond the donor / recipient government 
construct of the Accra Agenda. 
If the Global Fund’s country level governance model ascribes the ‘who’ in country 
ownership to a range of state and non-state and national and international actors, and 
‘what’ is owned is agenda-setting such as that for a country’s HIV/AIDS response, then 
‘how’ this agenda is shaped is also an important consideration.  Fidler (2007, p. 8) 
characterises the interests and influence of a range of stakeholders as resembling a form of 
“open-source anarchy”, and anarchy by definition resists the order of “rationalization, 
centralization, and harmonization.”  The complexity of this interaction is echoed by Walt 
et al. (2009, p. 63) who describe the vagaries of the global / national interplay:  
In terms of the literature on global architecture, the focus has been largely on 
global actors and their attendance at meetings to discuss or to agree to new policies 
or initiatives.  There has been much less attention played [sic] to their agency:  the 
interaction of these different actors, how far their actions may be governed by their 
interests, and how these reflect and are reflected in their ideas, values, motivations 
and exercise of power and the ways in which these may be affected by any 
particular governance arrangement. 
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The influences of actors and the agency they exercise on national agenda setting might, as 
Fidler (2007, p. 11) describes, “move beyond highly structured paucity and unstructured 
plurality towards purposeful plurality.”  Rather than this rational force which acts on a 
mediated space for country ownership coming from international frameworks like the 
Accra Agenda, it is embedded in the authority and hierarchical internal accountability 
exercised by the Global Fund (Chapter 3 describes the Global Fund’s internal 
accountability model).  As discussed in Chapter 6 in relationship to the Global Fund’s 
growing authority, this rational force counters patterns of “disorder, randomness, and an 
absence of rational imposition of planning” identified by Stone (2008, p. 22).  What Fidler 
(2007, p. 9) describes as “source code” is inherent in the old-fashioned donor/recipient 
power asymmetry, between the Global Fund’s authority, its performance-based funding 
and its internal accountability and an aid reliant, HIV/AIDS endemic country like Malawi.  
This accountability plumb line stabilises the interplay among diverse interests, new and 
distributed authorities and multiple constituencies in the mediated space for country 
ownership.  The problem that arises however is one of external accountability.  As the next 
section will describe, there are no mechanisms for Malawians affected by HIV/AIDs to 
hold accountable participants in the mediated space for country ownership--particularly 
elite, non-state national and international actors--or to hold accountable the Global Fund 
and its organs including the TRP.  Rather, accountability goes one way, from Principal 
Recipients up through the Global Fund and on to its donors. 
At first glance, country ownership might appear to describe the provenance of a state over 
its policy-making and agenda setting and signal a departure from what were perceived as 
coercive and unsuccessful neo-liberal development practices of the IFIs.  The Global Fund 
ascribes to ‘national ownership’ or ‘country ownership’ and is a signatory to the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda which broadly promote country ownership as a 
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government’s autonomy over its development agenda, the engagement of non-state actors, 
and donors in a supporting role.  In practice CCMs with their inclusive membership 
broaden the notion of country beyond the state to create a mediated space for country 
ownership where the object of action in the instance of Malawi’s CCM is the country’s 
HIV/AIDS agenda.  However, as the experience in Malawi demonstrates, non-state is not 
the same as ‘often-excluded’ and the CCM remains an elite forum.  Beyond the practical 
advantages that greater inclusivity provides where health service delivery is concerned, it 
is normatively convenient, embedding democratic, liberal values in what is described as an 
emerging aid architecture (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007, p. 319; Strand 2007, p. 227; 
Bonnel 2009, p. 165); but this belies the anarchy inherent in the multiplicity of actors and 
interests that influence country agenda setting in a mediated space (Christiansen and 
Rogerson, 2005, p. 1; Birdsall 2007, p. 593; Booth 2008, pp. 2; Walt, Spicer and Buse 
2009, p. 63).  The rational force on these dynamics lies in the old fashioned donor/recipient 
power asymmetry between the Global Fund and an aid reliant, HIV/AIDS endemic country 
like Malawi, where incentives to fulfil and comply with the Global Fund’s performance-
based funding and internal accountability are high.  The problem that arises however is one 
of external accountability:  there are no mechanisms for Malawians affected by HIV/AIDs 
to hold accountable participants in the mediated space for country ownership or the Global 
Fund itself. And as with any governance model, its true test--its legitimacy, authority and 
accountability—comes when times are tough, when grant applications to the Global Fund 
fail.  The next section of this chapter will discuss Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy 
associated with its failed 2009 National Strategy Application to the Global Fund. 
3. The Mediated Space for Country Ownership:  The Collision of Global Politics and 
Country Evidence in Malawi 
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The following section explores the effects of a mediated space for country ownership using 
the example of Malawi’s National HIV Prevention Strategy for 2009 to 2013 which was 
attached to its failed National Strategy Application to the Global Fund.   It looks at the 
context in which Malawi developed its proposal to the Global Fund and how the TRP’s 
feedback on the failed application created a collision between a ‘global social-political 
order’ and Malawi’s ownership of its HIV/AIDS agenda.  The section concludes with a 
discussion on how global political interests can exacerbate the mediated nature of country 
ownership especially for an aid reliant, HIV/AIDS endemic country like Malawi revealing 
a double deficit in external accountability. 
Malawi’s HIV/AIDS Prevention Strategy and a Global Human Rights Agenda 
Policy-making--and by association agenda setting--is by nature messy (Stone 2008, p. 29).  
The TRP’s challenge to Malawi’s National HIV Prevention Strategy for 2009 to 2013 
which formed part of the country’s failed National Strategy Application to the Global Fund 
exemplifies the unpredictability and fragmentation that Stone (2008, p. 29) associates with 
global policy processes but fit just as well in a country context.   
In 2009, Malawi was one of seven countries invited to submit an application to the Global 
Fund’s ‘learning wave’ for its first round of applications for its National Strategy 
Approach (The Global Fund 2010n, p. 4).  (Chapter 6 discusses the Global Fund’s 
National Strategy Approach in relation to its growing country-level authority).  The 
country visit by a Strategy Review Team designed to help Malawi develop its application 
and Malawi’s successful history of Global Fund applications set expectations among CCM 
members that the application would be successful.   
Everyone who was invited to apply for the National Strategy Approach should 
have been given the opportunity to succeed. What would also have been useful was 
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a continued refinement of the proposal so that the success is increased.  Those were 
the signals we got from both the TRP and the secretariat earlier on.  So the desk 
review was successful, the TRP came to the country and was very positive about 
the programme and the extended National Action Framework and so we felt that 
we were going to be successful.  And then when the proposal was submitted, it 
wasn’t [successful] and then an effort to engage further to see how to refine it 
really wasn’t something where the door was open (International CCM Member 
2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
The application’s failure came as a shock and the TRP cited three main reasons for its 
decision:  Malawi’s failure to take meaningful action to rectify the shortcomings of the 
Central Medical Stores (see Chapter 6 which refers to the drug stock outs in Malawi) 
which has had longstanding procurement and supply chain challenges; the need for more 
Principal Recipients in addition to the NAC, and weaknesses in the HIV/AIDS prevention 
strategy.  One critique of the HIV/AIDS prevention strategy was its lack of focus on men 
having sex with men.
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  Those who had participated in developing the country’s 
prevention strategy disagreed with the TRP’s assessment and defended its credible and 
evidence-based
28
 approach: 
I know the difference between how you focus on the general population and how 
you focus in concentrated epidemics.  I was appalled by the TRP’s comments.  I’ve 
worked with the men having sex with men community in so many different 
countries.  I feel like there is a very, very small vocal voice advocating. Go ahead 
and advocate, but it’s not evidence-based to focus a prevention strategy on a very 
small minority percentage of the population that are very hard to identify and 
actually have the same transmission rates as urban men.  Yes, you’re much more 
vulnerable because you’re not going to access healthcare, but it’s not the crux of 
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the epidemic here.  And the fact that it was men having sex with men and not sex 
workers.  The sex workers here are a big problem.  They are being ignored and 
they have 70% HIV prevalence. I thought that we had a very, very strong, 
evidence-based, national prevention strategy and we had experts from all over the 
world working on it. We have a very evidence-based National Action Framework 
which is what the National Strategy Application was based on and a very strong 
appeal.  If that was one of the main reasons, I can’t even say how that goes against 
everything in terms of evidence-based programme implementation.  It’s activism 
(International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
CCM members including donors supported an appeal to the TRP which also failed.  The 
TRP’s feedback was perceived by some as imposing a global human rights agenda on 
Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response (UN Representative 2010, interview, Lilongwe) and 
exemplifies a tension inherent in ‘country ownership’ when a country’s agenda departs 
from global level interests. As a Global Fund Executive observed, 
[t]his example [the TRP’s feedback to Malawi on the lack of focus on men having 
sex with men in its HIV/AIDS prevention strategy for its failed National Strategy 
Application] points to real tensions between country ownership and global 
principles and principles of human rights.  What do we do if women are minors but 
gender and equality drive the epidemic?  It’s very delicate and difficult, not black 
and white. It’s the responsibility of AIDS advocates and normative agencies to 
work with countries to point to vulnerable groups…In the Malawi case it was 
devastating for the country because the partners had worked together hard on the 
proposal (Global Fund Executive 2010, interview, Geneva). 
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Shortly after the TRP’s initial decision was submitted to the November 2009 Global Fund 
board meeting for approval, Malawi became the focus of global media attention because 
two men who had participated in a traditional engagement ceremony were imprisoned and 
charged with gross indecency under the penal code. Homosexuality carries a maximum 
sentence of 14 years in Malawi (Nyasa Times, December 30 2009, ‘Not Guilty Gay 
Couple Pleads in Court’).   The men were pardoned in May 2010 after a visit to Malawi by 
Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General of the UN (Nyasa Times, May 29 2010, ‘Malawi 
President Pardons Jailed Gay Couple’).  A diplomatic intervention from the highest level 
of the UN in a country’s domestic legal and social affairs makes evident the political 
weight of the global human rights agenda and in particular the strong interest in advocating 
for the rights of homosexuals.  
To lend some reflective context to these events, p. 276  provides a high level comparison 
of the HIV/AIDS prevention strategies of the three sub-Saharan African countries which 
applied to the Global Fund’s National Strategy Approach learning wave. Of the three, only 
Rwanda succeeded in its application.  As TRP deliberations are private, it’s not possible to 
draw conclusions about their rationale and decision making.  However, from comparing 
these strategies submitted by Malawi, Rwanda and Kenya, some broad observations can be 
made.  For example, all three countries have epidemics in the general population driven by 
discordant couples meaning that one or both people engage in sex with other partners. 
HIV/AIDS prevalence varies with Malawi having the highest at 12% and Rwanda the 
lowest at 3%.  None of the countries has much, or in some cases any, data on vulnerable 
groups such as sex workers and men having sex with men.  Both Rwanda and Kenya 
estimate that 15% of new infections occur in the men having sex with men population, 
while Malawi did not specifically attribute new infections to this group.  Rwanda is the 
only country among the three which outlines its intention to develop programmes with the 
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men having sex with men population and to conduct more research.  Both Malawi and 
Kenya are vague on their specific intentions, citing a cross-cutting approach without a 
specific course of action. From a human rights perspective, Rwanda is the only country 
where homosexuality is legal.  While none of the countries has addressed the human rights 
of vulnerable populations, Rwanda was the only one which included the intentional 
statement that “[u]nderpinning all of these strategies is a commitment to ensuring greater 
participation of members of these [marginalised] groups in assessing their needs, designing 
programs, and advocating for necessary changes in the environment” (Government of 
Rwanda 2009, p. 45).  However, human rights is only one factor--albeit an important one--
on which to assess the economic, social, biomedical, and health system strengths of an 
HIV/AIDS prevention strategy. 
Finally, given the earlier assertion that the TRP’s feedback was a form of activism, it is 
worth considering the progress on human rights for homosexual populations in the 
developed world.  The United States, the Global Fund’s largest donor, decriminalised 
sodomy as recently as 2003 with the ruling in Lawrence et al. v. Texas which stated that 
“…two adults…with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle…[and these p]etitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives them the full right to engage in private conduct without government 
intervention” (FindLaw 2003, ‘Lawrence et al. v. Texas’). There was not a global level 
diplomatic intervention in the political and legal systems of the United States to prevent 
legal persecution of a segment of its population prior to 2003. 
The coincidence of Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application and the diplomatic 
intervention by the UN Secretary General heightened sensitivity towards the TRP’s 
feedback.  At the time research was undertaken in Malawi for this thesis, debate was 
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underway among CCM members about how to change the HIV/AIDS prevention strategy 
for the Round 10 application to the Global Fund.  Given that Malawi’s HIV/AIDS 
response is highly dependent on Global Fund resources there was real and genuine concern 
about the prospect of a failed Round 10 application:
29
 
For this Round 10, there is a lobby to focus more on treatment, because there is a 
concern in the Malawi Government that they will get another rejection.  So they 
said let’s leave out some of the very sensitive areas with these vulnerable groups 
like men having sex with men and prison populations.  It’s all in the prevention 
strategy but maybe they will not include it as much in Round 10.  Because there are 
concerns about issues that are not yet resolved for Malawian society and there is a 
concern that if you make it too ambitious that you will get rejected again.  There is 
a lot at stake for this proposal.  People are nervous about it (NGO Representative 
2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
The feedback from the TRP on Malawi’s prevention strategy for its failed National 
Strategy Application illustrates the influence of Global Fund processes and the 
independent TRP experts on country agenda-setting.  It is a clear example where country 
ownership—country here includes state and non-state and national and global partners--is 
diminished when global politics and in particular a global human rights agenda comes into 
play. 
The Politics of Influence 
Although the CCM is a forum where development partners--which include multilateral and 
bilateral donors and international NGOs--participate in setting the agenda for Malawi’s 
HIV/AIDS response, historically it has not had an influential role (International CCM 
Members 2010, interviews, Lilongwe).  The CCM is one of several health and HIV/AIDS 
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fora in which development partners participate (see Chapter 4 for a description of 
Malawi’s health sector).  Others include the Health Donors Group and technical working 
groups associated with the Health SWAp, the HIV/AIDS Development Group, the 
coordinating mechanisms of the NAC, including the Malawi Partnership Forum and the 
technical working groups and sub-groups that advise the NAC.  At the time of field 
research for this thesis, Malawi’s CCM was chaired by the Secretary to the Treasury and 
included representatives from the OPC, the NAC, multilateral and bilateral donors, 
international NGOs, local NGOs, faith based organisations, and people living with 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria.  In other words, from the point of view of 
representation, the CCM’s composition ticked all of the Global Fund’s boxes.  
In the case of Malawi’s CCM, despite its inclusiveness, in the past there was little 
engagement particularly from national non-state actors.  In part this was due to 
Malawi’s weak civil society as a newly democratic country with a decade’s long legacy 
of authoritarian rule.  One of the CCM members spoke of the challenge of engaging 
civil society: 
It has become quite difficult [to get Malawian civil society voices included in the 
CCM’s deliberations] because the government determines a lot of the things that 
people do and people seem to be patient with government.  When things take time, 
they accept the excuses provided and then the next time, the next time, the next 
time, and then it [has been] ten years (International CCM Member 2010, interview, 
Lilongwe). 
Malawi’s CCM became a forum for elite decision makers:  the NAC and government 
ministries, donors and international NGOs.   
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In terms of…the CCM, the theory is wonderful, but I don’t know of any country 
where in practice it’s a real entity….[Is] the CCM a well-functioning entity that has 
an idea of its roles and responsibilities?  Not really…the CCM gets together when 
it’s called together and people rubber stamp what they need to rubber stamp. Is it 
perceived by its members as a governance institution?  Not really.  A new CCM 
has been constituted just recently.  It’s possible that it could become a governance 
entity, an overseer of what the Global Fund in this country does, it could become 
more of a serious player (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
Because of Malawi’s historic success with Global Fund applications, there was little 
incentive to change its CCM model.  Malawi was also demonstrating significant 
progress in scaling up treatment.  The failed National Strategy Application challenged 
this comfortable status quo. 
Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application had a galvanising effect for CCM 
members providing what has been described by some as a “wake up call” (International 
CCM Member, NGO Representative 2010, interviews, Lilongwe): 
If you look at the National Strategy Application...the government played a 
significant role and we as partners supported that effort and went to bat for them.  
In Round 10 however, it has been a combined dialogue...There’s a greater role for 
the other constituents now in defining the goals and strategies for this Round 10.  
NAC is part and parcel of the discussion, but members other than [the] NAC within 
the CCM were able to define what that package would look like.  This time around 
it was the partners (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
Development partners were on the verge of making the CCM a more active force and 
inclusive forum in agenda setting for Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response, a move away from a 
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highly centralised, government and NAC owned model to one where more and diverse 
interests would have real influence and the broader country ownership dynamic could take 
root. 
Without strong engagement from a broader ‘country forum’ through the CCM, it’s not 
surprising that the TRP’s feedback on Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy related to 
its failed National Strategy Application was influential.  In this case there was the power 
asymmetry inherent in the traditional donor/recipient grant relationship and the long term 
nature of Malawi’s need: 
Because this is a competitive process necessarily [the National Strategy 
Application process], over time what the Global Fund will realise and has started to 
realise is that they have lives at stake when they don’t fund some of these really 
large programmes and Malawi is one of the largest.  And the Global Fund has been 
at the forefront of pushing the value for money movement...And we still need to 
figure out what that really means.  There is value for money, but there is still a lot 
of need out there.  It’s becoming more and more difficult when the TRP makes a 
decision, lives are at stake.  And so now for us it’s do or die for Round 10, literally.  
If we don’t get this, we can’t roll out the WHO 2009 guidelines, and a whole bunch 
of other things are in jeopardy (International CCM Member 2010, interview, 
Lilongwe). 
The Global Fund’s weight as a donor and Malawi’s reliance on its funding to provide 
treatment to almost two thirds of Malawians with advanced HIV/AIDS undoubtedly 
influences Malawi’s HIV/AIDS agenda; however, the TRP’s feedback on Malawi’s 
HIV/AIDS prevention strategy entered a political domain where national and international 
values collided.  Castells (2008, p. 80) characterises this influence as the result of the 
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emergence of an “international public sphere” through which citizens, civil society, and the 
state communicate which creates a “global social-political order” where states “cling to the 
illusion of sovereignty despite the realities wrought by globalization.”  In the case of the 
TRP’s feedback and influence on Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy, it was clearly 
perceived by CCM members as a situation where values embraced in the global sphere 
were imposed on the Malawian context.  As one interviewee posited (UN Representative 
2010, interview, Lilongwe): 
A proposal can be well documented, well written with facts on the ground but if it 
is not addressing what donors want, it can easily wipe out.  So the issues of human 
rights, if they come on their own, it can be a hard way [for them] to penetrate, so 
the best way is [for them] to come in through the back door which is [along with] 
HIV/AIDS. 
In the case of Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application, the agility with which the 
values of the ‘global social-political order’ found their way onto a country agenda, despite 
support from CCM members for the country’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy, may have 
been exacerbated by weaknesses in participation and dialogue within the CCM itself.   
Okuonzi and MacRae (1995, p. 131) describe the dynamic whereby these weaknesses 
unduly favour the global actor:  
The weakness of national fora for discussion, reinforced by the lack of information 
available on the likely outcomes of different policy options, has brought into sharp 
contrast the power of international agencies to control the policy domain. This 
situation has heightened the need for policy partnerships between international and 
national actors, rather than the politics of domination which currently 
predominates.  
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The Global Fund claims, and rightly so, that its investment has positive benefits and a 
“catalytic effect” on country stewardship of HIV programmes (Atun and Kazatchkine 
2009, p. S68); however, the TRP’s influence on Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy 
reveals a more complex dynamic.  Country ownership and evidence-based decision 
making may be the desired methods of governing the HIV/AIDS response at country level, 
but influence comes from sources beyond even the broadly conceptualised and mediated 
space for country ownership; moreover, this influence is not limited to a granting 
relationship and an HIV/AIDS response.  It has a political dimension which exists in an 
international public sphere where defacto global governance emerges (Castells 2008, p. 
89).  In this case a global human rights agenda came into conflict with epidemiological 
evidence and the social and legal constructs in Malawi.  Without a CCM acting as a strong 
‘national public sphere’ Malawi’s ownership of its HIV/AIDS agenda in the face of the 
interests of a ‘global social-political order’ is at best mediated and at worst fails. 
The Double Deficit in External Accountability 
The mediated space for country ownership is problematic when it comes to external 
accountability, or “accountability to people outside the acting entity, whose lives are 
affected by it” (Keohane 2002, pp. 14-15).  (Chapter 3 discussed the Global Fund’s output 
oriented legitimacy and its accountability link).  When the ‘country’ in country ownership 
includes state and non-state and national and international actors, accountability and its 
mechanisms—for what and in whose interests— are difficult to define.  The traditional 
notion of accountability is reflected in Held and Koenig-Archibugi’s (2004, p.127) 
straightforward definition:  
Accountability refers to the fact that decision-makers do not enjoy unlimited 
autonomy but have to justify their actions vis-à-vis affected parties, that is, 
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stakeholders. These stakeholders must be able to evaluate the actions of the 
decision-makers and to sanction them if their performance is poor, for instance by 
removing them from their positions of authority. Thus, effective accountability 
requires mechanisms for steady and reliable information and communication 
between decision-makers and stakeholders as well as mechanisms for imposing 
penalties. 
Similar to Held and Koenig-Archibugi, Bartsch (2007b, pp. 11-13) describes the 
dimensions of accountability relative to GHIs  (or what she calls Global Public Private 
Partnerships) as giving an account (providing information on its activities), taking account 
(providing mechanisms to increase its responsiveness to and participation of stakeholders) 
and being held to account (providing mechanisms which allow for control and sanctions).  
Conceptually, the mechanisms necessary for accountability can be identified, but how 
accountability functions (or doesn’t function)  is much more chaotic and difficult to divine 
when country ownership in a mediated space waters down the rationality of locating 
legitimate authority with the nation state. 
If accountability as it relates to country ownership only concerned itself with the Global 
Fund being accountable to donors and Principal Recipients being accountable to the Global 
Fund, then Held and Koenig-Archibugi’s and Bartsch’s models might suffice.  This 
hierarchical accountability is what Keohane (2002, p. 14) characterises as “internal 
accountability”, a stabilising plumb line.  As discussed earlier, the accountability challenge 
for the Global Fund and for the participants in Malawi’s mediated space for country 
ownership lies in the lack of external accountability. In other words from an external 
accountability perspective, who among those who participate in Malawi’s mediated space 
for country ownership for HIV/AIDS--a space created by the Global Fund--including state 
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and non-state, and national and international actors are accountable to Malawians affected 
by HIV/AIDS and how are they held to account? 
A review of Malawi’s National HIV Prevention Strategy for 2009 to 2013 offers no clues--
accountability is inferred rather than made explicit.  The NAC claims “accountability” for 
its leadership and coordination (National AIDS Commission 2009, p. 41) but there is no 
indication of how this is conferred or sanctioned.  The strategy reflects the devolution of 
health service delivery to the local level by indicating that District AIDS Coordinating 
Committees, Community AIDS Coordinating Committees and Village AIDS Coordinating 
Committees are accountable for planning and implementing local interventions (National 
AIDS Commission 2009, p. 61) but provides no indication of on whose behalf or how they 
are held to account.  The document describes a consultative process for creating the 
strategy involving a range of stakeholders, expert advice from a National Task Force, and 
approval from a National Steering Committee, but there is no explicit indication of what 
this participation infers and whether there is any accountability in the sense of  Bartsch’s 
description of ‘taking account’.  For the most part, roles and responsibilities may be 
identified, but accountability is not ascribed.  For example, the strategy provides targets for 
reducing the incidence and prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the population; however, who is 
accountable for achieving the targets, on whose behalf, and the sanction that could be 
employed or the disincentive that could occur if the targets are not met is not addressed.  
Accountability might be seen to be partially addressed through Global Fund monitoring 
and evaluation requirements, but this is internal accountability to the Global Fund rather 
than laying out an accountability model in a country ownership context.  In Malawi’s 
HIV/AIDS prevention strategy document, answers to questions of who is accountable to 
whom, for what, and with what consequences are not in evidence. 
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From the interviews conducted in Malawi, responses to questions of accountability were, 
not surprisingly, varied. Some maintained that the government is ultimately accountable 
for implementing a successful HIV/AIDS response (International CCM Member 2010, 
interview, Lilongwe). Conversely, another observed that “the government is all for being 
in charge, but don’t ask them to be accountable” (International CCM Member 2010, 
interview, Lilongwe). One development partner described its own accountability for 
effectively responding to the epidemic as shared with government but then retreated from 
this view to say that partners were only facilitating (International CCM Member 2010, 
interview, Lilongwe). This lack of alignment and clarity was echoed by an interviewee at 
global level: 
The whole definition of accountability needs to be turned on its head in terms of 
donors.  We always write this into programme agreements—all partners will be 
accountable—but what does this mean?  What are the indicators?  There is a 
missing link that we are not able to have a legally enforceable accountability 
system that holds accountable the Global Fund, the WHO and [iNGOs] for that 
matter.  The population has no way to ensure their rights.  The same for national 
governments—it’s different to expect something other than aspirations – what are 
the obligations?  It’s not easy to hold governments to account.  Most African 
nations haven’t met the Abuja targets for health (NGO Representative 2010, 
Interview, Geneva). 
The challenge of external accountability is broader than Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention 
strategy.  As Stone (2008, p. 23) observes in relation to transnational policy communities,  
[o]ne outcome of this disjuncture [that economic globalisation and regional 
integration are proceeding at a much faster pace than processes of global 
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government] is that the power of the nation-state has been reduced or reconfigured 
without a corresponding development of international institutional cooperation. 
This is one of the major causes of a deficiency of public goods at global levels.  
It can be argued that this disjuncture could also cause a deficiency of public goods at 
country level, where accountability for developing, implementing and funding an effective, 
evidence-based HIV/AIDS prevention strategy is not defined and therefore neither are the 
sanctions to enforce it. 
Scholars describing governance and accountability within and across webs of actors 
beyond the traditional confines of the state have largely focused on describing some 
feature or form of global governance (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2004, p. 194; Slaughter 
2004a, p.160; Grant and Keohane 2005, p. 29; Stone 2008, p. 20).  In contrast, Grant and 
Keohane (2005, p. 34) question the existence of a juridical or sociological global public 
and instead rely on a “clearly defined public” in democratic nations in order to provide 
“the responses to the fundamental questions about accountability.”  In both instances, the 
focus is on the global sphere and the presumption of a clearly defined public.  The 
existence of a ‘national public sphere’ particularly a mediated space for country ownership 
is neglected.   
If indeed the TRP’s feedback to Malawi on its evidence-based HIV/AIDS prevention 
strategy was a form of activism as one interviewee suggested then Malawians affected by 
HIV/AIDS or those who could be affected in the future have no mechanism to hold 
decision makers-- the CCM, the independent TRP members and the Global Fund board--to 
account.  The only sanction Malawians affected by HIV/AIDS have is through democratic 
process, but the mediated space for country ownership means that the ‘national public 
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sphere’ is not entirely public or entirely democratic.  Scholte (2004, p. 212) points out the 
inadequacy of democratic accountability when national and global interests are in play:  
…relationships between national governments and global governance agencies 
have mainly flowed through unelected technocrats who lack any direct connection 
with citizens. Moreover, governments have on the whole intervened with global 
governance institutions only in respect of broad policy lines, leaving the suprastate 
bodies with considerable unchecked prerogative in operational activities. In short, 
then, the conventional statist formula of democratic accountability does not suffice 
in relation to present-day expanded global governance. 
The mediated space for country ownership that plays out through the Global Fund’s CCM 
has practical advantages in theory, broadening the involvement and stake of many partners 
in order to tackle a country’s HIV/AIDS response.  But it comes with a serious double 
deficit in external accountability.  First it ignores the power asymmetry in the 
donor/recipient relationship between the Global Fund, the largess of its contribution to aid 
reliant and HIV/AIDS endemic Malawi, and Malawi’s long term arc of need.  It also 
ignores the separation between Malawians affected by HIV/AIDS and those involved in 
agenda setting and decision making at country level in the absence of the boundaries 
provided by the legitimate authority of the nation state.  The Global Fund’s global and 
country level governance models serve the Global Fund’s internal accountability model 
well.  But where external accountability is concerned not only does the Global Fund 
created mediated space for country ownership exacerbate the external accountability gap, 
but the TRP’s influence, apparent activism and absence of accountability to ‘country 
owners’ only serves to intensify it.  At the feet of this failure in external accountability are 
the Malawians who are at risk because they are reliant or will become reliant on ARV 
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treatment procured with Global Fund resources.  The politics of prevention has a long-term 
effect:   
…increasing mortality among the most economically active members of African 
societies translates into low adult productivity a generation or two later. The net 
effect of an AIDS-depleted society is a challenge to development resulting from the 
potential-hollowed states and social networks.  For these reasons, HIV/AIDS may 
well pose the gravest threat to socio-political and –economic development in 
Africa (Poku 2005, p. 11). 
4. Conclusion 
The term ‘country ownership’ is conceptually convenient providing a soothing antidote to 
the legacy of structural adjustment and signalling the emergence of a new aid architecture 
as laid out in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda.  However, in practice the Global 
Fund’s CCM model creates a mediated space for country ownership where ‘country’ 
includes actors beyond the state, both national and international.  The rational force at play 
does not come from technical efforts at effecting a new aid architecture; rather it is 
inherent in the old-fashioned donor/recipient power asymmetry between the Global Fund’s 
authority, its performance-based funding and its internal accountability and an aid reliant, 
HIV/AIDS endemic country like Malawi.  This accountability plumb line stabilises the 
interplay among diverse interests, new and distributed authorities and multiple 
constituencies in the mediated space for country ownership.  It also gives rise to a double 
deficit in external accountability. 
Malawi’s 2009-2013 HIV/AIDS prevention strategy places the country’s challenge in stark 
human terms:  “While the national ART [anti-retroviral] programme has been successful in 
scaling-up antiretroviral therapy (ART) to about 200,000 Malawians by end December 
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2008, the number of new infections estimated at 90,000 per year continues to outpace the 
number of people starting ART each year” (National AIDS Commission 2009, p. 8).  As 
the case of Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application and the feedback from the TRP 
on its accompanying HIV/AIDS prevention strategy points out, country ownership may be 
advocated by the Global Fund, but this principle can be overlooked when a human rights 
agenda and the interests of a ‘global social-political order’ enter the deliberation; 
furthermore, the principle of country ownership does nothing to reflect the chaotic and in 
Malawi’s case elite nature of the mediated space in which this ownership exists or the 
problematic double deficit in external accountability that arises.   
Global governance scholars largely leave out the ‘country’ space in favour of a 
transnational or transgovernmental level analysis; this glosses over the limitations of the 
Global Fund’s own internal accountability which accrues to its donors and the problems of 
external accountability in a mediated space for country ownership.  The implications of the 
TRP’s feedback on Malawi’s evidence-based HIV/AIDS prevention strategy are that the 
challenge of a double deficit in external accountability is more than a philosophical issue.  
For Malawians affected by HIV/AIDS or those reliant on the implementation of an 
evidence-based HIV/AIDS prevention strategy, there are no mediated spaces between life 
and death.  
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Chapter 6 -  The Global Fund and Country Ownership - The Weak 
Authority-Accountability Link 
1. Introduction 
For a year now we’ve been doing crisis management.  A key issue which we 
continually educate patients on is adherence, adherence, adherence [to their anti-
retroviral drug regimen].  We’ve proven that adherence in rural communities can 
be as good as the developed world.  But now with this situation [stock outs of anti-
retrovirals] …we are contradicting ourselves.  And the patients know because 
we’ve told them continuously that they risk developing resistance [to the 
effectiveness of the drugs].  They know the dangers.  It makes them unhappy and 
doubtful about how things will continue--that maybe one day the medicine will not 
be there (Health Care Worker 2010, interview, Zomba). 
Chapter 1 began with recounting the failure of the international community to mobilise a 
response to HIV/AIDS when it was first recognised and the scale of the pandemic that 
resulted:   60 million people have been infected with HIV and nearly 30 million people 
have died of HIV/AIDS related causes.  In 2011, 4% of the approximately 22 million 
people living with HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa had access to treatment (UNAIDS 
2010d, p. 23).  Despite this bleak account, in Malawi as outlined in Chapter 4, progress has 
been made with almost 26% of the estimated 920,000 Malawians living with HIV/AIDS 
accessing treatment (UNAIDS 2010f, ‘Malawi’).  But headline results are not the whole 
story and they belie the messy reality of implementation and implementation failures on 
the front lines.   
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As described in Chapter 5 Malawi’s failed 2009 National Strategy Application which 
would have supported a continued scale up of the country’s HIV/AIDS response came 
about in part because the Global Fund’s TRP challenged Malawi’s evidence-based 
HIV/AIDS Prevention Strategy.  The failure of Malawi’s CCM’s National Strategy 
Application revealed a double deficit in external accountability, where Malawians affected 
by HIV/AIDS could not hold to account the CCM actors in the Global Fund created 
mediated space for country ownership, nor could they or the CCM hold to account the TRP 
whose decision making was described as a form of activism.  The stock outs of anti-
retrovirals in Malawi in 2009 and 2010 were a different type of failure, a failure of a drug 
financing and supply system.  The 2009 stock outs were a result of delays in signing the 
Global Fund Rolling Continuation Channel grant which in turn delayed drug orders.  When 
stocks of drugs were low again in 2010, “no funding from the Sector Wide Approach 
(SWAp) was allocated to bridge the gap, nor did any of the individual health donors step in 
to assist” (Médicins Sans Frontières 2010, p. 27).  As a result, some patients had to change 
their anti-retroviral drug combinations, putting them at risk for developing resistance to the 
drugs.  In addition patients were given two weeks of pills instead of two months, 
increasing transportation costs and consequently the likelihood treatment would be 
interrupted or stopped as well as increasing the workload for already burdened health 
workers (Médicins Sans Frontières 2010, p. 27).  When global and country level systems 
fail the people who they intend to serve, how are those in authority held to account and by 
whom?   
The discussion that follows begins by looking at the basis for legitimate authority beyond 
the state, the legitimising nature of the Global Fund’s ‘publicness’ and the contrast with its 
internal accountability to and influence of wealthy and powerful states.  It makes a case for 
the Global Fund’s growing authority as an innovative and quickly maturing international 
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institution.  At global level, its growing authority is evidenced by its leadership in health 
systems strengthening.  At country level its growing authority is evidenced by its adoption 
of a National Strategy Approach.  Finally, the chapter turns to the problem of the 
dislocation between the loci for authority and accountability which is both exacerbated and 
obscured by the ‘publicness’ of the Global Fund’s authority and its rapid rise.  In the words 
of one interviewee (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe), “[t]he big 
question is whether the Global Fund is set up for this type of burden of responsibility.  And 
I would argue that it is probably not.” 
2. Authority and the Demise of the Public/Private Dichotomy  
The forces of globalisation have created forms of legitimate authority beyond the state 
(Ruggie 2004, p. 504; Pattberg 2005, p. 591), where “[a]s long as there is consent and 
social recognition, an actor –even a private actor – can be accorded the rights, the 
legitimacy, and the responsibilities of an authority” (Biersteker and Hall 2002, p. 204). 
This discussion will not delve into the robust and complex literature on sovereignty and 
authority or exhaust the many forms of authority which scholars posit such as that derived 
through moral claims or expertise (Hall and Biersteker 2002, p. 4).  Rather, it will explore 
the nature of legitimate authority beyond states and in particular the legitimating 
‘publicness’ of the Global Fund’s authority contrasting it with the influence of and its 
internal accountability to wealthy and powerful states.  
Chapter 3 outlined broad themes in the literature on legitimacy making the case for the 
Global Fund’s innovative institutional design as new sources of legitimacy distinct from 
those of traditional multilaterals.  It discussed the dislocation that arises when legitimacy 
cannot rely on the realist-positivist idea of authority of the nation state and state-governed 
global institutions or as Stone (2008, p. 26) describes when “[a]genda setting is more 
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contested, externalized beyond the nation-state, and open to the input and disruption of a 
variety of political agents.”  In the context of globalisation and an emerging post-
Westphalian order, Ruggie (2004, p. 519) argues that authority lies in a new global public 
domain, “…an institutionalized arena of discourse, contestation, and action organized 
around the production of global public goods…[which] is constituted by interactions 
among non-state actors as well as states.”   This new global public domain fundamentally 
challenges “…the liberal conception of the public/private distinction [which] turns 
fundamentally on the separation between the administrative state and civil society—one 
dichotomy being mapped to the other” (Weintraub 1997, p. 14).   Geuss (2001, p. 6) takes 
things a step further suggesting “letting go” of the dissolved liberal distinction and instead 
accepting a “series of overlapping contrasts.”  Similarly Bozeman and Bretschneider 
(1994, p. 199) advocate for what they call a “dimensional” analysis, examining the 
implications of Geuss’ dissolution on external political authority rather than clinging to 
attempts to assign it a ‘publicness’ or ‘privateness’. The neat lines once demarcating public 
from private authority are blurred and the challenge lies in determining how new 
boundaries are being drawn and who it is who is drawing them (Krieger 1977, p. 256). 
As Bozeman and Bretschneider suggest, the demise of the liberal distinction, or what 
Weintraub (1997, p. 14-15) colourfully terms “procrustean dualism”, leaves open to 
description the nature of the authorities that are emerging in what has been a 
predominantly liberal conceived public domain.  According to Hall and Biersteker (2002, 
p. 5), “[t]he state is no longer the sole, or in some instances even the principal, source of 
authority, in either the domestic arena or in the international system.”  Cutler (1999, p. 73) 
argues the case for political authority that comes with the porousness of economic 
exchange:   
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The challenge [in locating and identifying authority globally] lies in depicting 
authority in a late-capitalist and post-modern world where "political" authority 
ostensibly stops at the territorial borders of the state, while "economic" relations do 
not. Liberalism masks the "political" nature of these economic exchanges and 
obscures the extent to which the territorial state has ceased to run coextensively 
with the "right to rule" or is definitive of and constitutive of political authority. 
In Bull’s (2010, p. 227) view, concern over whether authority gained through 
representation in international organisations--including the Global Fund--is public or 
private is eclipsed by another--the extent of concentration of representation among 
individual members of the global elite or the coalescing of an elite authority.  These 
propositions highlight the many dimensions of emerging authorities and the declining 
dominance of authority associated predominantly with the state. Stone (2008, p. 22) 
describes these new public spaces as the “global agora,” 
…[which] makes no presumptions about the communicative, progressive, or 
deliberative character of institutional or network interactions. The dynamics for 
exclusion, seclusion, and division are just as likely. A “global agora” encompasses 
a wider array of political relationships inspired by liberal democracy through to 
coercive arrangements of strong authoritarianism, as well as to patterns of disorder, 
randomness, and an absence of rational imposition of planning. 
In other words, the liberal conception of the public/private distinction has not only 
dissolved but the result is a chaotic array of political relationships vying for authority 
which are likely to lie outside the comfortable boundaries of sovereignty.  This 
authoritative disorder presents advantage for those who can lay claim to territory in a 
contested space. 
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The ‘Publicness’ of the Global Fund’s Authority 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Global Fund has derived its legitimacy from sources distinct 
from those of traditional multilateral institutions like the WHO, namely through its 
inclusive governance at global and country levels, its transparency and performance-based 
funding and the scale of its resource mobilisation and distribution.  These sources of 
legitimacy are subject to claims of ‘publicness’.  According to Hurd (1999, p. 381), “[t]o 
the extent that a state accepts some international rule or body as legitimate, that rule or 
body becomes an “authority””; further, the Global Fund’s claims that inclusive governance 
and transparency in particular facilitate participation in decision making by non-state 
actors amplifies the normative claim to ‘publicness’ of its authority where there exists “a 
fusion of power with legitimate social purpose” (Ruggie 1982, p. 382).   
Conferring a ‘publicness’ on the Global Fund’s authority not only diverges from its 
governance model which departs from the ‘doctrine of sovereignty’ but also contrasts with 
its strong internal accountability model which accrues to wealthy and powerful states.  By 
its own definition the Global Fund is a public/private partnership (The Global Fund 2010a, 
‘About the Global Fund’), yet, as Chapter 3 establishes, although its distinct sources of 
legitimacy may have normative and legitimating public qualities seen as being “by the 
people” (Scharpf 1999, p. 2), they remain output-oriented.  This output orientation 
supports the Global Fund’s strong internal accountability model which accrues to the 
donor governments who provide its financing, and as noted in Chapter 2, to its largest 
funder, the United States. Not only does this suggest an elite authority, it may as Bull 
(2010, p. 227) claims, “tilt agendas toward the priorities of the elite.” This suggests a 
model where authority ‘over’ is ultimately exercised by wealthy and  powerful states, but 
the authority ‘given’—for what and by whom--is much less clear.  This is in part due to the 
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mediated space for county ownership created by the Global Fund which, as demonstrated 
by the case of Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application, constitutes the first part of a 
double deficit in external accountability.  The second part is constituted by a failure in 
external accountability by the Global Fund’s TRP.  An interviewee familiar with the drug 
stock out situation in Malawi described failures attributed to the ‘authorities’ involved: 
With the delay in signing the RCC [the Global Fund Rolling Continuation Channel 
grant which is the primary grant for HIV/AIDS in Malawi], all the funding 
stopped.  There was no overstock in the supply chain—only 1.5 months in the 
whole country.  The challenge with UNICEF [at the time UNICEF was running 
Malawi’s HIV/AIDS drug procurement and supply chain] is that they will not 
move anything until the money hits their account, so any administrative delay has a 
huge impact...NAC didn’t want to say there was a problem.  They tried to get 
money from other donors to buy buffer stock…Donors then say that if the 
government hasn’t said there is a problem, then there is no problem.  The 
government is afraid that there might be negative consequences for the rest of the 
negotiations [for the release of Global Fund money].  The Global Fund also denies 
that there is a problem (NGO Representative 2010, interview, Geneva). 
The ‘publicness’ conferred on the Global Fund’s authority is at odds with the power 
asymmetry inherent and the coercion implied in a traditional donor/recipient relationship 
(Hurd 1999, p. 386).  While authority ‘over’ and the power of wealthy and powerful states 
is clear, the ‘giving’ of authority—how and by whom---is much less so as is the 
accountability that might go with it, particularly when failures occur. 
The next section will explore the rapid rise in the Global Fund’s authority.  It will look at 
how the Global Fund derives its legitimate authority from its bureaucracy particularly in 
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the eyes of donor governments and global partners and through the changes in social 
relations that have occurred through its country level governance model.  The section will 
argue that the Global Fund’s expansion into health systems strengthening and its National 
Strategy Approach are evidence of its expanding scope of authority and power.  This 
expanded authority further exacerbates the Global Fund’s weak authority-external 
accountability link. 
3. The Global Fund’s Authority:  A Rapid Rise 
Authority and Bureaucracy 
Weber (1947, pp. 330-1) characterised bureaucracy as a relationship between obedience 
and authority, where rational legal authority is “a continuous organization of official 
functions bound by rules…” within a “specified sphere of competence…” that “follow[s] 
the principle of hierarchy...”  Barnett and Finnemore (2004, p.3) soften the edges of 
Weber’s rational conception to define bureaucracy—in which they include international 
institutions as a form of bureaucracy--as a “distinctive social form of authority with its 
own internal logic and behavioral proclivities.”  Despite associating bureaucracy with 
social forms of authority, Barnett and Finnemore do not abandon rationality.  They 
describe the exercise of bureaucratic authority as derived in part from its “ability to make 
impersonal rules” and maintain that “because of their authority…bureaucracies have 
autonomy and the ability to change the world around them” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 
p.3). Similar to Weber, Barnett and Finnemore argue that bureaucratic authority, including 
that of international institutions, relies on more than the exercise of ‘impersonal rules’. 
Bureaucratic authority is conferred through legitimacy: 
Bureaucracy is powerful and commands deference, not in its own right, but 
because of the values it claims to embody and the people it claims to serve. IOs 
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[international organisations] cannot simply say, “we are bureaucracies; do what we 
say.”  To be authoritative, ergo powerful, they must be seen to serve some valued 
and legitimate social purpose, and, further, they must be seen to serve that purpose 
in an impartial and technocratic way using their impersonal rules….Bureaucracies 
always serve some social purpose or set of cultural values, even when they are 
shrouded in myths of impartiality or value-neutral technocracy (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004, p.21). 
Bureaucracy applied to international institutions can be seen as a form of authority which 
is conferred a ‘publicness’ or “a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose” (Ruggie 
1982, p. 382). However, regardless of the normative force of legitimate social purpose, the 
term ‘bureaucracy’ does not always infer social or humanitarian benefit.  It can also be 
used to imply negative characteristics associated with inefficiency and unresponsiveness—
the downside of the exercise of impersonal rules. 
The Global Fund’s distinct sources of legitimacy--in particular its inclusive governance at 
global level and its performance-based funding--underpin its bureaucratic authority. The 
Global Fund’s inclusive governance model was an attempt to address what was perceived 
as a breakdown in the ability of bureaucratic international institutions to adapt and respond 
to the complex nature of their ‘publics’ beyond states  due to their inefficiency, weak 
transparency and poor deliberative engagement with national and transnational civil 
society (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2004, p. 194; Nanz and Steffek 2004, p. 319; Castells 
2008, p. 88; Sridhar, Khagram and Pang 2009, pp. 7-8; Cooper, Kirton and Stevenson 
2009, p. 5).  At global level, the Global Fund’s board provided a new model and set of 
rules by including non-state actors in governance and emphasising transparency implying 
that broader participation in decision making is possible.  In addition to these normative 
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claims, the Global Fund’s performance-based funding, a highly rational tracking of 
investments and results was seen by donor governments to be an improvement on the 
accountability practised by UN organisations and an incentive to invest in the Global Fund 
(Wallace Brown 2009, p. 170).  Its sources of legitimacy tell a normative story about the 
Global Fund’s inclusiveness, transparency and accountability and provide “binding norms” 
and “rational rules” (Weber 1947, pp. 954) that were envisioned as departures from the 
poorly functioning bureaucracy of the UN.  As discussed previously, claims associated 
with inclusiveness and transparency in particular confer a ‘publicness’ on the Global 
Fund’s authority. 
The Global Fund has had a remarkably quick ascent in terms of its size and the resources it 
commands.  At inception, the rationale for the creation of the Global Fund outside the UN 
system was that it would escape the negative connotations associated with UN bureaucracy 
and the participation of private actors in its governance would bring a market discipline 
(implying efficiency) with its hybrid organisational form (Buse and Walt 2000a, p. 552; 
Buse 2004, p. 225). Despite the intention to avoid the vices of bureaucracy and claim the 
virtues of efficiency, the Global Fund has matured organisationally so that by early 2011, it 
had a staff complement of 568 (The Global Fund 2011e, ‘Secretariat’), and had mobilised 
just over US$30 bn (The Global Fund 2011c, ‘Pledges and Contributions’) for distribution 
to 150 countries (The Global Fund 2011b, ‘Grant Portfolio’). The Global Fund was 
intended to be the antithesis of a bureaucratic UN organisation, but its legitimacy and its 
normative ‘publicness’ has contributed to its organisational maturation towards a 
bureaucratic form, a “rationally regulated” authority” (Weber 1922, p. 954), laying claim 
to territory once the exclusive domain of multilaterals governed by the ‘doctrine of 
sovereignty’. 
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The Global Fund’s Growing Global Level Authority: Health Systems Strengthening and 
the Health Eight 
The Global Fund’s organisational maturation, bureaucratisation and the accompanying 
growth in its authority among global health leaders is evident in the role it has taken 
globally in health systems strengthening.  Health systems strengthening is an expansion of 
the Global Fund’s initial mandate to provide vertical funding for three diseases and an area 
in which the WHO and the World Bank have traditionally laid normative and financial 
claim respectively.  Despite the attention given to the health systems strengthening agenda 
at global level, in Malawi the focus remains access to treatment, a disconnect from the 
territorial manoeuvring at global level.  
As described in Chapter 2, the WHO’s leadership at global level has waxed and waned 
over more than 60 years.  It has largely been seen as a technical and convening 
organisation, with the expertise to research and set standards and guidelines (Lee 2009, p. 
103).  Its role as the ‘leading health organisation’ however is predicated on supporting its 
technical capacity with its ability to promote cooperation among state and non-state actors 
(Zacher and Keefe 2008, p. 97; Kickbusch 2009, p. 328; Lee 2009, p. 10) to drive 
normative agendas such as the Alma-Ata Declaration of “health as a fundamental human 
right” (World Health Organization 1978, p. 1).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the early 1990s the WHO’s global health leadership role was 
eclipsed by the World Bank.  The Bank overrode the WHO’s ‘health for all’ social justice 
values with its 1993 World Development Report which advocated a neoliberal economic 
approach to health and argued for greater efficiencies and a more prominent role for the 
private sector (Brown, Cueto and Fee 2006, p. 68, Zacher and Keefe 2008, p. 97, 
Kickbusch 2009, p. 327; Lee 2009, pp. 111-2).  Moreover, by 1995 the World Bank was 
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“the largest single source of external funding for health” (World Bank 1993, p. 166). But 
despite their respective normative and financial strengths, by the late 1990s the health 
leadership roles of the WHO and of the World Bank were challenged by the emergence of 
other actors with an interest in the health agenda: 
Alongside WHO has emerged a multiplicity of players...The World Bank maintains 
a prominent place because of its unrivalled financial resources and policy 
influence. Regional organizations, such as the European Union, and other UN 
organizations (e.g. UNICEF, UNDP, and UNFPA) retain health as an important 
component of their work…The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO) approach health 
from an economic and trade perspective. Varied civil society groups, such as 
consumer groups, social movements and research institutions, also make 
substantial contributions to health development. Finally, the growth of private 
sector actors in health, within and across countries, is notable (Dodgson, Lee and 
Drager, 2002, p. 11). 
By the beginning of the new millennium, the global health landscape had transformed from 
one with leadership by a few to one with a range of actors, the Global Fund prominent 
among them.  Global level leadership in health was no longer the exclusive domain of the 
WHO and the World Bank.  
Within this newly populated landscape, health systems strengthening emerged as a focus 
and point of discussion for G8 leaders at the 2008 Toyako Summit (Miyata 2008, p. 1).  
Health systems strengthening came to the fore because of some of the unintended 
consequences of disease-focused programmes which included, for recipient countries, an 
array of uncoordinated programmes with significant funds and  multiple donors, increased 
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costs of servicing these  programmes and increased demand on the capacity of already 
strained health ministries, and skewed incentives for health professionals to work in better-
funded disease programmes, rather than in primary care (Takemi and Reich 2009, p. 10-
11).  For G8 governments, it was becoming evident that improvements in health systems 
were necessary in order for their commitments to and investments in disease focused 
programmes like that of the Global Fund to have their intended effects and for the health 
MDGs to be achieved.  As a consequence, there was nervousness among vertically 
oriented programmes like the Global Fund about shifts in global resources to health 
systems (Takemi and Reich 2009, p. 10). 
As described in Chapter 2, in 2009, the Global Fund and the GAVI Alliance made a bold 
claim to global leadership in health systems strengthening.  The Global Fund and the 
GAVI Alliance wrote to the IHP+ Co-Chairs, then-United Kingdom Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown and then-President of the World Bank Robert Zoellick to advise of their 
intention to underpin their leadership in health system investment with a joint 
programming approach for health systems strengthening (Lob-Levyt and Kazatchkine, 
2009).  Subsequent to staking their claim, the Global Fund and GAVI worked with the 
World Bank to “…establish in an inclusive manner the operational, financial and policy 
implications for joint HSS [health systems strengthening] funding and programming” (The 
Global Fund 2010i, ‘Report of the 13th Meeting of the Policy and Strategy Committee’).  
Two relatively new players in global health made an authoritative leadership claim to what 
had previously been the domain of the WHO and the World Bank; moreover, it was 
territory that lay outside the original purview of both organisations.  
It would be misleading to think that the Global Fund and GAVI’s move was without 
contest or was a fait accompli.  Their assertion of authority in health systems strengthening 
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remains contentious.  “If you hadn’t had that letter [the Lob-Levyt and Kazatchkine letter], 
and kept on with the original initiative [we would be on our way to] producing a half way 
decent approach [to] getting everyone aligned.  As it is we’ve been diverted into some 
structural mess which has no obvious signs of resolution” (UN Executive 2009, interview, 
Geneva). 
In addition to asserting its authority among traditional international institutions and 
claiming ownership of health systems strengthening, the Global Fund’s growth in authority 
associated with its bureaucratic size and weight is evident through its inclusion as one of 
the Health Eight (H8), the other members of whom are the WHO, the World Bank, 
UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, GAVI and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.  The 
Health Eight is described as a “meeting of global health leaders [that] resembles the 
meeting of global political leaders…providing communication, collaboration, and 
consensus building on global health policy, including interactions with the G8” (Takemi 
and Reich 2009, p. 14-15).  The composition of the Health Eight demonstrates the extent to 
which global health leadership has moved beyond traditional international institutions.  It 
includes a private foundation and two GHIs, none of which are governed by states.  The 
Health Eight’s relationship to the G8 signals its political gravitas as well as what Reich and 
Takemi (2009, p. 15) describe as a “power shift…[and] restructuring [of] the architecture 
of global health policymaking.”   
The Global Fund’s role in this restructured architecture of global health policymaking 
along with its political influence is critical for its resource mobilisation; however, its 
quickly won authority and expanding mandate are amplified at country level.  As the stock 
out of anti-retroviral drugs in Malawi shows, the Global Fund’s processes and decision 
making have very real effects on the ground, not all of which are positive:   
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In terms of the IHP+ and HSS [health systems strengthening] platform, in my view 
it’s completely irrelevant.  I don’t think the Global Fund is set up to work on HSS, 
to work in a SWAp [sector-wide approach] environment…It’s a rather dangerous 
irrelevance because it has taken our dialogue away from …grant management and 
issues on the ground…The biggest responsibility of the Global Fund is ART [anti-
retroviral] delivery…In Malawi well over 210,000 people’s lives are dependent on 
Global Fund grants…It’s not the type of situation where you can start bickering or 
delaying over condition precedents not being met...The big question is whether the 
Global Fund is set up for this type of burden of responsibility.  And I would argue 
that it is probably not (International CCM Member 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
There is clearly a tension between the initial mandate of the Global Fund as a financing 
mechanism for three diseases, its design which supports this mandate and its evolved 
authority, which can be said to be taking the Global Fund away from its original mission.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, Kazatchkine, the Global Fund’s Executive Director from 2007 
to 2012, noted the tension between the ‘treatment mortgage’ for donor governments and 
the dependence of millions who receive ARV treatment from Global Fund resources. To 
be seen to manage funds effectively through performance based funding does not equip the 
Global Fund to respond to very real humanitarian and ethical questions where millions of 
lives, or ‘communities of fate’, depend on its granting and grant administration decisions.   
The Global Fund’s legitimacy, particularly its inclusive governance and its transparency 
and performance-based funding, have contributed to its rapid maturation and its authority 
associated with its bureaucratic size and weight.  This in turn signals its claim to global 
level territory in health systems strengthening and its policy and political influence among 
health leaders including the WHO and the World Bank; moreover, this authority is 
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mutually reinforcing in the sense that the creation of the Health Eight is itself recognition 
that the landscape has changed and new members with non-traditional sources of authority 
are now a part of the global health leadership ‘club’.  Nevertheless, at country level, the 
story can play out differently where an expanded mandate risks diluting focus on the 
Global Fund’s core role which in Malawi is to provide funding for the purchase of anti-
retrovirals.  The global level politics of claiming territory in health systems strengthening 
is a long way from expanding treatment to Malawians in need.  The Global Fund’s growth 
in global level authority and its country level burden of responsibility are out of step. 
Authority and Social Relations 
In contrast to the impersonal nature of bureaucratic authority, Weber (1922, p. 1006) 
identified patriarchalism as a social form of authority derived largely through personal 
loyalty. The rational elements of social forms of authority lie in social ‘rules’ or customs 
and their normative elements in the beliefs that bind people to these traditions. Weber 
(1922, p. 1020) argued that normative nature of this authority is “rooted in the belief that 
the ruler’s powers are legitimate insofar as they are traditional.”   
While authority associated with the Global Fund’s bureaucratic size and weight may be the 
domain of international institutions, Hyden (2008, p. 12) argues that socially-based 
authority and informal institutions in particular play a significant role in the African 
context: 
Together [formal and informal institutions]…shape the articulation of power. That 
is why in Africa, power is not always legitimized by authority, i.e. legitimized 
power stemming from constitutions, laws or procedures. It comes as often from 
conventions, customs and other beliefs with roots in African society. 
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In other words, social forms of authority matter; further, despite the negative connotations 
with ‘poor governance’ associated with what is described as neo-patrimonialism, in 
African states this form of authority can be accompanied by strong economic performance 
(Kelsall 2011, p. 84).   So there is a tension between the embedded and beneficial nature of 
social forms of authority and its negative aspects which can mean that formal rules are 
flouted and leaders “personalize their power and avoid accountability” (Khan 2005, p. 
714). Where states are fragile, the negative attributes of social forms of authority can 
emerge. 
In the case of Malawi, the fragile nature of its state authority arises due to several factors.  
First, as discussed in Chapter 4, Malawi is a new democracy where the exercise of political 
power remains volatile, giving rise to the potential for “[t]he parochialisation of the 
political realm…[where] due to an absence of effective structures of autonomy and 
strength to check corruption, the governing elite of most African states have engaged in 
high and sometimes egregious levels of corruption” (Poku and Sandkjaer 2007, p. 12). 
Second, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, among the state and parastatal organisations 
involved in setting the HIV/AIDS agenda and overseeing the significant funds that the 
Global Fund has awarded, ‘internal’ politics and as discussed in Chapter 5 the sway of  
elites to hold power over the national agenda are alive and well.  Lastly, the very nature of 
Malawi’s HIV/AIDS epidemic is a threat.  Poku and Sandkjaer (2007, p. 23) describe this 
effect as, 
…a downward spiral wherein the epidemic relentlessly reduces state capacity, even 
as the state requires ever-increasing capacity to stop the growing epidemic.  The 
structures of government remain, but the ability to govern is diminished…It [a 
‘hollow state’] implies a weak state relying largely on the support of those who 
receive some benefit from its existence.  Finally, it implies a form of governance in 
 237 
which the state is unable to adequately interact with citizens through its 
institutions. 
The ‘intractable circumstances’ described in Chapter 4, create vulnerabilities for Malawi’s 
exercise of state authority in the interests of its citizenry, reinforces the influence of an 
elite enclave in agenda setting for HIV/AIDs and creates the potential for the negative 
aspects of social forms of authority to take hold. 
The Global Fund’s country level governance through its CCMs is a hybridised authority 
model.  On the one hand it overrides socially-based authority through its bureaucratic 
approach based on formal institutions and impersonal rules, but it also creates a type of 
social authority through its elite national and transnational character.   CCMs’ bureaucratic 
practices may discourage corruption or misuse of resources and promote the CCM as a 
participative forum in which state and non-state and national and international actors come 
together to jointly set an agenda for action, apply for Global Fund grants and oversee 
programme outcomes.  Along these lines, Khan (2005, p. 714) argues that the role of 
democracy in modern developing countries is to undermine the authority of personal rule 
and “…[drive] the emergence of capitalism.” By depersonalising authority, opening a 
space for discourse beyond the state and exercising transparency, CCMs represent a 
substantial (or potential) counter to neo-patrimonial authority.   
The authority exercised by CCMs aligns with the orthodoxy and intuitive benefits of ‘good 
governance’ promoted by international institutions, but it also promotes a social form of 
authority prevalent in the environments in which they function, in particular the elite 
nature of agenda setting that was observed in Malawi (see Chapter 5).  As Hyden (2008, p. 
17) observes: 
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…the basis of power in Africa is bifurcated. It is made up of, on the one hand, a 
small enclave-like set of actors dominated by transnational corporations and 
diplomats adhering to formal rules and, on the other, a myriad of relations of 
dependence stemming from social structures that have yet to modernize and still 
rely on informal institutions. There are few, if any, linkages between these two 
spheres which is a main explanatory factor behind Africa’s lack of development. 
In Malawi, the Global Fund’s inclusive governance model resembles Hyden’s “enclave-
like set of actors”, a form of authority that is bureaucratic, but also elite in nature. 
According to Mason (2004, p. 2),  
[t]he reconfiguration of social, political, and economic structures on a global scale 
loosens the container-like qualities of states, and entails a correlative shift toward 
global loci of authority and the legitimation of nonstate polities with domestic 
constituencies. At the same time, these special alterations involve the 
intensification of subnational forms of territorial organization. 
The Global Fund’s inclusive governance at country level is one manifestation of 
‘territorial organization’ through bureaucratic authority favoured by international 
institutions.  The CCM’s emphasis on deliberation and oversight on the one hand 
undermines as Khan suggests patrimonial or socially-based authority which can be 
viewed as ‘poor governance’ or at worst, corruption countering the risks of weakened 
capacity in vulnerable states.  On the other hand it replaces it with what Bull (2010, p. 
221) might describe as transnational elite empowered by Mason’s “legitimation of 
nonstate polities with domestic constituencies.” The Global Fund’s governance model 
at country level is a hybridised exercise of social authority that undermines the 
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patrimonial power of individual leaders and supplants it with an elite national and 
transnational forum. 
The Global Fund’s Growing Country Level Authority: National Strategies  
The Global Fund’s adoption of its National Strategy Approach was argued by one Global 
Fund Executive to be the biggest reform in the Global Fund’s history (Global Fund 
Executive 2009, interview, Geneva).  (Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application is 
discussed in Chapter 5). The Global Fund’s board authorised the first learning wave of 
National Strategy Applications in 2008 (The Global Fund 2008, no page).  The National 
Strategy Approach was part of the Global Fund’s development of a health systems funding 
platform which was to be “country driven, results-focused and involve relevant 
stakeholders including civil society and the private sector” (The Global Fund 2010L p. 2) 
and align with IHP+ principles.  The Global Fund argued that the benefits of a National 
Strategy Approach included more efficient processes, lower transaction costs for countries 
and better donor harmonisation (The Global Fund 2010L, p. 2).  The rationale rested on the 
Global Fund’s tenet of transactional efficiency. 
The move to a National Strategy Approach solidifies and amplifies the Global Fund’s 
authority at country level in two significant ways:  first it explicitly expands the scope of 
the Global Fund’s disease focused mandate to the other health MDGs for child (MDG 4) 
and maternal (MDG 5) health and beyond to a country’s overall health system.  This 
implies that at country level there is recognition that the Global Fund has a legitimate role 
in the broader health system. Second, the move to a National Strategy Approach also 
increases the purview of CCMs, from developing and overseeing programme-based 
responses to three diseases towards governing national disease strategies and health 
systems.  This implies an expansion of the Global Fund’s authority ‘over’ its initial 
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financing and agenda setting reach. The Global Fund’s country level governance model is 
becoming a locus among government, national and international CSOs and NGOs and 
other donors for a much broader health agenda than was originally intended, an agenda 
that used to be the domain of a Ministry of Health and a Ministry of Finance. 
Malawi’s CCM is an example of the “bifurcation of power described” by Hyden.  Its 
membership is drawn from “a small enclave-like set of actors” including government, the 
NAC, international donors and national and international NGOs and CSOs and an 
international private foundation.  It is also a forum where “CSOs and NGOs…“compete 
against” each other…” (McKinsey and Company 2010, p. 37) within the context of the 
proposals that are developed since these organisations are often sub-recipients and 
implementing partners and therefore have an interest in a proposal’s success and a 
project’s design.  In a review of the first National Strategy Approach ‘learning wave’, 
Malawi was among the countries which identified the process of developing a national 
disease strategy for HIV/AIDS as encouraging more participation from NGOs and CSOs 
over regular Global Fund application processes (McKinsey and Company 2010, p. 37).  
However, increased participation and the more comprehensive mandate under discussion 
were also found to amplify the “tensions in oversight between the CCM and the 
government accountability body [the NAC] for the national strategy particularly related to 
the selection and oversight of Principal Recipients [of which the NAC is one]” (McKinsey 
and Company 2010, p. 27).  In other words, the National Strategy Approach application 
process increased the participation of civil society, albeit an elite selection, and further 
diluted the authority of government and the NAC.  As one UN Executive expressed, 
funding national strategies is helpful because it’s focusing for all partners.  On the other 
hand, it also has the potential to be a monopoly for the Global Fund (UN Executive 2009, 
interview, Geneva).  The process to develop Malawi’s National Strategy Application to the 
 241 
Global Fund is evidence that country level actors including the state accept the authority of 
the Global Fund to expand its scope beyond three diseases and govern the broader health 
agenda; moreover, the authority that the Global Fund exercises not only dilutes neo-
patrimonial forms of local authority and systems of patronage it replaces it with a distinctly 
elite transnational form. The actors in the mediated space for country ownership have a 
much larger policy and service delivery remit than that for three diseases and the potential 
exists for a Global Fund “monopoly” or worse, an exercise of donor coercion over this new 
territorial claim. 
Where recipient countries are concerned, the Global Fund’s expanded reach and growing 
authority relative to the health system overall is troubling, not because the resources and 
programmes are not needed, but because as discussed in Chapter 5 the Global Fund’s 
country level governance suffers from a double deficit in external accountability.  As 
outlined earlier in this chapter, Malawi’s negotiations with the Global Fund to release its 
Rolling Continuation Channel grant disrupted the drug supply chain and caused stock outs.  
But more than that it heightened the CCM’s decision making role with respect to the 
country’s strategy for its Global Fund applications and consequently with respect to the 
Ministry of Health’s policy for the WHO’s 2009 treatment guidelines for HIV/AIDS: 
The HIV Unit in the Ministry of Health has gone to the CCM with a technical 
proposal that included PMTCT (prevention of mother to child HIV transmission) 
based on WHO guidelines to keep mothers on treatment during breast feeding.  It’s 
not clear why the CCM rejected this…It may not be about costs but reluctance to 
introduce an innovative approach. The CCM is not so transparent.  It’s hard to 
know why exactly a technical proposal was rejected (NGO Representative 2010, 
interview, Lilongwe). 
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The lack of perceived transparency of the CCM is compounded by the perception among 
CCM members that the TRP’s decision-making also lacks transparency.   
Our experience of the National Strategy Application for Malawi with the TRP was 
not a positive one…[We are] interested in creating a system where the TRP 
maintains its independence which the Global Fund is adamant about but manages 
to take into account the politics and policy context of the country.  I would be 
particularly interested in greater dialogue and representation.  It seems at the 
moment that when a funding application goes to the TRP a decision is made behind 
closed doors and there is no one there to defend it.  When we got our comments 
back on the National Strategy Application we didn’t agree with them.  So we went 
to appeal.  And the TRP gave the same comments back, so there was no dialogue.  
For us that didn’t seem to be a productive process (International CCM Member 
2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
If the Global Fund does move towards funding national strategies, then it begs the question 
as to who is in charge of health system policy making and policy implementation in a 
mediated space for country ownership.  The Global Fund’s growing authority at country 
level appears in Malawi’s case to coincide with a weakening of government authority over 
the development of public health policy, amplifying the impact of the Global Fund’s 
double deficit in external accountability. 
The Global Fund’s legitimacy derived from its form of institutional innovation has 
contributed to its authority particularly over the course of its rapid organisational 
maturation.  The Global Fund derives its authority in part from its bureaucratic nature, its 
“ability to make impersonal rules” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p.3) underpinned 
primarily by its inclusive governance at global level and its transparency and performance-
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based funding approach. The Global Fund’s inclusion in the Health Eight and its claim to 
global level leadership of health systems strengthening is more than an evolution of its 
initial, disease-focused mandate.  It is an indication that the Global Fund is recognised as a 
legitimate global level authority beyond HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and a 
member of the global health leadership ‘club’.  Nevertheless, for HIV/AIDS endemic and 
aid reliant countries like Malawi the territorial stakes at global level mean little if treatment 
cannot be sustained and scale up continued. 
The Global Fund’s country level governance model is one manifestation of ‘territorial 
organization’ through bureaucratic authority favoured by international institutions (Mason 
2004, p. 2), but one with an elite character.  The CCM’s emphasis on deliberation and 
oversight undermines socially-based patrimonial authority associated with individuals and 
discourages the negative aspects of this less formal form of authority, but at the same time 
replaces it with an elite national and transnational form.  The Global Fund’s adoption of its 
National Strategy Approach is evidence of its authority at country level and signals that the 
Global Fund has significantly expanded its exercise of ‘authority over’ compared with its 
initial financing and agenda setting for three diseases. The practical problem that arises is 
that the CCM then acquires authority traditionally held by government with none of the 
accountabilities expressed through democratic processes.  The Global Fund’s growing 
authority at global and country levels only serves to amplify this troubling double deficit in 
external accountability. 
4. Blurring the Boundaries and Erasing the Lines 
The Global Fund describes itself as “a unique global public/private partnership dedicated 
to attracting and disbursing additional resources to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria. This partnership between governments, civil society, the private 
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sector and affected communities represents a new approach to international health 
financing” (The Global Fund 2010a, ‘About the Global Fund’).  The challenge with the 
Global Fund’s self-described public/private partnership is that is belies the difficulty of 
locating authority outside of the neat boundaries of sovereignty and it obscures the 
dissonance that exists when loci for authority and accountability do not coincide. 
According to van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004, pp. 157-8),  
…the central question is whether the shifts in location of public, semi-public and 
private governance are threatening to make old established systems of 
accountability obsolete. The traditional separation of powers may be less suited to 
organizing accountability for these new forms of network governance. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Global Fund’s authority is conferred a 
‘publicness’.  The legitimating nature (Barker 2000, p. 9) of this ‘publicness’ and the 
liberal values it implies have contributed to the growth in the Global Fund’s authority 
‘over’ particularly with respect to the mediated space for country ownership it has created.  
But as the Global Fund expands its authoritative territorial claims as evidenced at global 
level by its leadership of health systems strengthening and at country level by 
implementing its National Strategy Approach, who ‘gives’ authority and how is less clear.  
Without the boundaries provided by traditional liberal conceptions of state-centred, 
legitimate public authority, the ‘giving’ of authority evokes Stone’s (2008, p. 22) 
description of the global agora “… [which] encompasses a wider array of political 
relationships inspired by liberal democracy through to coercive arrangements of strong 
authoritarianism, as well as to patterns of disorder, randomness, and an absence of rational 
imposition of planning.”  In other words the virtues associated with the Global Fund’s 
legitimating ‘publicness’ not only exacerbates the Global Fund’s double deficit in external 
accountability, but also obscures it.  
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Both Malawi’s failed 2009 National Strategy Application and the stock outs of anti-
retrovirals in 2009 and 2010 suggest that the Global Fund has taken on a “burden of 
responsibility" for which it is not prepared (International CCM Member 2010, interview, 
Lilongwe); however, its exercise of authority ‘over’ serves to displace this burden towards 
countries and to the actors in the mediated space for country ownership in two ways:  first, 
as evident in the case of Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application and the TRP’s 
feedback on its national HIV/AIDS prevention strategy (see Chapter 5), the Global Fund’s 
authority eclipsed that of Malawi’s CCM  despite its evidence-based case. Nevertheless the 
failure to secure funding was the CCM’s and the burden of that failure--the inability to 
continue to scale up treatment—accrues to the ‘national sphere’, those actors in the 
mediated space for country ownership, and those whose lives are affected.  Second, the 
case of the stock outs of anti-retrovirals in 2009 and 2010 demonstrates the failure of a 
number of actors in the mediated space for country ownership who were reluctant to 
challenge the authority of the Global Fund and the Global Fund who did nothing to address 
the impact of its delayed funding.  When systems fail at the country level, country 
ownership resembles “empower[ing] these [endemic] nations to take ownership of their 
[italics mine] HIV/AIDS problem and to work to solve it” (Institute of Medicine 2010 
‘Sharing the Responsibility’), where the problem belongs to the country regardless of 
where the failures might have arisen:  
Obviously we are worried, we are extremely worried.  We are so dependent on the 
support that we get from the Global Fund, to see a situation where that is blocked 
in the face of increasing demand, means that the Malawi government cannot cope. 
They do not have the resources to manage.  So I think the only plea that one can 
make, or the only hope that one can have, is that at least the individuals who are on 
treatment will continue and also the pregnant women continue to get ARVs [anti-
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retrovirals] because that’s one way to tackle the epidemic...the Global Fund is the 
only one that can do it (Health Care Worker 2010, interview, Lilongwe). 
Authority then, as it is exercised by the Global Fund is evidence of “[t]he merging and 
blurring of lines of authority [which] are ultimately likely to blur the distinction between 
public legitimacy and private power” (Slaughter 2004a, p. 169).  Despite its legitimating 
‘publicness’, it is an exercise of authority ‘over’ where the authority ‘given’ and the 
accountability that goes with it remains unclear.  Consequently it displaces the burden of 
responsibility towards the ‘national sphere’ and ultimately to the people whose lives are 
affected by HIV/AIDS at once both exacerbating and obscuring the Global Fund’s 
troubling double deficit in external accountability. 
5. Conclusion 
When global and country level systems fail the people they are intended to serve 
accountability to those whose lives are affected rests close to home. This chapter has made 
a case for the legitimating nature of the ‘publicness’ conferred on the Global Fund’s 
authority and the dissonance this creates between loci for authority and accountability.  It 
tracks the Global Fund’s rapid rise in authority at both global level as evidenced by its 
claim to leadership in health systems strengthening and at country level as evidenced by its 
National Strategy Approach.  These territorial claims, far beyond the Global Fund’s 
original remit as a financing mechanism for three diseases, have gone largely unchallenged 
even though the Global Fund’s double deficit in external accountability makes clear that 
the Global Fund may not be set up for the extent of its burden of responsibility. 
Finally the chapter argues that the legitimating nature of the ‘publicness’ conferred on the 
Global Fund’s authority and its rapid expansion exacerbates and obscures its weak 
authority-external accountability link.  As Malawi’s failed 2009 National Strategy 
 247 
Application and the anti-retroviral stock outs in 2009 and 2010 indicate, although the 
Global Fund has taken on a burden of responsibility far beyond its original remit, when 
global and country level systems fail, this burden is displaced towards the ‘national 
sphere’—those in the mediated space for country ownership and those whose lives are 
affected by HIV/AIDS.  The powerful effects of the Global Fund’s authority ‘over’ means 
that country ownership may be less about the empowerment of agenda setting and citizen 
participation as it is about owning the problem at hand, particularly when failures occur.  
The model that is emerging is one where the Global Fund has increasing authority and 
diminishing external accountability to those whose lives it affects.  The “new global public 
domain” (Ruggie 2004, p. 519) needs an accountability model beyond one that serves 
wealthy and powerful states.   
 …contemporary multilateral institutions…are contingently legitimate…But their 
advocates, and their leaders, should begin to reconstruct their legitimacy on a 21st 
century basis – with more emphasis on democratic principles and less on 
sovereignty. Otherwise, multilateral institutions will be in danger of losing 
legitimacy to a revival of democratic nationalism, or to new forms of transnational 
organization that are designed to bypass sovereignty, and that will be in many ways 
problematic for those of us who believe in the accountability of power-wielders to 
ordinary people (Keohane 2006, p.23). 
Returning to the stock outs of anti-retrovirals that occurred in Malawi in 2009 and 2010, it 
is clear that the system of Global Fund financing and the global and country systems that 
managed the drug supply chain failed; moreover, there was no mechanism, no course of 
action for those affected to hold those responsible to account.  Until a new order emerges 
from Kirton and Cooper’s (2009, p. 309) “Westphalian order of old”, the people affected 
by HIV/AIDS are left vulnerable, “…unhappy and doubtful about how things will 
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continue--that maybe one day the medicine will not be there” (Health Care Worker 2010, 
Interview, Zomba).  To experience, as Rosenau (1995, p. 13) suggests “hope embedded in 
despair”, requires that the Global Fund comes to terms with its burden of responsibility 
and recognises and resolves what is a troubling and obscured dissonance between the loci 
for authority and accountability. 
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Chapter 7 -  Conclusions, the Global Fund’s Agenda for Reform and 
Future Research 
1. Conclusions 
This thesis is an inquiry into change, both organisational and systemic, that arises from the 
creation of the Global Fund.  The puzzle at its centre seeks to understand how the Global 
Fund has so rapidly won legitimate authority at global and country levels even though the 
nature of its innovative design challenges liberal notions of legitimate state authority in the 
international system.  The thesis argues that the Global Fund has become more than a 
financing mechanism to address MDG 6.  It is a new type of international institution which 
at global level has disrupted the traditional multilateral order and is shaping a new order 
that is emerging. At country level, it has created a mediated space for country ownership 
from which a troubling double deficit in external accountability has arisen.  The case of 
Malawi’s failed 2009 National Strategy Application shows that while country ownership 
as it is advocated by the Global Fund may imply Malawi’s ownership of its HIV/AIDS 
agenda, this falls away when global politics and country evidence collide.  The stock outs 
of anti-retrovirals in Malawi in 2009 and 2010 underscore the burden of responsibility that 
accrues to the ‘national sphere’ regardless of where the failures occur, suggesting that the 
Global Fund may not be set up to govern the scope of authority it has claimed.  The nature 
of this authority, its legitimating ‘publicness’, its exercise ‘over’ ultimately by wealthy and 
powerful states and its rapid expansion at global and country levels serves to both 
exacerbate and obscure the Global Fund’s double deficit in external accountability.  The 
Global Fund’s form of institutional innovation and its departure from the well defined 
boundaries of the realist-positivist idea of legitimate authority centred on the nation state 
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signifies that the new order which is emerging comes with a troubling dissonance between 
loci for authority and accountability which has yet to be resolved.  
Two research questions shaped this thesis.  The first asked how the Global Fund has 
changed global health governance and what the implications are for traditional 
multilateralism, particularly its sources of legitimacy, authority and accountability.  
Chapters 2 and 3 set out the analysis and response.  First, in Chapter 2 the thesis argues 
that the Global Fund is a form of institutional innovation within the traditional multilateral 
order.  It lays out “a confluence of events” which served as the crucible from which the 
Global Fund emerged.  These events included a political and discursive case for change 
advocated by wealthy and powerful states and the availability of new sources of funds 
from donor governments and private actors to address HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria. Together with the UN’s desire to embrace private actors and the virtues attributed 
to a neo-liberal ethos, these events informed the Global Fund’s unique design. 
Chapter 2 introduces the aspects of the Global Fund’s design which lend it its 
institutionally innovative character.  These are its inclusive governance model at both 
global and country levels, its transparency and performance-based funding approach and 
the scale of its resource mobilisation and distribution.  The chapter also describes its initial 
vertical disease focus.  Subsequent chapters link the Global Fund’s organisational 
maturation to its departure from this initial, vertical mandate.   They also examine how 
these design features have both legitimised and catalysed the Global Fund’s rapid growth 
in authority which heighten its troubling double deficit in external accountability. 
Chapter 2  argues that the Global Fund’s institutionally innovative design has challenged 
the leadership and division of labour among multilaterals and international health 
institutions including the WHO, UNAIDS, UNDP, the World Bank, Roll Back Malaria and 
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Stop TB and as a consequence the Global Fund has disrupted the traditional multilateral 
order, particularly where health is concerned.  The evidence provided is three fold:  first 
the Global Fund has gained momentum towards becoming a global level policy maker; 
second it has created an ‘unfunded mandate’ for many traditional international health 
institutions at country level; and lastly, the Global Fund has changed the nature of 
competition for donor resources.  Therefore, in investigating how the Global Fund has 
changed traditional multilateralism, the thesis contends that its institutional innovation is 
the foundation for its disruptive effects on the traditional multilateral order where 
international health institutions are concerned and its shaping of the order that is emerging. 
Chapter 3 builds on this global level analysis by arguing that the Global Fund’s design has 
provided new sources of legitimacy which are linked to and therefore have implications for 
its accountability mechanisms.  It asserts that the Global Fund’s legitimacy is not what 
Scharpf (1999, p. 2) defined as ‘input-oriented’ as it may first appear and as the 
legitimating effects of its inclusive governance and transparency practices might suggest, 
but rather it is ‘output-oriented’--strongly focused on donor governments and the necessity 
of ‘proving’ its outcomes and accomplishments.  In other words the Global Fund’s 
legitimacy reinforces its resource mobilisation function.  In addition, because the Global 
Fund’s legitimacy is held in the eyes of donor governments, its accountability model is 
internally oriented.  That is, it forms a hierarchical chain of accountability that ultimately 
accrues to donor governments rather than to those whose lives the Global Fund affects.  
Consequently, the Global Fund is subject to donor influence and in particular influence 
from its largest donor, the United States which has signalled that its interests have 
transitioned from supporting an emergency HIV/AIDS response to an agenda of efficiency, 
effectiveness and country responsibility.  The disparity between country responsibility or 
ownership and country authority is described in Chapter 5 which sets out the Global 
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Fund’s double deficit in external accountability in relation to Malawi’s failed 2009 
National Strategy Application and its associated HIV/AIDS prevention strategy.  It is also 
discussed in Chapter 6 where Malawi’s stock outs of anti-retrovirals in 2009 and 2010 add 
to the evidence that the burden of responsibility when failures occur accrues to the 
‘national sphere’, and is ultimately borne by those who Stiglitz (1998, p. 21) described as 
the “often-excluded.”  
Chapters 2 and 3 respond to the first research question.  They make a case for the Global 
Fund’s design as a form of institutional innovation within the traditional multilateral order, 
one that has had disruptive effects.  They analyse the Global Fund’s new sources of 
legitimacy and make the link to its internally focused accountability model.  Consequently, 
the research and analysis in these chapters provides a basis to evolve the IR literature on 
globalisation, governance and international institutions to consider the nature, significance 
and effects of the Global Fund beyond its characterisation as a financing mechanism for 
three diseases.  It positions the Global Fund as an international institution worthy of the 
attention of IR scholars, one that is shaping the order which is replacing “the Westphalian 
order of old” (Kirton and Cooper 2009, p. 309). 
The second research question for this thesis asked how the Global Fund’s governance has 
affected what is ‘country owned’ with respect to Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response and in 
particular Malawi’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy and what the implications are for 
accountability to those whose lives are affected.  Chapter 4 provides an empirical analysis 
of Malawi’s intractable political, economic and social circumstances including its 
HIV/AIDS epidemic.  It also describes the structure and nature of Malawi’s health system 
and its HIV/AIDS response. It challenges the proposition that a new aid architecture is 
emerging where Malawi’s ownership of its development agenda and funding tied to 
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performance are in evidence.  Rather, it asserts that Malawi’s aid dependence and its 
reliance on and vulnerability to its Global Fund relationship in order to respond to its 
devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic is a lot like the aid architecture--and by implication the 
donor/recipient country relationships--of old.   
Chapter 5 explores ‘country ownership’ in more depth.  It begins by tracing the roots of the 
term ‘country ownership’ as an antidote to the negative connotations of ‘IFI ownership’ 
associated with the legacy of structural adjustment. It argues that in practice, the liberal 
ideals of citizen participation may be naïve particularly where “…elite control of the state 
systems ensures their access to both the dwindling economic opportunities and the 
mechanism for state power…ensuring that economic and political privilege are protected” 
(Poku and Sandkjaer 2007, p. 12).  It outlines how the Global Fund’s CCM model creates 
a mediated space for country ownership where ‘country’ includes elite actors beyond the 
state, both national and international.  Further, it’s not the force of technocratic efforts to 
effect a new ‘country ownership’ aid architecture which shapes this space in Malawi, but 
rather the old-fashioned donor/recipient power asymmetry between the Global Fund’s 
resources, Malawi’s aid reliance and its long term arc of need.  It argues that these 
dynamics layered with the Global Fund’s internal accountability model exacerbate the 
Global Fund’s accountability gap, giving rise to a double deficit in external accountability:  
no mechanism exists to hold the Global Fund created mediated space for country 
ownership nor the Global Fund and its organs to account to Malawians affected by 
HIV/AIDS. 
As the case of Malawi’s failed National Strategy Application and the feedback from the 
TRP on Malawi’s accompanying HIV/AIDS prevention strategy points out, ‘country 
ownership’ may be advocated by the Global Fund, but it fails when global politics and 
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country evidence collide.  At country level, the ‘giving’ of authority by wealthy and 
powerful states to recipient countries over their problems and the ‘giving’ of authority by 
‘national publics’ to the Global Fund over agenda setting creates a dissonance between the 
loci for authority and accountability.  This argument is revisited in Chapter 6 in relation to 
the rapid rise in the Global Fund’s authority and both global and country levels. 
Chapters 4 and 5 offer research and analysis related to the second research question.  They 
offer new insight for scholars and practitioners related to the governance problems that 
arise when the political interests at global level conflict with the agenda set at country level 
in a Global Fund convened mediated space for country ownership.  The research provides 
evidence for challenging the implied and ambiguous use of the term ‘country ownership’ 
to mean the ‘country is in the driver’s seat’ to one where country takes on a broad 
interpretation beyond the state and ownership relates to the problem as much as the agenda 
that shapes the solution.  
This inquiry provides a ‘thick’ description in response to the two research questions that 
shaped it.  Chapter 6 synthesises the arguments for the Global Fund as an agent of change 
at global and country levels.  It examines the nature of the Global Fund’s authority 
including the contrast that exists between its legitimating ‘publicness’ and its more 
coercive exercise ultimately by wealthy and powerful states in a traditional donor/recipient 
relationship.  It links the Global Fund’s organisational maturation and with is rapidly 
growing authority at global level as evidenced by its claim to leadership in health systems 
strengthening.  It links its creation of a mediated space for country ownership with its 
rapidly growing authority at country level as evidenced by its National Strategy Approach.  
It makes the case that the nature of the Global Fund’s authority, its legitimating 
‘publicness’, its exercise of authority ‘over’ by wealthy and powerful states and its rapid 
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expansion at global and country levels serves to exacerbate and obscure its external 
accountability problem.  It concludes by observing that the dissonance between loci of 
authority and accountability remains unresolved. 
2. The Global Fund’s Agenda for Reform 
The Global Fund’s direction is evidence of its strong alignment with the United States’ 
interest in efficiency, effectiveness and country responsibility (see Chapter 2).  At its 23
rd
 
Board Meeting in May 2011, the Global Fund’s board endorsed the proposal from the 
Comprehensive Working Group on Reform which among other items set forth the 
direction for its business model and governance (The Global Fund 2011f, ‘Twenty-Third 
Board Meeting’).  The reforms acknowledge the Global Fund’s authority and influence, 
advocating that it “leverage its role as a predominant financier of essential health products 
to help shape the markets for those products so as to improve price, quality, design and 
sustainable supply, and as a result, health outcomes” (The Global Fund 2011d, p. 14). The 
Global Fund’s market role extends its authority beyond the global and country health 
policy domain as discussed in this thesis and further “blur[s] the distinction between public 
legitimacy and private power” (Slaughter 2004a, p. 169). 
The Global Fund’s reforms to its business model and governance do not recognise or aim 
to address the dissonance between its growing authority and its double deficit in external 
accountability. In fact they work to do the opposite--strengthen the Global Fund’s internal, 
hierarchical accountability oriented towards wealthy and powerful states.  For example, the 
principles which are to guide its business model include focusing on disease impact and 
value for money, adjusting its resource allocation relative to performance and risk of the 
grant, the Principal Recipient and the country, and the size of its overall country 
investment, and lastly measuring its effectiveness with respect to health impact and 
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transaction costs (The Global Fund 2011d, p. 17).  The value for money agenda 
reverberates strongly, with the Global Fund indicating its interest in “moving towards 
payment-for-service” (The Global Fund 2011d, p. 17).  Its governance reforms focus 
exclusively on improving the effectiveness of its board, with the exception of one objective 
which is to “[r]eview role [sic] and oversight of the TRP and Partnership Forum, with a 
focus on aligning the role, processes, and structure of the TRP to the Global Fund’s reform 
agenda and the 2012-16 strategy, and increasing the efficiency and impact of the 
Partnership Forum” (The Global Fund 2011d, p. 17).  In other words, reform of country 
level governance and addressing external accountability is not a concern, but donor 
interests in efficiency, effectiveness and the mantra of value for money are.   
The Global Fund was the international community’s response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
after 20 years of inaction.  From the point of view of its initial mandate as a financing 
mechanism for three diseases it has mobilised and distributed funds of a magnitude that 
has helped countries like Malawi make progress in fighting a devastating epidemic. It has 
however, over its relatively short institutional history, grown its authority and become 
pivotal to a burden of responsibility for which it was never designed.  As this thesis points 
out, when failures occur and lives are affected, there are no external accountability 
mechanisms that hold either the Global Fund created mediated space for country 
ownership to account or the Global Fund and its organs.  The emerging order which is 
replacing the ‘Westphalian order of old’ has so far failed to acknowledge or resolve its 
troubling weak authority-accountability link. 
3. Future Research Suggestions and Caveats 
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As described in Chapter 1, the descriptive, single case study approach adopted for this 
thesis provides several avenues for future research and inquiry, rather than a basis for 
generalised findings.  This future research and inquiry has five distinct facets: 
1. The first is to develop comparative country studies on the Global Fund’s effects on 
the mediated space for country ownership. There are a number of studies which 
compare country level institutional models related to the Global Fund (for example, 
Dickinson, Mundy and Whitelaw Jones 2007; Dickinson and Druce 2010), but they 
largely provide an empirical account of who does what rather than further a 
scholarly analysis of the Global Fund’s governance gap related to authority and 
accountability.  A more traditional comparative country study design could analyse 
‘like’ situations for example among countries in sub-Saharan Africa or ‘unlike’ 
situations, for example assessing the differences between low and middle income 
countries or types of epidemics. 
2. The second relates to the governance of country HIV/AIDS prevention strategies.  
With infections continuing to increase in some countries, limited or constrained 
donor resources and the challenge of the ‘treatment mortgage’ the dissonance 
between ‘country ownership’ of prevention and the loci for accountability and 
authority deserves further exploration.  There is a contribution to be made to better 
understand the political and social aspects of the governance of HIV/AIDS 
prevention strategies, and a necessity to complement analysis that is largely 
situated in a biomedical and health systems implementation domain. 
3. Third there is a more normative exploration on accountability mechanisms that 
address or at least could alleviate the external accountability gap particularly in 
sectors where new institutional models are emerging. For example the area of 
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climate change or rapidly adapting sectors such as mobile telephony where the 
lines of public legitimacy and private power may blur.  This could provide 
instructive positive or problematic examples of innovative accountability 
mechanisms and a basis to evolve the Global Fund’s governance model so that it is 
reflective of the Global Fund’s burden of responsibility. 
4. The fourth concerns the interplay between the Global Fund and its partners beyond 
the Global Fund’s disruptive effects, particularly in relation to UNAIDS deserves 
some attention.  UNAIDS’ 2011-2015 strategy, Getting to Zero (UNAIDS 2010a, 
‘Getting to Zero’) highlights three priorities:  to revolutionise HIV/AIDs 
prevention, to catalyse the next phase of treatment, care and support and to advance 
human rights and gender.  The extent to which the Global Fund is politically and 
practically prepared to share and support these priorities has significant 
implications for UNAIDS.  Research related to the inter-organisational 
requirements and optimal organisational structures to enhance cooperation, small 
‘p’ politics and performance and incentive mechanisms to align global leadership 
on effective strategy and implementation could assist these organisations and their 
boards in improving their effectiveness and efficiency and better serving their 
beneficiaries. 
5. Lastly, where the effects of the double deficit in external accountability are 
concerned, there is opportunity for more local research. This would isolate the 
critical factors that contribute to it, particularly in the mediated space for country 
ownership, the nature and magnitude of its effects and normative strategies to 
resolve it.  
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The ‘thick description’, single case study method adopted for this thesis has its limitations 
(see discussion and rationale in Chapter 1) the main one being that generalisations are not 
possible.  However, the research process uncovered a number of avenues for future 
research, some of which could adopt a more traditional comparative case study method, 
and others which have a normative nature. Both are necessary to better understand the 
Global Fund’s effects as a change agent within the traditional multilateral order and in 
global and country level health governance.  The speed with which the Global Fund has 
both matured and adapted challenges scholars to set a pace of inquiry that has so far lagged 
.
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Endnotes  
1
The Millennium Development Goals were adopted in September 2000 by the 189 member 
states of the United Nations. They set out eight development priorities for donor and 
recipient governments and are a mechanism to focus and measure progress against targets 
for 2015 (UN 2000b, ‘UN Millennium Declaration’). 
2
IPPPH ceased operations in 2004 and the database is not currently publicly available. 
3 
The literature on public goods and global public goods is extensive. For public goods and 
global public goods see:  Sandler (1992). For global public health as a global public good 
see Chen, Evans and Cash (1999), Sandler and Arce M. (2002), and Kaul and Pedro 
Conceiçäo (2006a).  On the provision of global public goods including their private 
provision see Kaul, Conceiçäo, Le Goulven, and Mendoza (2003) and Conceiçäo (2003). 
On the role of international institutions in the provision of global public goods see Zedillo 
and Thiam (2006). 
4 
See Kaldor (2003, pp. 589-90) and Keane (2003, p. 8 and p. 64). 
5 
In other efforts to engage the private sector the UN established the United Nations Office 
for Partnerships in 1998 to serve as “a gateway for collaboration between the private 
sector, foundations, and the United Nations family (United Nations Office for Partnerships 
2011, ‘About Us’)” and in 2000 it launched the Global Compact intended to promote the 
alignment by businesses with the “ten universally accepted principles in the areas of 
human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption” (United Nations Global Compact 
2011, ‘About Us’). 
6 
Of the 48 Global Health Initiatives analysed for this study, 21 of them included the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation among their funders and/or governors. 
7 Analysis by author based on grant portfolio data extracted from the Global Fund’s 
website.   Accessed November 10, 2010. 
8 
Simply, parallel importing refers to the ability to buy drugs at a cheaper price outside a 
country and import them. The literature on parallel imports largely focuses on the political 
economy of trade and the WTO.  See for example Sykes (2002). 
9
 The Global Fund was initially constituted as a private foundation but became an 
international institution in 2004.  This is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
10
 The Transitional Working Group, comprised of representatives of developing countries, 
donor countries, NGOs, the private sector, and the UN system, developed guidelines for 
the Global Fund's operation, including its legal status, management structure, financial 
systems and eligibility criteria (The Global Fund 2010p, ‘Transitional Working Group’).  
11
 The Global Fund concluded a Headquarters Agreement with the Swiss Government in 
2004.  It does not provide the Global Fund treaty making capacity or the capacity to 
espouse international claims. In assessing its options for changing its legal status, the 
Global Fund noted, “According to internal [sic] law, the Global Fund in its present status 
would not qualify for an agreement with the Swiss government, such as that provided to 
the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which did not 
require treaties to initiate their international status. The transformation of the Global Fund 
into an intergovernmental organization would require the conclusion of a multilateral 
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treaty. The conclusion of a headquarter agreement between the future IO and the host State 
is relatively easy in Switzerland” (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria 2003, p. 5). 
12
 The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the International 
Health Regulations (IHR) are examples. See Fidler (2007). For the FCTC see Collin and 
Lee (2009).  For the IHR see Sridhar, Khagram and Pang (2008). 
13
 Artemesin is marketed as Coartem by Novartis.  It is an anti-malarial medication that is 
effective on a type of malaria parasite for which chloronique is no longer effective. 
14
 The Headquarters Agreement with the Swiss Government does not provide the Global 
Fund treaty making capacity or the capacity to espouse international claims.  The 
Headquarters Agreement provides the Global Fund with certain privileges and immunities 
available to international organisations (i.e. certain legal immunities and exemption of its 
assets, income and other property from direct federal, cantonal and communal taxes), 
without entering into a multilateral treaty. 
15
 Analysis by author based on pledge data extracted from the Global Fund’s website.  
Accessed February 17, 2010. 
16
 This is not to say that monitoring and evaluation of vertically-focused disease 
programmes in high need countries with weak infrastructures is in any way straightforward 
or not without significant challenges.  As the Global Fund’s Five-Year Evaluation noted in 
its study of the outcomes of Global Fund investment in 18 countries, “[n]otwithstanding 
these positive developments [important improvements in data availability], the evaluation 
study found significant deficiencies in data availability, quality, and comparability both at 
baseline and over time (Macro International 2009, p.  ES8). 
17
 President Mutharika died suddenly in office in April 2012 and was succeeded by his 
Vice President, Joyce Banda. 
18
 In 2011, subsequent to field research for this thesis, the international community 
expressed concern over President Mutharika’s exercise of authority.  In April 2011, 
Malawi expelled Britain’s High Commissioner after a leaked diplomatic cable in which he 
called the country’s government autocratic.  In July, Britain suspended aid and later the 
same month 18 people were reported killed and 200 arrested in demonstrations against the 
government (The Guardian, July 14 2011 and July 22 2011).   
19
 The Vision 2020 process was undertaken by Malawi’s National Economic Council.  A 
core group comprised of representatives from government, the private sector and academia 
managed the process which was supported by a working group that included 
representatives from chiefs, trade unionists, civil servants, parliamentarians, womens’ 
groups, the police, army and others.  The process included analytical working papers, 
scenario planning and public consultations and conferences (Government of Malawi 
(1997), ‘Malawi Vision 2020 Mission Statement’). 
20
 Malawi devalued the kwacha during this period.  The 1994 exchange rate applied is 
0.224724 and the 2008 exchange rate applied is .00723306. 
21
 This figure is significantly lower that the estimate provided in the Malawi Health SWAp 
Mid-Term Review, which provides a figure of US$20 of funding for the health SWAp in 
2004/05 which includes all sources, public and private (Carlson et al. 2008b, p. 25 and 
p.220). 
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22 
Assumes the population of Malawi is 12.75 million and the rate exchanging the Malawi 
Kwacha to the US$ is 134.74. 
23
 Professor Tony Harries had worked in Malawi for over 20 years when he led the first 
scaled up HIV/AIDS response in Malawi for what was then the HIV Unit at the Ministry 
of Health and Population.  
24
 These projections did not take into account Malawi’s two failed Global Fund grant 
rounds.  As discussed later in this chapter, the first was its 2009 National Strategy 
Application and the second was its Round 10 application, both focused on HIV/AIDS.  In 
addition Malawi faced donor sanctions in 2011. 
25
 Analysis by author based on Global Fund Grant Performance Reports. 
26
 The term “national ownership” is used interchangeably with “country ownership.”  For 
example, the final report of UNAIDS’ Global Task Team on Improving AIDS 
Coordination Among Multilateral Institutions and International Donors (which included 
the Global Fund) notes that national or country ownership refers to “a broad-based 
partnership, encompassing government, civil society (including people living with and 
affected by HIV), the private sector, academic institutions, and others” (UNAIDS 2005a, 
p. 11). The point made in this paragraph is that the specificity of what is meant by national 
(or country) was not evident in the Global Fund’s Framework Document.   
27
 Men having sex with men (MSM) is an epidemiological term which does not reflect how 
men self-identify as either homosexual or bisexual.  
28
 Evidence-based here is used in its epidemiological sense.  It is not intended to signal 
debates on what constitutes evidence and how this shapes and distorts policy development. 
29
 Malawi’s Round 10 application to the Global Fund subsequently proved unsuccessful. 
 
Appendices 
1. Research Plan Excerpt:  Propositions and Rival Propositions 
Connecting Propositions (and Rival Propositions), Data and Information Sources and Literatures 
Proposition Data and Information Literatures (cumulative list) 
Describe how the Global Fund as a form of institutional innovation within traditional multilateralism has 
affected global health governance: 
Unit of Analysis:  Global health governance for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis among the following 
organisations: 
The Global Fund 
WHO 
UNAIDS  
Roll Back Malaria (RBM) 
Stop TB 
While the clarification of 
leadership roles among 
global partners relative to the 
three diseases and health 
systems strengthening may 
have improved, there remain 
gaps at global level where 
‘theory’ and ‘practice’ do not 
align. 
Alternatively, the global 
governance of health is 
supported by clear leadership 
roles among global partners 
in theory and practice. 
 Current by-laws and 
governance 
documentation  
 Key informant interviews 
(targeting people in 
governance, partnership 
and/or programme roles) 
 Multilateralism 
 Global governance (general) 
 Global health governance  
 Public-private partnerships 
The emergence of the Global 
Fund since 2002 has 
contributed to changes in the 
division of labour among 
global partners with some 
exercising more authority 
over and influence in 
particular disease areas and 
others less. 
Alternatively, despite the 
emergence of the Global 
Fund there has been little 
change in the division of 
labour among global 
partners. 
 Mandates, strategic 
evaluations from 2002 to 
2008 
 Policy documents in the 
global public health 
literature (examples – not 
an exhaustive list): 
 World Health 
Organization (1978) 
‘Declaration of Alma 
 World Bank (2003) World 
Development Report 
1993:  Investing in Health 
 Report of the Commission 
on Macroeconomics and 
Health (2001) 
Macroeconomics and 
Health: Investing in 
Health for Economic 
Development 
 McKinsey (2005) Global 
Health Partnerships: 
 Global public health policy 
 Global public goods 
 Health systems strengthening  
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Connecting Propositions (and Rival Propositions), Data and Information Sources and Literatures 
Proposition Data and Information Literatures (cumulative list) 
Assessing Country 
Consequences 
 Report of the International 
Task Force on Global 
Public Goods (2006) 
Meeting Global 
Challenges:  International 
Cooperation in the 
National Interest 
 Etc. 
 Key informant interviews 
The Global Fund in 
particular has influenced the 
public global health policy 
discourse through its strategy 
and funding. 
Alternatively, the Global 
Fund has had little influence 
on the global public health 
policy discourse compared to 
other global partners. 
 Global Fund Board 
decisions and documents 
 Task force and committee 
reports among the 
organisations listed above 
 Global Fund calls for 
proposal and funded 
applications 
 Global public health 
discourse as above 
  
The Global Fund in 
particular has influenced the 
resource mobilisation 
strategies of global partners. 
Alternatively, resource 
mobilisation strategies of 
global partners have changed 
little since 2002. 
 Where available, regular 
and special budgets from 
2002 to 2008 
 Key reports and policy 
documents on global aid 
architecture 
 OECD DAC (2005). The 
Paris Declaration. 
 OECD DAC (2008b). The 
Accra Agenda for Action. 
 Sachs, Jeffrey (2005). 
Investing in Development 
– A Practical Plan to 
Achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals. UN 
Millennium Project 
Report to the UN 
Secretary-General 
 Etc. 
 Key informant interviews 
 Aid architecture (The Global 
rather than country) 
 Global Civil Society 
 Aid architecture 
To describe how the Global Fund’s resources and governance have affected what is ‘country owned’ with 
respect to Malawi’s HIV/AIDS response and in particular Malawi’s HIV/AIDS Prevention Strategy and what 
are the implications for accountability to those whose lives are affected 
Unit of Analysis:  The country level effects of Global Fund resources and governance, particularly agenda 
setting for HIV/AIDS 
Key Informant Interviews: 
Members of the Global Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) 
Decision makers, influencers and those involved in researching, developing, leading or implementing health 
human resource strategies for HIV/AIDS (which also include CCM members): 
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Connecting Propositions (and Rival Propositions), Data and Information Sources and Literatures 
Proposition Data and Information Literatures (cumulative list) 
National AIDS Commission 
MoH, MoF  
Donors that pool funds (e.g. WB, DfID, NORAD, UNFPA, and formerly CIDA) 
Donors that don’t pool funds (e.g. UNDP, USAID, CDC) 
NGOs (e.g. MSF) 
UN organisations – WHO, UNAIDS 
Foundations (e.g. Clinton) 
Aligning and Coordinating 
Donors and Partners: 
The Global Fund’s country 
governance model serves to 
align and coordinate country 
partners’ agenda setting and 
resource mobilisation for the 
HIV/AIDS response 
Alternatively, the Global 
Fund’s country governance 
model fragments alignment 
and coordination among 
country partners involved 
agenda setting and resource 
mobilisation for the 
HIV/AIDS response 
 Global fund proposals and 
reports (Round 1 
HIV/AIDS, Round 5 
HIV/AIDS, Round 5 
Health Systems 
Strengthening) 
 Research reports on the 
Global Fund’s impact on 
Malawi 
 National HIV/AIDS 
Strategy 
 National HIV/AIDS 
Prevention Strategy 
 National HIV/AIDS 
Framework 
 Health SWAp mid-term 
review 
 SWAp donor group needs 
assessment (2007) 
 Etc. 
 Key informant interviews 
 Health policy literature 
(country level) 
Scaling Up the HIV/AIDS 
Response: 
The Global Fund, as the 
largest funder of the 
HIV/AIDS response in 
Malawi, has had the greatest 
influence over agenda setting 
for the HIV/AIDS response 
and Prevention Strategy 
Alternatively, regardless of 
the scale of Global Fund’s 
financial contribution, other 
actors have legitimately led 
agenda setting for the 
HIV/AIDS response and 
Prevention Strategy 
 As above  As above 
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2. Interview Question Example: Geneva-based Interview 
Theme Proposed Questions 
Global 
Partners – 
Current 
Leadership 
1) Among global partners today, how would you describe the Global 
Fund’s leadership role in combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis? 
2) Among global partners today, what is your view of who leads what 
with respect to combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis? 
3) At global level today, can you describe an example where a global 
partner is particularly effective at leading some aspect of combating 
HIV/AIDS, malaria or tuberculosis?    
Global 
Partners – 
Division of 
Labour 
1) Since its creation, how has the Global Fund affected--if at all--the 
division of labour among global partners? 
2) Since its creation, how has the Global Fund affected—if at all--which 
global partners have authority over and influence on global public 
health policy? 
3) Can you describe an example? 
Global Public 
Health Policy 
Discourse 
1) In your opinion, since its creation has the Global Fund influenced the 
global public health policy discourse? 
2) If so, how? 
3) If not, why not? 
Global 
Partners – 
Resource 
Mobilisation 
1) The Global Fund has mobilised significant resources since 2002 for 
MDG 6.  In your view, how has this affected the resource mobilisation 
strategies of other global partners? 
2) What in your view is the relationship—if any—between leadership at 
global level and resource mobilisation at global level? 
Global Fund 
Influence on 
Country Public 
Health Policy 
1) Generally, in your view, how has the Global Fund influenced—if at 
all—country public health policy? 
2) Can you describe an example (Uganda, Tanzania)? 
3) How is the Global Fund’s influence different from or similar to other 
aid providers? 
Global Fund 
Influence on 
Country 
Healthcare 
Professionals 
1) How, in your view, has the Global Fund affected—if at all—country 
policies, strategies or practices related to attracting and retaining 
healthcare professionals in the three disease areas? 
2) Can you describe an example (Uganda, Tanzania)? 
3) How is the Global Fund’s influence in this regard different from or 
similar to other aid providers? 
Additional 
Questions 
1) How does the Global Fund determine, internally and with partners, its 
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Theme Proposed Questions 
priorities for each funding round? 
2) How did Global Fund’s and GAVI’s leadership role in HSS among 
IHP+ partners emerge? 
3) What is the future of ‘innovative financing’ mechanisms?  How do 
they affect the politics of aid? 
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3. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were laid out in the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration (UN 2000b, ‘UN Millennium Declaration’): 
 Goal Targets 
Goal 1 - Eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger 
Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose 
income is less than $1 a day 
Halve between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer 
from hunger 
Goal 2 – Achieve universal 
primary education 
Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will 
be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. 
Goal 3 – Promote gender 
equality and empower women 
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015 
Goal 4 – Reduce child mortality Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five 
mortality rate 
Goal 5 – Improve maternal 
health 
Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality rate 
Goal 6 – Combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other diseases 
Have halted by 2015 and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and 
other major diseases 
Goal 7 – Ensure environmental 
sustainability 
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources 
Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers 
Goal 8 – Develop a Global 
Partnership for Development 
Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory 
trading and financial system (includes a commitment to good 
governance, development and poverty reduction—both nationally and 
internationally) 
Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries (includes 
tariff- and quota-free access for Least Developed Countries’ exports, 
enhanced program of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs) and cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more generous 
official development assistance for countries committed to poverty 
reduction) 
Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and 
small island developing states (through the Program of Action for the 
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and 22
nd
 
General Assembly provisions) 
Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries 
through national and international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long term 
In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement 
strategies for decent and productive work for youth 
In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries 
In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of 
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 Goal Targets 
new technologies, especially information and communications 
technologies 
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4. Comparing the WHO’s Constitution and the Global Fund’s By-laws 
 World Health Organization (WHO) 
- Constitution
30
 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (The 
Global Fund) By-laws
31
 
Instrument and Date Constitution  
Original signed July 1946 
By-laws  
Adopted January 2002 
Organisation type Specialised agency of the United 
Nations 
Non-profit foundation under 
(Switzerland) – Headquarters 
Agreement in 2004 changed status to 
an international organisation 
Membership All states Members of the Board representing 
their constituencies including donor 
and recipient governments and 
international and country level NGOs 
and CSOs 
Governance bodies 1) World Health Assembly (WHA)  
a) Delegates representing 
members (one member = one 
vote) Determines policy  
b) Can establish regional 
organisations  
2) Executive Board 
a) 34 persons designated by 
members  
b) Executes WHA decisions and 
policies  
c) Can establish committees at 
the direction of the WHA  
3) Secretariat  
a) Director-General and 
technical and administrative 
staff  
4) Regional Organisations  
a) Comprised of a regional 
committee (members) and a 
regional office  
b) Formulate regional policy 
1) Global Level Board 
a) Originally 18 voting members 
(7 developing country, 7 
donors, 4 civil society/private 
sector),  
b) 4 non-voting members (1 
NGO-person or community 
living with AIDS, TB or 
malaria, WHO, UNAIDS, 
Trustee) 
2) Evolved to: 
a) 20 voting members = 7 
developing country members, 
8 donors, 5 civil 
society/private sector) 
b) 6 non-voting members = 
WHO, UNAIDS, Trustee, 
Swiss Citizen, Executive 
Director, Partners 
Constituency (Stop TB, Roll 
Back Malaria and UNITAID)  
c) Sets policies and strategies  
2) Secretariat  
a) Manages day to day 
operations  
3) Technical Review Panel  
a) Independent and impartial 
advisors appointed by the 
Board  
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 World Health Organization (WHO) 
- Constitution
30
 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (The 
Global Fund) By-laws
31
 
b) Reviews applications and 
makes recommendations to 
the Board  
c) No specific membership 
defined  
4) Partnership Forum  
a) A periodically (every 24 – 30 
months) convened forum for a 
wide range of stakeholders to 
express their views  
b) No formal governance role 
and no specific membership 
defined 
Other Governance 
Mechanisms 
 1) There are several governance 
mechanisms associated with the 
granting process:  
a) Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms—Country level 
partnerships which develop 
and submit proposals and 
oversee implementation  
b) Local Fund Agents—Country 
level oversight, verification 
and reporting function hired 
by the Global Fund  
c) Principal and Sub-
Recipients—Direct country 
recipient of the Global Fund 
grant responsible for 
implementation or granting to 
sub-recipients  
2) here are two organisational units 
which provide oversight and 
advise the Board of Directors 
directly:  
a) Technical Evaluation 
Reference Group—Provide 
independent advice and 
assessment reporting directly 
to the Board  
b) Office of the Inspector 
General – Independent control 
and risk oversight function 
reporting directly to the Board 
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 World Health Organization (WHO) 
- Constitution
30
 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (The 
Global Fund) By-laws
31
 
Objective / Mandate “…the attainment by all peoples of the 
highest possible level of health.” 
“…attract, manage and disburse 
resources through a new public-private 
foundation that will make a sustainable 
and significant contribution to the 
reduction of infections, illness and 
death, thereby mitigating the impact 
caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria in countries in need, and 
contributing to poverty reduction as 
part of the Millennium Development 
Goals established by the United 
Nations.” 
Scope of Activity Nine principles such as “Health is a 
state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity.”  
22 functions such as “to act as the 
directing and coordinating authority on 
international health work” 
Not defined in by-laws 
Relationship to other 
organisations 
May cooperate with other inter-
governmental organisations and enter 
into formal agreement with 2/3 
approval of the WHA  
May consult and cooperate with non-
governmental international 
organisations 
Not defined in by-laws 
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5. Comparing Resource Mobilisation:  Select Figures from the Global Fund, the 
WHO, UNAIDS and the World Bank’s Multi-Country AIDS Program (2002 
to 2007) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
2002-07 
Global Fund-Pledges Due
32
    3.40   1.51   2.03   2.68  9.62 
Global Fund-
Disbursements
33
 
1.37 
(Round 
1-Apr 
02) 
 
1.72 
1.33 
(Round 
2-Jan 
03and 
Round 
3-Oct 
03) 
2.17 
(Round 
4-Jun 
04) 
1.12 
(Round 
5-Sep 
05) 
.83 
(Round 
6-Nov 
06) 
.61 
(Round 
7-Nov 
07) 
7.82 
WHO Total Budget 
(Regular and Extra 
budgetary funds by 
Biennium) 
2.23
34 
2002-03 
 
2.82
35
 
2004-05 
 
3.67
36
 
2006-07 
8.10 
WHO Expenditure (area of 
work) on HIV/AIDS 
.05
37
 .13
38
 .15
39
 .33 
WHO Expenditure (area of 
work) on Malaria 
.09
40
 .16
41
 .17
42
 .42 
WHO Expenditure (area of 
work) on Tuberculosis 
.08
43
 .15
44
 .18
45
 .41 
UNAIDS Total Unified 
Budget (includes WHO 
contribution) 
.38
46
 .52
47
 .84
48
 1.66 
World Bank Multi-
Country AIDS Program 
Commitments
49
 
.46 .43 Not available  
World Bank Multi-
Country AIDS Program 
Disbursements
50
 
.097 .23 Not available  
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6. Malawi, Rwanda and Kenya:  Comparative Overview of HIV/AIDS 
Prevention Strategies for the 2009 Global Fund National Strategy 
Applications 
Malawi 
Source:  National AIDS Commission (2009) National HIV Prevention Strategy 2009-2013 
Outcome of 2009 NSA Failed 
HIV/AIDS Prevalence (overall 
population) 
12% 
Type of Epidemic Discordant couples=88% of new infections 
Mother to child=10% of new infections 
Other=2% of new infections (e.g. blood transfusion) 
HIV/AIDS 
Prevention 
Strategy 
Human 
Rights 
Approach 
Cross cutting  
“Promote legal and human rights issues that reduce HIV risk and 
vulnerability (p. 37)” 
Special 
Populations 
(Primary 
Focus) 
Sex workers – 71%  prevalence 
Men having sex with men – 21% prevalence - limited data 
Prisoners – no data 
Men having 
sex with men 
(MSM) 
Illegal in Malawi 
Approach 
“Data from a study which used a snowball sampling method 
identified 200 MSM in urban centres of Malawi, and this group had 
an HIV prevalence of 21%. This is particularly important because 
high-risk unprotected sexual contact between MSM was prevalent in 
the group. Many of these men have female sexual partners, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of HIV transmission to their female 
partners. Effort has to be made to reach out to MSM and their female 
sexual partners with appropriate prevention interventions” (p. 16). 
“Develop tailored interventions for populations who are vulnerable to 
HIV infection because of their behaviours or environments (sex 
workers, MSM, prisoners, etc.)” (p. 34). 
Rwanda 
Source:  Government of Rwanda, Rwanda National Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDS 2009-2012 
Outcome of 2009 NSA Successful 
US$213 mm 
HIV/AIDS Prevalence (overall 
population) 
3% 
Type of Epidemic Discordant couples=85% of new infections 
MSM = 15% of new infections (limited data) 
HIV/AIDS 
Prevention 
Strategy 
Human 
Rights 
Approach 
… Particular attention needs to be given to the training of health care 
providers to ensure that people who belong to marginalized groups 
receive adequate care, regardless of the prejudices service providers 
may have towards them. Policy analysis and advocacy activities will 
also be conducted where necessary. Underpinning all of these 
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strategies is a commitment to ensuring greater participation of 
members of these groups in assessing their needs, designing 
programs, and advocating for necessary changes in the environment” 
(p. 45). 
Special 
Populations 
(Primary 
Focus)  
Sex workers – no data on prevalence for any vulnerable population 
Prisoners 
Refugees 
Truck Drivers 
Men having 
sex with men 
(MSM) 
Legal in Rwanda 
Approach 
“As of yet, Rwandan HIV policy has not addressed HIV prevention 
among MSM, due largely to a lack of data and due to denial about 
the existence of sex between men. Homosexuality is not illegal in 
Rwanda, but is strictly against societal norms, with a strong cultural 
resistance regarding its existence” (p.30). 
“Addressing sex between men in general, and within prisons, is a 
new area of work. Operational research will be carried out, and an 
emphasis will be placed on ensuring MSM are active in the design 
and implementation of these programs, to ensure that they are carried 
out in the most appropriate way” (p.58). 
Kenya 
Source:  Government of Kenya, Kenya National Strategic Plan 2009/10 -2012/13:  Delivering on Universal 
Access to Services 
Outcome of 2009 NSA Failed 
HIV/AIDS Prevalence (overall 
population) 
7.1% 
Type of Epidemic Discordant couples=44%of new infections 
Men and women engaging in casual sex=20% of new infections 
MSM and prison populations=15% of new infections 
Injecting drug users (IDUs)=3.8% of new infections 
Health facility related infections=2.5% of new infections 
HIV/AIDS 
Prevention 
Strategy 
Human 
Rights 
Approach 
“A series of difficult legal issues arise from attempts to programme 
more directly for the MARPs [most-at-risk populations] (sex 
workers, IDUs, MSM), and to take these programmes to scale. Sex 
work, homosexuality and drug use are all illegal in Kenya. 
Programmes have been working with all these groups for many 
years, but under constraints. There is a need to come up with policies 
that will facilitate scaling up access to services by the different 
groups clustered under the term MARPs” (p. 9). 
Special 
Populations 
(Primary 
Focus)  
Sex workers – no data on prevalence for any vulnerable population 
Prisoners 
Men having sex with men 
Injecting drug users 
Men having 
sex with men 
(MSM) 
Illegal in Kenya 
Approach 
“It is difficult to target services effectively when so little is known 
about MARPs [most-at-risk populations]” (p. 6). 
“Cutting across all of the four strategies will be a central focus on 
MARPs and vulnerable groups in order to directly address existing 
epidemiological evidence and the sources of new HIV infections” (p. 
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Interviews 
None of those interviewed agreed to have quotes attributed personally or directly. 
Name and Title Organisation 
Dr. Rifat Atun 
Director, Strategy, Performance and Evaluation 
The Global Fund 
Anurita Bains 
Senior Advisor in the Office of the Executive Director  
The Global Fund 
Lily Banda 
Acting Team Leader 
USAID Health Office, Malawi 
Dr. Sabine Beckmann 
Senior Programme Advisor 
HIV/AIDS Group 
UNDP 
Marielle Bemelmans 
Head of Mission 
MSF Brussels, Malawi 
Dr. Christoph Benn 
Director for Partnerships, Communications and Resource, 
Mobilization 
The Global Fund 
Dr. Léopold Blanc 
Coordinator, Tuberculosis Strategy and Health Systems 
Stop TB 
Patrick Brenny 
UNAIDS Country Coordinator 
UNAIDS, Malawi 
Craig Burgess 
Senior Programme Officer, Health Systems Strengthening,  
GAVI Alliance 
Dr. Andrew Cassels,  
Director of Strategy, Office of the Director General 
WHO 
Dr. Adrienne Chan 
Medical Advisor 
Dignitas International, Malawi 
Steven Chizimbi 
Local Fund Agent for the Global Fund 
Malawi 
Paul DeLay 
Deputy Executive Director 
UNAIDS 
Helen Frary 
Chief of Board and UN Relations 
UNAIDS 
Dr. William S. Gunn 
Head of Emergency Relief (Retired) 
WHO 
Sara Hersey 
Epidemiologist 
Center for Disease Control, Malawi 
Florence Kayambo 
Head of Policy Support and Development 
National AIDS Commission, Malawi 
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Name and Title Organisation 
Dr. Peter Kazembe  
Executive Director 
Baylor College of Medicine, Children’s 
Foundation, Malawi 
Peter Killick 
Aid Liaison Consultant 
Malawi-Canada Support Unit, CIDA 
Dr. Dieter Koecher 
Director 
GTZ, Malawi 
Dr. Jason Lane 
Team Leader, Human Development 
DfID, Malawi 
Dr. Selina Lo 
Medical Coordinator  
Access to Essential Medicines 
Médicins sans Frontières (MSF) 
Dr. David Luke 
Senior Advisor and Coordinator, Trade and Human 
Development Unit 
UNDP 
Patrick Makondesa 
National Project Coordinator, HIV Prevention and 
Economic Empowerment Project 
ILO, Malawi 
Jacques Martin 
Deputy Head, UN Development Division (Retired) 
SIDA and former Global Fund Board Member 
Brian Mtonya 
Senior Private Sector Development Specialist 
(Author of a study on the System Wide Effects of the 
Global Fund in Malawi) 
World Bank, Malawi 
Takondwa Mwase 
Country Lead 
Abt Associates, Malawi 
Madolo Nyambose 
Assistant Director, Data and Aid Management Division  
Ministry of Finance, Malawi 
Mit Philips 
Author of ‘No Time to Quit’ 
MSF, Brussels 
Carole Presern, Acting Managing Director, External 
Relations 
GAVI Alliance 
Dr. Esther Ratsma 
Medical Programs Coordinator 
Dignitas International 
Dr. Eric Schouten 
Technical Assistant for Co-ordination of HIV and AIDS 
Programmes 
Department of HIV and AIDS 
Ministry of Health, Malawi 
Dr. Luis Andres de Francisco Serpa 
Team Coordinator and Special Advisor Strategy 
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child 
Health, WHO 
Dr. Mary Shawa 
Principal Secretary for Nutrition and HIV/AIDS 
Office of the President and Cabinet, Malawi 
Kisimbi Thomas 
Director 
Clinton Foundation, Malawi 
Dr. Boi Betty Udom,  
Partnership Facilitator and 
Roll Back Malaria 
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Name and Title Organisation 
Dr. James Banda  
Senior Advisor 
Vincent and Constance 
Social Workers 
Baylor Pediatric AIDS Clinic, Lilongwe, 
Malawi 
Dr. Tom Warne 
Medical Officer Care and Treatment Advisor 
Center for Disease Control, Malawi 
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